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Training and Education on Small Arms



Civil Society Action on SALW Control

module CSA 05B02



# Civil Society Action on SALW Control

written by William Godnick (International Alert) and the TRESA team TRESA modules are produced by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) under a special grant from the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung/ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).





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## List of Icons for TRESA modules

The following icons will be used in the text. These are intended as pointers for actions the trainer or trainee should take while using the text.



#### **Activity**

Indicates some sort of group activity, exercise, discussion, division into separate smaller groups, etc.



#### Case study

Two types of case studies are indicated here:

- Case studies which are required (later text refers to the case, and therefore the case study must be used). These are indicated by an "R".
- MAR

Case studies that are optional (trainers can use a similar case study they might be more familiar with, as the same lessons are drawn).



#### **Essential point**

Main points that the trainees *must* remember from the training.



#### Formal quote

Written or pictographic material that is a quote from some other source (e.g.: UN declaration, national law) and cannot be changed or modified.



#### **Outside reference**

An arrow pointing to some outside source, for example, another module.



#### Tag

This indicates an element of the module that the trainer must be careful to modify to fit the audience.



- L: Linguistic usage. Where the text uses a particular expression that might not translate well from one language to another.
- C: Cultural usage. Where the text uses examples from one culture that might be misunderstood in another.
  - S: Social usage. Where a text is aimed at a particular audience (example, parliament members) and must be modified to fit another audience (example, military people).



### Take a break

Breathe some fresh air, relax, have a cup of coffee, ...



#### Technical device

Trainer must ensure the availability of some technical device: a computer with presentation software, an OHP, a film projector, puppets, ...



#### Tool

A film, a form or questionnaire, theatrical performance, etc., that accompany the module but are not part of it. Most are downloadable from www.tresa-online.org



#### Trainer preparation required

The trainer must make some special preparation (prepare notes or labels, assemble material, collate material for distribution).

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## Civil Society Action on SALW Control

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Annex XI: Two step-by-step-guides for writing a funding proposal.

Bibliography

## **Trainee Preface**

This module is intended to serve as a guideline for members of civil society and civil society organizations (CSOs) that want to become involved in small arms and light weapons (SALW) control.

The objective of this training module is:

- To acquire an understanding of the role CSOs can play in a weapons collection and destruction program (WCDP).
- To acquire an understanding of the different means and topics of events CSOs can undertake to accompany a WCDPs.
- To help equip you or your organization to initiate and carry out civil society action in support of WCDPs in your society.

During the course of this module you will find references to case studies on different methods of weapons collection and destruction programs (WCDP) that accompany this module, e.g. "Goods for Guns in El Salvador", 45-75. This indicates that we believe that reading lines 45 to 75 in the "Goods for Guns in El Salvador" case study will help you understand the topic you are being taught at that point. This "lining-system" prevents you from having to read the whole case study in order to find the relevant topic, e.g. incentives.

Details on a number of other crucial issues, such as identifying SALW, the UN Programme of Action and other regional agreements, and dealing with donors, are dealt with in the following TRESA modules: SALW Basics-Recognizing SALW and Ammunition (SB-R05); Recognizing SALW and Ammunition (RSA05); Global and Regional Agreements on SALW Control (GRA05). At the appropriate points in this module you will be directed to these modules for your information or further training. Please make use of the space provided within this module to record additional information or notes from the training, as well as your ideas and answers to specific exercises and discussion questions. As we hope to make this and all other TRESA modules more targeted, relevant and useful to your area of work, we welcome any feedback and comments you might have. Please feel free to contact us at www.tresa-online.org.



Please also note that all module abbreviations deliberately state only the first three letters (e.g. SB-D), as well the year in which the module was written (05), but not whether it is the A (trainer), or B (Trainee) version, or e.g. 01 (is the first version of this module, 02 the second, etc.). This is to emphasize that all our modules are works in progress, and will be regularly updated and modified (01, 02, 03, 04, etc). We therefore welcome any feedback or comments you might have.

We wish you the best of luck in using this manual.

## Acknowledgements

We would like to thank International Alert and especially William Godnick for his extensive contribution and input in developing this training module.

We would further like to thank International Alert, Oxfam, and Saferworld for giving us permission to use parts of the "Action Against Small Arms. A Resource and Training Handbook" in this module.

In addition, we would very much like to thank Zoe Dugal (AFD UNDP, Sierra Leone), Amaparo Mantilla de Ardila (Fundación Gamma Idear, Colombia) and Micha Hollestelle (Pax Christi Netherlands) for reading the module and providing us with valuable and extensive comments and feedback.

Further, we would like to thank Friederike Foltz, Jonas Horner, Elvan Isikozlu, Sayuri Matsuno and Sylvia Wanjau for their valuable input and comments in finalizing this training module.

We would also like to thank Rosula Blanc for her creative design and illustration of the TRESA mascot, the Anteater.

Last, but not least, we would also like to thank EU ASAC, UNDP AFD Sierra Leone, CIVIL (Macedonia), FOSDA, CAMP, SASA-Net (Sri Lanka), SEESAC, Craig M. Bennett, Wolf Christian Paes, Chor Sokunthea and Tim Page for their kind permission to use their material and/or photos for this module.



## Meet the Anteater, the TRESA mascot.

Much of the transfer of SALW occurs through what has been called the "ant trade": the small-scale, cross-border smuggling and person to person transfer of SALW. Since the Anteater only has an appetite for ants, it's no surprise to see it as the TRESA mascot.

The Anteater will appear throughout this module to highlight important facts and help draw your attention to some interesting points.

## Glossary

**Civil Society** Collectivity of civilian and social organizations or institutions

which form the basis of a functioning society.

Community groups An association of people with common rights, privileges and/

or interests.

**DFAE** Arms and Explosives Control Division of the Rio Civil Police,

Brazil.

Empirical evidence Evidence based on observed phenomena.

Gender-inclusive

analysis

An assessment of gender roles, representation and

participation in a particular project or program.

**Halo effect** A situation where the known benefits of a successful program

make associated programs desirable as well.

**Incentives** Something that is provided to motivate people into action. In

weapons collection programs, incentives are often cash or inkind contributions (e.g. tools, motorbikes, and cattle) that

serve to induce people to hand in their weapons.

**Internal Security** Security within the borders of a nation.

**National Defense** Issues that pertain to the safety and security of a country

from external threats.

**NGO** Non-governmental Organization. A voluntary organization that

is non-profit oriented and independent from the government

and government institutions.

**ONUSUL** UN Observer Mission in El Salvador.

Process evaluation Evaluation that takes place during a project/ program and

provides feedback to be incorporated into the project.

**Results evaluation** An evaluation that takes place after the conclusion of a project

or program.

**Small arms and light** Weapons that can be carried and are used by one person.

weapons (SALW)

**SEESAC** South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small

Arms and Light Weapons.

## Civil Society Action on SALW Control

SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats. A standard

business tool used to analyze a business environment and help make decisions about future plans for a business. This

can be used to plan SALW programs as well.

**UN PoA** The UN Programme of Action calling for international and

national action to control SALW.

**WCDP** Weapons collection and destruction program.

## Section 1

# Groundwork for organizing civil society actions

## Objectives and Goals of Section 1:

- To show *where* and *why* civil society organizations can contribute to SALW control measures.
- To show *how* civil society can apply its unique characteristic of community ownership to weapons collection and destruction programs (WCDPs).
- To introduce issues relevant to civil society participation in WCDPs.

## 1. Introduction


The presence of small arms and light weapons (SALW) threatens the lives and livelihood of individuals as they go about their daily activities. The problem of the proliferation, availability and use of SALW is therefore not only a political issue, but also a civil one, as it threatens the security and well-being of people in addition to the state.

Thus, individuals and collectives, which form a part of civil society, are uniquely positioned to become an effective part of SALW collection and destruction programs. In particular, civil society organizations can exert a special influence over SALW control activities, as they often have the trust of the community and are seen to be more impartial and/or neutral. Therefore, CSOs are able to undertake work even on sensitive issues, such as WCDPs.

The content of this module relies heavily on lessons learned – both positive and negative – from the past experiences of others. We therefore provide a number of case studies (see Annexes I-IV), along with instructions on how to use them in order to demonstrate the types of roles civil society may play in SALW collection and destruction. These include:

- Goods for Guns/El Salvador (Annex I)
- Tools for Arms/Mozambique (Annex II)
- Viva Rio/Brazil (Annex III)
- Weapons for Development/Cambodia (Annex IV)

2



Section 1

## 2. Why collect and destroy SALW?

In order find answers to the question "why collect and destroy SALW?" we have to first look at what small arms are and why they are a risk.

## 2.1 What are SALW?

Despite their widespread use, there is no universal definition of SALW (see also TRESA Module SALW Basics-SALW Definitons (SB-D05). For the purposes of this module, we recommend defining SALW as:

All lethal conventional munitions (arms and ammunition) that can be carried, maintained and used by an individual or a small group of individuals, or transported by a small vehicle or pack animal, and that do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability.



#### Box—SALW definitions

In most SALW control related documents and publications, SALW are divided into three categories:



- **Small arms** are those arms designed for personal use. They can be maintained, carried and used by one person.
- **Light weapons** are weapons that can be maintained, used and carried by small groups (2-3 persons), or transported by small vehicles or pack animals.
- And related material, such as ammunition and explosives form an integral part of small arms and light weapons, since weapons can be rendered useless without appropriate ammunition.

## 2.2 Why are SALW a risk?

SALW enter a community when there is a certain demand for these weapons. There are many reasons why a civilian might feel s/he needs a gun. These reasons however very much depend on the context of the country/region.

## Exercise 1:

Divide up into groups of women and men, and/or adults and youth, depending on the mixture of the trainee group. Now write down on a big sheet of paper how you perceive the problem of SALW – for example, what it entails, why you think people possess small arms in your country/region and what they use them for, its impact, the challenges involved in solving the problem, etc. Compare your results with the rest of the group and discuss.




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## **SALW** represent both direct and indirect risks to civilian populations. *Direct risks* include:

- Greater likelihood of an escalation of inter-personal, political, economic, or ethnic conflicts and disputes.
- Deaths and injuries as a consequence of acts of armed violence or incidents, accidents or suicides.
- High probability of accidental wounding of bystanders by those handling or using firearms.
- Accidental wounding of children playing with SALW or ammunition.
- Psychological consequences, such as trauma.
- Etc.





#### Indirect risks include:

- Social, political and economic instability and tension due to the presence of small arms.
- Decrease in the rule of law, as justice systems are unable to cope with and prevent the increase in gun violence and demand for small arms.
- Economic strain as disposable income is directed to the purchase of arms and ammunition.
- Inability to carry out development projects because of insecurity and continued disruptions caused by people carrying and probably misusing firearms.
- Greater personal insecurity (real or perceived) as small arms become prevalent. This situation will in turn lead to a perceived need for small arms as people believe that they need the capacity to defend themselves.

# Exercise 2: Drawing all the above points together, discuss the following questions:




- What are some of the reasons for wanting to collect weapons in your community? (If your community does not have an SALW problem, give general reasons why you think that weapons collection would be useful in your community).
- Would you destroy them? Why?

#### Answers:

| ALISWOIS.                                       |
|---|
| Reasons for wanting to collect weapons include: |
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| Reasons for destruction include:                |
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Note: the main reason for weapons collection is almost always to improve security.



Remember: the sheer number of SALW is not a sufficient indicator of whether a WCDP is needed, as a high number of SALW does not necessarily indicate whether they are used or misused. Examples of this phenomenon include Switzerland and Yemen, where a high number of weapons are owned by the population, while at the same time, armed violence and criminal rates remain low.



## 2.3 SALW collection and destruction


In the wider definition of security, which includes human security<sup>2</sup>, collecting and destroying or storing SALW are only two elements of controlling SALW and rendering them less harmful. Voluntary WCDPs offer the opportunity to improve the security of a region, while at the same time boosting the confidence of those participating in the program. Therefore WCDPs are an important tool in conflict prevention and have been applied successfully in many post-conflict situations. In combination with amnesties, they have been successful in reducing gun violence.

SALW collection and destruction efforts often take place either immediately or some time after a peace agreement or the end of armed hostilities and conflict. They may also be carried out in societies 'at peace', where there are large numbers of SALW leftover from a conflict, and/or high levels of armed violence related to crime or social instability. In some cases these efforts may have been spurred on by an incident, such as a disastrous accident. Sometimes governments decide to destroy surplus weapons to avoid 'leakage' of weapons out of the security services or because the costs of storing them is too high, or to correct the unwanted results of loose SALW legislation.

Both SALW collection and destruction may at times be isolated, stand-alone activities. It is, however, desirable that they are coordinated with other initiatives that seek to reduce the proliferation and/or misuse of weapons and to improve the security situation (including human security). That is why it is important not only to understand the environmental and societal contexts surrounding SALW collection and destruction, but also the policy context, specifically other measures in place to reduce the spread of weapons and their negative consequences.

SALW collection and destruction can be an integrated part of a package of measures, some or all of which are implemented together, such as:

- Demobilizing ex-combatants and reintegrating them into productive social life within a peace process.
- Passage of stricter weapons legislation (e.g. who can possess, carry and use a weapon).
- Weapons registration and licensing.
- A confidence-building measure between the government, security sector, civil society and other actors by encouraging cooperation among all groups on a certain topic (e.g. weapons collection).
- Establishment of weapons-free zones.



- Public awareness campaigns on the dangers of SALW ownership and the responsibilities of owners to prevent them from being stolen or misused.
- A policy of search and seizure.
- Overall reduction of the demand for SALW.
- A peace agreement.
- Fighting of crime.
- Poverty reduction.
- Security Sector Reform.
- Etc.

A mixture of these different measures, together with SALW collection and destruction is often the best recipe for removing SALW permanently from a community or society, as these measures not only aim at removing and destroying SALW, but also at reducing the factors that lead to SALW ownership and misuse in the first place. Other measures related to security and development are also often implemented in conjunction with SALW collection and destruction.

#### Case studies:

- Annex I: "Goods for Guns", 150.
- Annex IV: "Weapons for Development", 10-13 and 90-110.
- Annex III: "Viva Rio", 30-50 and 110-190.


#### Ouestions for case studies:

Identify the various other activities taking place within these case studies.

## **Exercise 3: Discussion**

- 1. Are there other measures in place in your society designed to control SALW?
- 2. What are they?
- 3. Do you consider any of these to be compatible with SALW collection and destruction?
- 4. If not, what other measures come to your mind?





#### 2.3.1 SALW Collection

There are two types of collection programs: voluntary and coercive.

#### Voluntary SALW collection programs:

- Can be defined as an activity where responsible government, civil society and/ or international organizations motivate individuals or groups to voluntarily surrender legal and/or illegal weapons.
- Encourage individuals or groups of people to participate, sometimes based on incentives that may include amnesty, anonymity, or some material benefit in cash, in-kind, or development incentives.
- Can destory weapons collected on site or store them for later destruction. Depending on the country context, they can, at times, also be stored for further redistribution based on a new legal framework including a licensing process. This is the case now in Sierra Leone, for example, where the government is drafting a law that will encompass a licensing procedure. Some of the weapons that the UNDP "Arms for Development" Project collected will therefore be given back to owners who have acquired a license.
- Weapons can also be stored for further use by the security forces.

## Box—Example of voluntary SALW collection programs:

Door-to-Door collection (e.g. in Bosnia-Herzegovina)

Soldiers went from door-to-door asking people to voluntarily turn in illegal weapons left over from the Bosnian War.

■ Weapons/Arms for Development (e.g. in Cambodia, Sierra Leone)

Weapons were handed in in exchange for wells, duck ponds, schools, etc.

■ Tools for Arms (e.g. in Mozambique)


Weapons, rounds of ammunition and explosives were submitted in exchange for bicycles, sewing machines, food commodities, zinc roofing sheets, construction materials and a wide range of tools.

■ Goods for Guns (e.g. in El Salvador, Colombia)

Civilians were encouraged to surrender their weapons in exchange for vouchers for supermarkets, shoe stores and pharmacies. The value of the vouchers depended on the model, condition and number of weapons turned in.

**Note:** while voluntary weapons collection programs often take place in post-conflict contexts, they are also organised in non-conflict situations where high levels of SALW availability and/or armed violence exist.





#### Command-oriented and coercive SALW collection programs:

- Are often implemented at the end of an armed conflict as part of a ceasefire or peace agreement. The former combatants of one or all armed groups involved in the conflict may be required to surrender their weapons for collection, safe storage and/or destruction, often as part of the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration process (DD&R process).
- Also, security forces may carry out raids and operations to confiscate weapons owned without a license, or in the pursuit of criminal groups.

There is less opportunity for civil society participation in coerced activities because of the associated security-related concerns.

A combination of voluntary and coerced WCDP is also possible. For example, there could be a coerced WCDP for ex-combatants parallel to a voluntary one for civil society. Another option is to start with a voluntary WCDP, which after a certain period of time turns into a coerced program in order to seize weapons from individuals who are unwilling to hand in their weapons voluntarily.

## Case study—Karamoja, Uganda<sup>3</sup>

In the Karamoja district of northeastern Uganda, the presence of small arms has exacerbated inter- ethnic conflict between various nomadic groups in the district. Living semi nomadic, the Karamojong are dependent on cattle for their primary source of income. While weapons were always relevant for the protection of the cattle and small-scale cattle raiding, the possession of modern SALW has increased the incidence of cattle raiding, and the killing of herders and villagers has contributed to growing insecurity and poverty in the region. After a particularly intense period of conflict and raiding during the 1990s and early 2000s, the Government of Uganda established a disarmament programme to disarm the Karamojong warriors and protect civilians from growing insecurity and violence. This programme was undertaken in two phases: the first phase was a voluntary weapons collection program that ran for one month beginning in December 2001. Individual incentives such as iron sheets, ox-ploughs and farming tools were offered for the voluntary surrender of a weapon. It is estimated that about a quarter of illicit small arms in the region were successfully collected through the programme and several promising results were visible: the number of Karamojong warriors openly carrying a gun had decreased, as well as the incidence of cattle raiding. The second phase of this programme began in February 2002 immediately following the first and was a forced program implemented by the UPDF (Ugandan Army). This phase only lasted one month, as the Government of Uganda had to withdraw the UPDF to contain rebel uprisings in the north. This premature withdrawal, however, led to the immediate increase of cattle raiding by those Karamojong groups that had not yet disarmed and to the rearmament of groups that had already been disarmed. The tentative success of the first phase of the programme was therefore undermined and unsustainable.

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### Exercise 4: Pro- and Con- collection arguments

Split into groups of 4-5 people. The trainer will provide you with the following cards containing arguments for and against voluntary weapons collection. Discuss and prepare counter-arguments to the statements on your cards. Each group will then be asked to present their arguments followed by a general discussion.



### 2.3.2 Defining SALW destruction

Weapons collected in SALW collection programs are ideally either immediately destroyed on site, or either stored for use by the security forces or for destruction at a later stage. The methods of destruction vary and include burning, cutting, shredding, and crushing by a vehicle. The methods used will very much depend on the local context, cost and safety. In Cambodia, for example, weapons collected were burnt in public "Flames of Peace" ceremonies, as the burning signifies to Cambodians the passing into a new life, and in this case into a more peaceful life without weapons. Reasons for why the destruction of collected weapons is preferable to their storage, for instance, will be discussed in more depth during the course of this module.

Remember: though the destruction itself should always be done by experts, it is important that the destruction process is conducted in a transparent manner, and made known to the public to avoid suspiscion that weapons collected are being re-used rather than destroyed. This transparency also helps build confidence between the population and the security forces.




# 3. What is civil society?

# 3.1 Civil Society—a definition

Though there are many distinct definitions, the simplest way to see civil society – and how we use the term in this module – is as a "third sector", which is distinct from state authorities and related institutions. Therefore, civil society refers essentially to the so-called "intermediary institutions" such as professional associations, NGOs, religious groups, labor unions, citizen advocacy organizations, that give voice to various sectors of society and enrich public participation in democracies.<sup>4</sup>

According to the Centre for Civil Society (London School of Economics), civil society can be defined as:

"...the arena of non-governmental, non-profit, uncoerced, organized, collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil society is often populated by international, national and local organizations."<sup>5</sup>



The term 'civil society organization' (CSO) is often used synonymously with the term 'non-governmental organization' (NGO) or 'community-based organization' (CBOs). However, this is incorrect, as the latter two organizations only make up *a part* of civil society. They are, just like any other group mentioned below, one of the target groups of this module.

Examples of civil society organizations include:


- Registered charities or non-profit groups,
- Non-governmental organizations,
- Community groups,
- Women's organizations,
- Faith-based organizations,
- Professional associations,
- Trade unions,
- Self-help groups,
- Social movements,
- Business associations,
- Coalitions and advocacy groups,
- Schools, universities,
- And many others.


# 3.2 Points of entry for civil society

Any action you are planning to undertake should ideally be **in cooperation with your local government** and **not in opposition** to them. You have rights as well as obligations, and should therefore make aware of these rights in a non-violent way. By cooperating with your local government you can influence their policies and have a positive impact on their actions. In turn, these actions can have a positive impact on your whole community.

Working together towards a common goal is more beneficial to all players involved!

However, if you feel you cannot cooperate with your local government, make sure that you do not oppose them. There is always a chance that they may change their minds and support you later!





Civil society organizations can play an important role in weapons collection and destruction processes, as they can mediate between the national government and the local population.



### Civil society can involve itself in WCDPs in some of the following ways:

- Awareness raising of collection and destruction programs.
- Proliferating (word) information on details of such programs, including benefits, incentives, penalties and amnesty.
- Fundraising.
- Legal aid.
- Assessment of needs (Needs Assessment) for optimal success of WCDP.
- Manning/attending collection points (civil society generally enjoys a trusting relationship with communities).
- Program evaluation.
- WCDPs must be considered and embarked upon only within the framework of co-operation with the national government, civil authorities, legislators, the security sector, and very often in cooperation with other civil society organizations (CSOs).


Civil society organizations usually take an interest in participating to one degree or another, in an SALW collection and destruction effort based on motivations including:

- The perceived need to do something about the problems of SALW in their community or society.
- The opportunity to collaborate, either through invitation by another institution, or the offer of resources.
- To provide services that are within their mandate and related to the implementation of the SALW collection and destruction process.

There are benefits and risks involved in becoming engaged in the control of weapons. Each organization has to balance for itself the risks and benefits of its participation. These benefits and risks may include:

### **Benefits**

- Laying the groundwork for future collaboration in larger coalitions.
- Benefiting from experiences that can be gained in larger programs.



## Civil Society Action on SALVV Control

- The opportunity to provide services that they are uniquely qualified to deal with, e.g. an organization/actor dealing with gender issues might become responsible for gender input in a weapons collection program.
- Gain a good reputation within civil society and broader public recognition.
- Influence within the field.
- Personal benefit as a member of the community.
- Being able to act as a mediating element between the national government and the civilian population.
- Establishing a new niche area.
- Decrease of armed violence.
- Less domestic violence.
- Safer streets
- Etc.

### Risks

- Having their main objective sidelined in the process of working on SALW.
- A drain on resources, both human and material.
- Being lost and not having 'product definition' of their own: they might fear becoming 'just another NGO'.
- Being perceived as associating with governmental actors or other organizations.
- Fear of negative results of WCDPs.


As we can see from the case studies included in this module, civil society organizations may be the main protagonists behind SALW collection and destruction, or may collaborate at specific moments in the process depending on the context. The decision to pursue SALW collection and destruction or to collaborate with other government and civil society institutions depends on a variety of contextual, technical, political and institutional factors. In short, civil society actors may play the leading role throughout the entire effort, or they may be invited by others to play a very small, but complementary role. They may also play a role that is anything in between.

### Case studies:

- Annex I: "Goods for Guns", 90-110.
- Annex II: "Guns into Ploughshares", 50-70.

### Questions for case studies:

Which civil society organizations are involved?



In post-conflict societies, there are often either very few or no functional civil society organizations. Also, mistrust between people or groups of people, as well as between civilians, the government, political parties and the military or other security forces can often be observed in these societies, making it even more difficult to organize civil society action.

Often, the history of collaboration between civil society and governments is neither long nor very constructive. This is especially the case with issues such as disarmament and security, where military and police institutions are often given considerable responsibility for SALW matters. At the same time, a history of violence and human rights abuses by these institutions make rapprochement with civil society groups even more complicated.

Remember: there are a wide variety of roles CSOs can play in SALW collection and destruction that break down some of the pre-existing barriers to civil society-government collaboration. One area of potential collaboration between civil society and the national government is the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW (the PoA), which will be discussed below.




# 4. Framework: the UN Programme of Action (PoA)

In July 2001 the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held at the UN Headquarters in New York. This conference agreed, by consensus, on a political commitment, the Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA). The PoA forms one of two global agreements currently in existence on SALW. The other one is the UN Firearms Protocol agreed a few months earlier. The Firearms Protocol, however, is focussed on illicit SALW used in crime, while the PoA has a more comprehensive scope.

Most states are signatories to the PoA, which also encourages a role for non-governmental civil society organizations. The PoA serves as the fundamental basis from which many SALW control activities are derived, though it is up to the national authorities to decide on the modes of implementation. The PoA and the Firearms Protocol are mutually reinforcing.

Despite its limitations<sup>6</sup>, the agreement of the PoA was a watershed in the development of international commitments to prevent and reduce SALW trafficking and proliferation. Full implementation of its commitments would make an important impact on the scale of the problem, and the PoA now provides the main framework for the further elaboration and development of international cooperation in this area. The scope of the PoA is currently being extended for follow-up decisions, such as marking and tracing, ammunition, and brokering.



### Exercise 5: Discussion of the PoA

- Do you know if your government has made a commitment to collect and destroy SALW, in line with the PoA?
- Do you think legislators and government officials in your country know or acknowledge this?
- Has the media raised this as an issue and if so, in what context?



# The gender dimension

### Box—Definition

The concept of gender is used to explain different learned identities associated with masculinity and femininity: it describes socially constructed as opposed to biologically determined identities of women and men. Gender shapes the roles, relationships, experiences and expectations of women, men, boys and girls in a society. It is intertwined with other forms of social differentiation such as age, ethnicity, class, caste, religion and socio-economic status. These different roles and relationships influenced by local, national and regional contexts, often determine ways in which people are affected by the availability of SALW and the impact of SALW on their lives, both in conflict and non-conflict situations.<sup>7</sup> Men, women and children experience, and are affected by SALW and armed violence in different ways.


### Men

The highest percentage of both perpetrators and victims of SALW violence are men. Men are often expected by society to be the ones who have to defend and protect their pride, reputation, families, country or property; and who have to provide the necessities of living. Men often see weapons as symbols of characteristics such as "courage", "masculinity" or "honor". The last two points, in particular, help to explain why in many cultures and situations men often perceive guns as generally positive and necessary for their survival.

#### Women

Although in many cultures women don't have access to weapons, their lives are strongly influenced by SALW: they are targets of rape, other forms of sexual violence and killings in conflict situations, crime, and domestic violence (violence in their homes). They are health providers and caretakers for the victims of armed violence.

Whenever men are absent in times of crisis, women are responsible for the survival of their families and have to take over all kinds of responsibilities at the community level. Women are indirectly involved in fighting, for example as associates to armed forces. Often they are forced to act as "combatant wives", cooks, spies, or messengers, and often suffer from sexual violence. In many countries there is a considerable number of female combatants, either in the military or (more often) non-state armed forces. While some women may also see SALW in their household



as a means of protection, women generally tend to be more sceptical, or even have a negative opinion about the benefits of SALW for society.

### Case study—Colombia

A Colombian NGO found that homes that possess a firearm - although they may never have been used - is one of the principal psychological factors that impedes women from confronting domestic violence (and/or spousal, child, family abuse), reporting their spouses to the police, or taking the necessary measures to escape the violence.

### Children

Children tend to be the victims of small arms use. Even when children turn into perpetrators of SALW violence, this is almost always at the instigation of (ir)responsible adults: every year thousands of children are killed or wounded by small arms. In conflict situations, children often can't go to school and don't have access to health care.

In many countries in crisis, children and youth are associated to armed forces. Children and youth join armed youth gangs and become involved in armed crime.

**Note:** gender is a dynamic concept, and gender roles can and do change. For example, in times of war women will take over responsibilities that are culturally considered to be the domain of men, such as acting as the head of the household or being an armed fighter.

# Box—Gender roles and subsequent attitudes towards, and experience with SALW



2




Men:
Defender
Provider
Protector

Women:
Nurturers
Supporters
Care-givers

Children:
Vulnerable
Dependent
Impressionable

Remember: SALW affect and are perceived by different sections of the population in very different ways. As a result, the gender dimension of small arms action must always be kept in mind when planning SALW control activities.





### Exercise 6

Divide into separate groups (if possible into a female and a male group) and discuss what guns symbolize to each of you.



**Note:** *gender is a dynamic concept*, and *gender roles can and do change*. For example, in times of war women will take over responsibilities that are culturally considered to be the domain of men, such as acting as the head of the household or being an armed fighter.

While unfortunately the UN PoA makes little reference to gender, the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (S/RES/1325/31 October 2000) addresses issues relating to women. Paragraphs 2 and 13 of the resolution are relevant to civil society action for SALW collection and destruction and encourage:


- "... the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;" (UNSC 1325, Paragraph 2); and
- "... all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of females and male excombatants and to take into account the needs of their dependents;" (UNSC 1325, Paragraph 13).

These statements of the UN Security Council provide clear language that empowers women internationally to participate actively in the formulation and implementation of SALW collection and destruction, particularly in post-conflict situations. At the same time, it also calls for a gender-inclusive analysis and planning for any potential SALW collection and destruction efforts. These are important considerations given that the political and technical aspects of SALW control, dominated by men from the political, military and national security spheres often exclude women.

The gender-inclusive aspect called for by the UN Security Council has particular value in those societies in which women are generally excluded from the decision-making process. Post-conflict situations can also be viewed as possibilities for the injection of new ideas, particularly in altering the perception of gender roles, although this has to be dealt with carefully. The following sub-section will focus on gender perspectives.

Remember: SALW affect and are perceived by different sections of the population in very different ways. As a result, the gender dimension of small arms action must always be kept in mind when planning SALW control activities.






## Summary of Section 1

In this section we have laid the groundwork for organizing your collective action. In particular, the following points have been emphasized:

- TRESA modules define civil society as "the arena of non-governmental, non-profit, uncoerced collective action organized around shared interests, purposes and values." An important characteristic of civil society and related organizations is its distinction from the State.
- As a result of their position within the wider community, civil society is uniquely placed to contribute to WCDPs.
- SALW represent both direct and indirect risks to the civilian population. Not only do they negatively impact relationships within communities, but indirectly, SALW can cause stagnation in development, threaten human security and drain economic resources.
- Often, WCDPs take place in the aftermath of, or immediately following the resolution of conflict. They can also be undertaken in non-conflict situations if the number of SALW and the numbers of armed violence is too high in a society.
- WCDPs can be either *voluntary* or *coercive*.
- It is almost always preferable to destroy any weapons that have been collected. Destruction, however, should be undertaken solely by experts.
- Civil society contributions to SALW WCDPs are primarily based on:
- The perceived need to control the spread of SALW in a given society/community, and/or
- The opportunity or capacity to collaborate and offer resources related to the process of SALW collection and destruction.
- The United Nations Programme of Action (PoA) is an overarching framework for addressing the scourge of SALW. It encourages civil society to play a role in weapons control.
- SALW affect and are perceived by different sections of the population in very different ways. Therefore, the gender dimension of small arms action must always be kept in mind when planning SALW control activities.



### Exercise 7: Review of issues in Section 1.

Please discuss the following questions:

- What are the reasons for collecting and destroying SALW?
- What is an SALW collection and destruction program?
- How would you characterize your organization? What experiences does it have in collaborating with government/al institutions?
- What does the United Nations say about SALW collection and destruction?
- In practice, do women have a space at the table on SALW issues in your country?





# Section 2

# Preliminary steps of civil society action in a SALW collection and destruction program

## Objectives and Goals of Section 2

- To provide the tools that allow civil society organizations to assess whether there is scope for their participation, and additionally how they can best contribute to a WCDP. The following variables will be considered:
  - Available resources (of the organization).
  - Types of weapons.
  - Types of weapons holders.
  - Demand.
  - Legal considerations.




**Note:** if you feel that you or your organization does not have a) the capacity (in terms manpower), b) the resources, and c) enough experience, and might therefore be unable to carry out *all* of the steps and activities discussed in Sections 2 and 3, let us assure you that focusing on only one or two activities is no shame at all. It's quite the opposite: even if you are only able to carry out one activity, it shows your strong will and determination to rid your community of SALW. In this case it might be very useful to consider a strong coalition with reliable partners who have expertise in other fields, so that together you can cover all the issue areas discussed below.

SALW collection and destruction represent two SALW control activities, though there are a number of related activities within these two control measures. It is therefore beneficial for all actors involved if these two stages (collection and destruction) are accompanied by further activities, which are linked to SALW control. Table 1 provides an example of an intervention process for SALW control actions.

Civil society can participate in the WCDP process in a number of different ways including:


- Awareness raising of collection and destruction programs.
- Proliferating information on details of such programs, including benefits, incentives, penalties and amnesty.

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- Fundraising.
- Legal aid.
- Assessment of needs (Needs Assessment) for optimal success of WCDP.
- Manning/attending collection points (civil society generally enjoys a trusting relationship with communities).
- Program evaluation.

Table 1: SALW Intervention Process Flow9




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| The destruction of collected weapons should always be done by experts and no CSOs!             | CSOs!                                 |   |   | Tra<br>he<br>SO | ai<br>de<br>s! | ne<br>estu | ee<br>rud | cti | Non | lo<br>n o | ot ( | eco     | lle | ct  | ed | l w | wea | ap  | on | •     | sho |     |    | alw | wa          | ys  | be |     | •  | ne | e b | •        | •  |   |     |     |    | •  |     |     |
| The destruction of collected weapons should always be done by experts and no CSOs!             | CSOs!                                 |   |   | Tra<br>he<br>SO | ai<br>de<br>s! | ne<br>estu | ee<br>rud | cti | Non | lo<br>n o | ot ( | eco     | lle | ct  | ed | l w | wea | ар  | on | is:   | sh  |     |    | alv | way         | ys  | be |     | •  | ne | : b |          | •  |   |     |     |    | •  |     |     |
| The destruction of collected weapons should always be done by experts and no CSOs!             | CSOs!                                 |   |   | Tra<br>he<br>SO | ai<br>de<br>s! | ne<br>estu | ee<br>rud | cti | Non | lo<br>n o | ot ( | eco     | lle | ct  | ed | I w | wea | ap  | on | is:   | sh  |     |    | alw | way         | ys  | be |     | •  | ne | e b |          | •  |   |     |     |    | •  |     |     |
| The destruction of collected weapons should always be done by experts and no CSOs!             | CSOs!                                 |   |   | Tra<br>he<br>SO | ai<br>de<br>s! | ne<br>estu | ee<br>rud | cti | Non | lo<br>n o | ot ( | eco     | lle | ct  | ed | l w | wea | ap  | on | 115 : | sh  |     |    | alv | wa          | ys  | be |     |    | ne | b b |          | •  |   |     |     |    | •  |     |     |

# A collection and destruction program should ideally have the following stages:

- Deciding, on the basis of objective factors (and ideally based on the fact that your government authority is planning to carry out SALW control activities), to engage in the program based on preliminarily assessments of the situation through the collection and analysis of relevant data.
- 2. Planning the program:
  - Rationale and goals
  - Types of weapons to be collected, holders and incentives if appropriate.
  - Organizing a coalition.
  - Organising public consultations in order to shape the program.
  - Legal considerations.
  - Funding.
  - Place and time.
  - Raising public awareness.
  - Technical and logistical support requirements.
- 3. Assembling the necessary human and financial resources as well as building a coalition of other interested organizations.
- 4. Initiating the process of obtaining necessary legal and official permission.
- 5. Initiating a publicity campaign to inform the public about the program.
- 6. Organizing and preparing a site or sites for collection and for destruction.
- Collecting, registering, storing, and destroying SALW.
- 8. Evaluating the program and assessing its impact.

In practice, SALW collection and destruction programs rarely follow these stages in this precise order. Four issues need to be kept in mind in the gap between theory and practice:

- Stages overlap, and often run into one another.
- Resources do not often arrive in time, and adjustments need to be made during the process itself.
- Cooperation between the different agencies involved sometimes breaks down, and capacities become strained.
- Unforeseen accidents and obstacles arise.



Below are some of the issues that need to be dealt with during the process. Generally, all of these stages below can be tackled by civil society. This depends, however, on your organization's background, experience and focus. A coalition of different CSOs, all specialized in different areas, would be an ideal entity to run a WCDP.

### Decision

Deciding to initiate a program must be preceded by an *assessment* of the real problem. How many SALW are there? Who will be the target group of the project/campaign? Are people willing to give them up? Under what condition? Does the SWOT analysis (see Annex VIII) indicate there is room to start such a program?

# **Planning**

Have all relevant factors been accounted for? Is the plan supported by our strengths, and do we have ways to overcome our weaknesses? Is the plan do-able within the framework of time and resources we can *count* on?

# Assembling resources

Signing up allies and co-operators. Ensuring we have seed money. Listing people (employees and volunteers) who will work on the program. Ensuring we have the infrastructure (office, supplies, and transport) needed for each stage of the program.

## Legal and official permission


Proceeding to get official permission (e.g. from the police, the local governor, or other lines of local authority in order to obtain permission to implement a WCDP in their community or region of authority or from the government in the case of a nation-wide program). Encouraging any necessary legislation (to provide amnesty, for example).

## Preparing sites

Improving or building safe and secure storage sites. Cooperating with experts who will destroy the weapons.

# Publicity campaign

How do we announce the campaign? What media (word of mouth, banners, posters, radio broadcast, skits on television, advertising billboards...) are to be used? What course of action is the most cost effective?



**Note:** consultations with people running similar initiatives in other countries can be very useful. SEESAC for example, has developed a support pack for public awareness campaigns on small arms (www.seesac.org/resources/sasp.htm).

# Collecting, registering, storing, and destroying SALW

Organizing the different stages of your program and who is responsible for the implementation of these individual stages. Coordinating the arrival of personnel. Managing the event. Administering incentives.

### Evaluation and assessment

Organizing an evaluation. Conducting an impact assessment survey.

**Note:** an impact assessment survey will have an even greater meaning if a similar exercise was conducted before starting the program, allowing for a comparison and assessing what the program has changed.

It must be emphasized that for legal, administrative, and security reasons, civil society can *rarely* carry out a collection program by itself, as they would likely be breaking the law in handling military-type weapons. CSOs would further be unable to provide security to ensure that weapons are safely stored and would put itself at risk by handling large sums of cash or goods for the incentives.<sup>10</sup>

Remember: SALW collection and destruction programs must be considered and embarked upon *only* within a framework of co-operation with the civil authorities, legislators, and security services.



As mentioned above, the sequencing of SALW collection and destruction activities depend on a variety of factors and internal capacities of your organization and/or its partners in a coalition. The relationship between capacities, partners and planning will be discussed further in Section 3 (step 6) on organizing coalitions.

### Case study:

Annex I: "Goods for Guns", 195.

**Note:** sometimes elements of these steps might take place simultaneously, but you must be aware of which step you are engaged in. It should also be noted that following the step-by-step approach does not automatically guarantee success.

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# Step 1: Decision to become involved in WCDP: SWOT Analysis

At this stage we recommend that you carry out a SWOT Analysis, a method to help you determine whether or not your organization might be able to play a role in SALW collection and destruction. The answers to the four SWOT criteria will help you visualize your potential for success; for example, a particular factor may stand out as either insurmountable or particularly beneficial for your organization's participation in the project. Listing 'positive aspects' as denoted by the headings 'Strengths' and 'Opportunities' and comparing them side-by-side with the 'negative aspects' as denoted by the headings 'Weaknesses' and 'Threats' can generate a clearer picture of whether your organization can indeed be a positive influence on the problem at hand. The SWOT Analysis is not comprehensive and should always be done in combination with all the other assessments suggested in this module, but it isolates the four crucial determinants of project effectiveness.

Remember: you cannot fail the SWOT Analysis! If the positive aspects dominate we recommend your organization to engage actively in the SALW collection and destruction process. However, in case of an equal or even negative balance of all factors, we believe that your organization can still become engaged in the SALW collection and destruction process. We only recommend that your organization do this in cooperation with another organization that has a lot of experience in this field, so that you can assist and learn from them in order to build upon your existing strengths.




**Note:** for further information on ways to conduct a preliminary assessment and methods for conducting fieldwork, please refer to the TRESA module "Basic Principles of Field Research in Small Arms Action" (BPF04).

# Step 2: Basic assessments

Before even advocating for an SALW collection and destruction program you must have a comprehensive picture of the overall environment in which you are working. Normally, NGOs and other civil society actors are very aware of the local conditions they are facing; however, there is no substitute for written documentation that can be used to raise awareness of the problem of SALW, help build consensus with others on the way forward, or inform potential supporters from the international community.

While there is no magic formula for developing a basic preliminary assessment it should contain analysis of key factors relevant to the local context as well as examine weapons-specific factors, including whether a weapons collection program is needed in your community or not. Furthermore you should keep in mind that your analysis should be gender-inclusive and take the following issues into consideration:

■ Women's specific concerns about security (sexual violence, domestic abuse).



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- Necessary provisions to enable their participation in community projects (e.g. general acceptance by the community, transportation facilities, childcare, household duties, etc.).
- A shift in gender roles in post-conflict societies resulting from the high number of male victims of violence.

The following is a list of some of the more general factors that should be included in your preliminary assessment in order to obtain an understanding of the general situation surrounding the target society.

### Social context


- Demographics: How many individuals are concerned/affected by this problem? What is their distribution in terms of (at least) sex, age, occupation, and education?
- Gun use or "attitudes towards guns": what are weapons used for in your community? How are weapons generally perceived (e.g. as a threat or as a symbol of power)?
- Levels of community cohesion: Do communities exist, or has war or criminal activity disrupted them?

# Security context

- Current status of human security: to what degrees are people sure of their physical security, access to food, water, healthcare, sanitation, and education?
- Levels of crime and violence: can they be considered (by local people, by comparison to international indicators) low? High? Intermediate? Are there programs in action to reduce crime? Are they effective? Will they impact on a weapons collection program?
- Youth gang activity: is there such as thing? How does it impact on most peoples' lives?
- Status of borders and seaports/situation in neighboring countries: are exports and imports secured from banditry and theft? Does everyone have access to these points of entry?
- Structure and quality of security forces (see Box below): are they respected by the population or feared? Do they act legally or without a legal mandate? Do they act with impunity or are they subject to the law? Do they carry weapons?

## **Box—Security Forces, their functions and shortcomings**

All security forces, whether they are police, military or private security companies, have the same function: to provide security. Their role is to protect the state from external threats and invasions (military), and to protect the states' citizens (police and private security companies). Their mandate obviously also includes other areas (such as the protection of important people, buildings, etc.), but these will not be discussed in this module.



Step 12

Political context

- Political situation: is the program to take place while a conflict is ongoing, post-conflict, in peacetime, or in a high crime situation?
- Effectiveness of judicial system: are judges affected by bribery or political pressure in making their decisions? Are criminals sentenced objectively? Do criminals serve their sentences?
- Foreign relations: what are the roles and influences of other states? What is the regional context like? What international assistance would be available? What outside influences are there and how would these positively or negatively affect the program?
- External Intervention: were there external interventions?

### Economic and educational context

- Economic factors: what are the standard economic indicators? E.g. employment, poverty, currency value, and inflation.
- Education and training: how is the level of education and training?
- Etc.

Much of this information can be collected through research using a combination of sources including books, media items (if available), the Internet (if available), interviews, and observation. Sometimes, more thorough investigation is needed using a variety of techniques. We strongly suggest that you also consult TRESA module "Basic Principles of Field Research in Small Arms Action" (BPF04) for an in-depth analysis of different research techniques, or see Annex IX for a brief overview of research tools.

### Case studies:

- Annex I: "Goods for Guns", 45-75.
- Annex III: "Viva Rio", 5.
- Annex II: "Guns for Ploughshares", 10.

### Questions for case studies:

- Which specific questions listed above have these case studies addressed?
- Do the case studies compare to your situation? If yes, in what way?
- If not, how does your situation differ?

### Remember: whatever method is used, it must be:


- Objective: the people making the assessment should be unbiased about the results, even if they do not like them; and
- Empirical: the results should be based on evidence and facts interviews with people, articles in the media, observations and not on speculation or rumor.



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**Note:** different groups, including the security forces, may participate in the assessment phase. However, care should be taken on deciding who will survey the general population. This should be decided right from the very beginning. If interviews are required, interviewers who are not being seen as a threat should conduct them. For example, in some societies, women are not allowed to speak to men, so a female interviewer might be the most appropriate option when interviewing women or women's groups. In addition, you should make sure that all segments of society are heard. All of these considerations, therefore, require that you choose your methodology in conducting an assessment very carefully.

#### **Exercise 1: Discussion**


- Have you or your organization carried out a Preliminary Assessment prior to an intervention on another issue?
- If yes, can its results be fed into the SALW collection program needs?
- How does the list of basic factors (p.44-46) compare with the factors you looked at?
- Are there factors not mentioned in the list that you think are important?

## Considering weapons-specific factors


Before deciding to take action on such a sensitive issue as SALW control, assessments on the nature, extent and impact of SALW specific problems are vital for efficient and effective planning activities.

The SALW problem can be understood in three interdependent dimensions: *availability, misuse, and demand.*<sup>11</sup>

- Availability: the supply and transfer of weapons (e.g. production, ownership, trade, brokering, etc).
- *Misuse:* the use of armed violence in an illegitimate way.
- Demand: the factors driving the acquisition of small arms by states, groups and individuals.







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Step 1

## Types of weapons, their holders and incentives

It is important in any campaign to characterize concretely what or who the problem is. Two elements need to be considered:

- The types of weapons the campaign will be concerned with.
- The people who are holding or using them.

This sort of definitional exercise is important in order to ensure that all resources are focused on concrete problems, rather than being allocated toward goals that either cannot be achieved, or that will have minimal impact.

## Weapons-holders and their perceptions

Frequently, the issue at hand is more who holds the weapons rather than what type they are, though this also varies greatly from place to place. Some groups who might hold weapons may be less willing to turn them in. A campaign should therefore identify the main target group(s) and then focus on as many of these groups as possible, preferably on them all. Keep in mind that different groups might need different strategies and may respond to different incentives (see table 2 below).

#### Table 2

| Groups of weapons-holders  | Issues a campaign should address   |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Those with no alternative, no access to resources and who feel they are left out of the political process. | A campaign to address the problems of this group would have to include <i>elements</i> of social justice to be effective.                                |  |  |  |  |  |
| People who feel they do not have alternative ways of making a living.                                      | Addressing the problems of this group would also have to address issues of poverty, alternative forms of making a living, and economics.                 |  |  |  |  |  |
| People who feel insecure in their persons, homes, or property.   | This category can be addressed through enhancing local and communal security.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Those who own firearms because they feel that it enhances their social image.                              | This group would more likely respond to alternative ways of building social capital.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Those who see their guns as a form of economic investment (in the hope of a buy-back program).             | This group could be addressed by providing alternative forms of savings and investment, and by lowering the value and raising the cost, of keeping guns. |  |  |  |  |  |



Case study:

Annex III: "Viva Rio", 1-5 and 120-135.

Questions for case study:


- In the campaigns featured in this case study who are the main people being targeted to hand over their weapons?
- What approachable avenue have the organizers used and do you have the same possibility of using different avenues other than direct ones?

In addition to the above-mentioned problems, we recommend that you analyze the weapons perceptions of people and the impact of SALW in your society, etc. Table 3 provides some useful indicators for such analysis.<sup>12</sup>

#### Table 3

| Perception   | Impacts   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Perception of security.  | Social impact caused by armed violence. Where? To what extent? By whom?   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Perceptions of SALW use.   | Reasons for people's decision to hold weapons. Why do people possess theseweapons?  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Perceptions of SALW on conflict resolution at individual, group, and state level.            | Visibility of SALW.  How visible are SALW in society?   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individual and community views towards security providers.                                   | Frequency of SALW misuse. How often are they misused?   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individual and community perception of the impact of SALW on society.                        | Diffusion of weapons.  How are they distributed?  When did they first come intoyour community?  What are the costs of one weapon?   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individual perceptions towards SALW control.   | Other SALW related organization. What other organizations (governmental and civil society) are present that could assist in reducing or preventing SALW proliferation and misuse? |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individual perceptions toward weapons collection and other possible intervention strategies. | Meaning of SALW in your society.  What is the meaning of SALW in your society? (e.g. SALW are an important good; they define a man; they are seen as a threat; etc.)              |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Step 2



Information collected during this process will be useful beyond the preliminary assessment for two key purposes:

■ It will tell you where there are gaps in information that need to be filled in the future.

It will help provide a baseline for evaluating the intervention's impact.

#### Exercise 2:

Break up into groups of 2-4 people. Have each group discuss what they know about weapons-specific information from the list above in their own context with a focus on providing the information needed to collect and destroy SALW. The suggested duration of this exercise is 20-25 minutes.



- What don't you know?
- Where could you find out?
- Is this research that could be carried out by your organization?
- What others organizations could contribute?

# What specific types of weapons can be identified as the primary cause of the problem?

The types of weapons one wishes to collect and destroy depends primarily on the context. After a war, purely *military-style* weapons and explosives are the greatest priority for collection. The preliminary assessment should tell us which weapons are causing the greatest harm.

Civilian-type arms may be a lesser issue.

Nevertheless, organizers need to consider whether or not excluding certain types of weapons based on type or legal status should be considered, given that it might send a message of impunity to civilians carrying arms.

Also, one needs to be careful of excluding civilian type weapons on the grounds that they are not used by fighting forces. In Sierra Leone for example, this mistake was made in the DD&R process (Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration), as shotguns were not accepted as demobilization weapons though the civil defence forces mostly fought with shotguns. This resulted in their improper demobilization, which still causes security threats today.

In practice, *civilian* SALW generally refer to pistols and revolvers, shotguns, rifles and ammunition used for hunting and sport shooting. *Military* SALW usually include grenades, assault rifles, machineguns, rocket launchers and a host of other types of ammunition and explosives.

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
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To determine your policy, you will have to make three decisions:

#### Decision 1: Usable and disabled firearms

Will you accept only weapons in good working order (exclusive), or should you accept all weapons (exhaustive), no matter whether they are rusted beyond repair, missing parts, or damaged? Clearly, those that are usable are your main priority. However, being exhaustive ensures a much wider program, involves more of the populace, and serves to drive home the idea that <u>all</u> weapons are to be removed from society.

Keep in mind, however, that the policy (e.g. which types of weapons to include) will affect:

■ The cost.

The more inclusive you are the higher the costs for incentives, rewards, storage, and destruction.

Participation.

Certain decisions might alienate a part of the population that would otherwise participate in this civil action.

Relations with the security forces.

They may be focused purely on what *they* consider threats to 'national security' or to their own operations, ignoring other weapons that may be a threat to civilians.

Up-gunning.

If you make exclusive decisions you could actually encourage people to try and get better quality weapons for the incentives. On the other hand, being exhaustive (e.g. collecting *any* kind of weapon) could cause people to give only their poor-quality weapons and keep the "good" weapons (that is, the more powerful and dangerous) for themselves.

The effects.Civilian weapons, such as hunting rifles, can also cause injuries and death.

## Decision 2: Antique and contemporary firearms

Older weapons, e.g. from the 1960s or the Second World War, that people have in their houses may be brought to the collection points. You need to decide whether these weapons (muzzle-loading muskets, old hunting arms, one-shot pistols) should be included in the weapons collection program. This is of course important in deciding whether the person bringing these weapons is entitled to enjoy a reward or receive an incentive. If you want to be exhaustive, and your resources stretch that far, you should take these to ensure a weapons-free society. Otherwise you might consider excluding these from the collection program.

## Decision 3: Military and civilian firearms


Quite often collection programs aimed at collecting arms in the hands of civilians are not concerned with so-called civilian arms (shotguns, hunting rifles, large revolvers). Sometimes the security forces, which are running the actual collection program, have

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no interest in these weapons, because (a) they feel they do not pose a threat to the security forces, and (b) these cannot be entered into a military arsenal. Are you going to be exclusive (collect only those arms with clear military use) or inclusive (collect all arms, no matter which category they fall into)? Keep in mind there is no simple or right answer as to whether to accept these items or not. This decision depends on funds (how much is allocated for incentives?), relations with the security services, final objectives, and the people/interpesonal skills of those actually doing the collecting. You also will have to decide whether you only target weapons, or also accept ammunition and explosives.

#### Case study:

Annex II: "Guns into Ploughshares", 20-30.

#### SALW demand

Understanding the reasons behind the local demand for SALW is crucial for developing a strategy for collection. Your preliminary assessment should help you in understanding why people demand weapons. Any WCDP should ideally also target the underlying reasons for SALW demand (e.g. by pressurizing for a reform of the security sector). There are many *reasons* why an individual might feel s/he needs a gun. Among these reasons are:

- Personal security and self-defence. Potential antagonists (those whom people perceive as threatening their security) include the security sector, criminals, former enemies or vengeful community members.
- Legal subsistence, e.g. hunting.
- Illegal subsistence, e.g. banditry.
- Fear of resurgence of a conflict.
- A continued culture of gun ownership.

### **Exercise 3: Discuss**

- Why do you think there is a demand for SALW in your community? (If your community does not have an SALW problem or if there is not much of a demand for SALW, imagine the reasons why people in your community might want to keep weapons).
- Do these reasons for keeping or wanting a weapon differ from the list of reasons noted above?
- Can you think of any other reasons that might have created a demand for SALW in your community?




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**Exercise 4: Discussion** 

What are other SALW measures and interventions that complement collection and destruction?





Step 10

Legal considerations

In general, legal considerations related to SALW collection and destruction refer to the legislation governing weapons in a given country, state, province, city, or other legal geographical entity, and to the means of enforcement. However, in some societies often those coming out of a long period of intense warfare and violence - there might not be laws in place, nor the institutions to enforce them. This does not mean there are no norms or governance structures already in place; these may exist at the communal, tribal or even religious level. Keep in mind that in traditional legal systems and in some countries, women and children will not be able to participate in determining or affecting the legal process.

The following points identify some of the important legal issues related to SALW collection and destruction:

■ What regional, national or local law(s) govern SALW possession and use?

Most countries have national laws on weapons, ammunition and explosives. Some provincial governments and cities also have laws, regulations, and ordinances.

### Box—Legal definitions

The following explains the above mentioned legal terms:

- A law is an obligatory rule of conduct or procedure established by authority.
- A **regulation** is a rule issued by a government agency and often has the force of law. It is also called an "executive order".
- Ordinances are regulations enacted by a city government.

Remember that, oftentimes, a problem is not only dealt with through the formal legal process but also through other rules – whether these be traditional or customary rules – that have to be taken into consideration.


Can SALW collection and destruction take place under the current law?

Even if a person intends to hand in a gun, it might be illegal to carry an unregistered weapon for that purpose. There may also be laws requiring confiscated or recovered weapons to be stored for a period of time. If weapons recovered once belonged to police, military or other private owners they may have to be returned to their original

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owner. It is important to consult with two or more respected and trusted legal authorities before lobbying for permanent or temporary changes to the arms law that would permit SALW collection and destruction. It is often easier to obtain a temporary amnesty from the executive or legislative branches of government allowing people to carry illegal weapons for the sole purpose of surrendering them for destruction, than to achieve a permanent reform of the law.

Who enforces the law?

It is usually the police, civil guard, and international actors or the military that enforces laws relevant to SALW.

- Has the government or any other institution tried to deal with the problem of SALW before?
- What were the results?

#### **Exercise 5: Discussion**

- Do you know if the laws in your country would permit SALW collection and destruction?
- How would you go about finding out?
- Who does your organization turn to for legal advice or guidance on norms within a given community?




#### Case study:

Annex I: "Goods for Guns", 135.

Questions for case study:

Is dealing with the legal aspect of your situation similar or very different from that presented in the case study?

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## Summary of Section 2

In this section we have discussed the following issues as preliminary steps towards civil society action in a SALW collection and destruction program:

- SALW collection and destruction represent two of the main activities in SALW control.
- A collection and destruction program should ideally consist of the following stages:
  - 1. Deciding on how to participate.
  - 2. Planning the program.
  - 3. Assembling resources.
  - 4. Seeking the necessary legal permissions.
  - 5. Initiating a publicity campaign.
  - 6. Arranging and preparing a site or sites for collection and destruction.
  - 7. The collection and destruction of SALW.
  - 8. Evaluating the program.
- Specific to civil society, each CSO aiming to take part in a WCDP should undertake a preliminary assessment of whether to become involved in a given WCDP. Devices such as a SWOT Analysis can help with this assessment. Some basic assessments must be made about the environment in which the program will take place. These include evaluations of:
- The social/community environment.
- Security.
- Politics.
- Economics.
- Culture.
- Weapons-specific issues such as the type of weapon to be collected and the attitudes of the weapons-holders must also be considered.
- Before planning WCDP activities, legal issues have to be considered (e.g. are national laws in place regulating the possession and use of SALW).



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## Section 3

## Planning and implementation

### Objectives and Goals of Section 3

To guide civil society participants in conceiving, outlining and implementing a WCDP. While civil society organizations may have a limited technical role to play, they are ideally placed in society to co-ordinate community efforts at SALW control.

**Note:** in some countries civil society has a more 'traditional' role in weapons collection programs, while the destruction progress is often the 'traditional' role of the State.

Once the decision to carry out an SALW collection and destruction program has been made, there is a great deal of planning and groundwork that must be undertaken to ensure the minimum conditions for implementation are met. The decision to move forward should be based on the preliminary assessment, but during this stage it is still possible to decide not to carry out SALW collection and destruction activities if your organization, does not feel comfortable or able to do so.


The sequence of planning activities depends greatly on the type of organization that is leading the effort. Some may have lots of technical capacity to deal with weapons while others are good at raising awareness. For this reason, coalitions that bring together government agencies, the security sector and civil society are often ideal for implementing SALW collection and destruction programs. In practice, however, these coalitions are very difficult to form since there is often a wide difference in each sector's values, interests and mode of operation.

The interests of governments quite often diverge from those of individuals in society, and the abilities of different governments vary widely. It is a common experience to find that civil society organizations must supplement, and often even encourage government action if a certain issue is to be pushed forward. Under certain circumstances, civil society might be leading the way, but will always require legal and technical support from the government. In cases where governments are taking the lead, they should engage and encourage civil society to become more prominently involved.

For the purposes of structuring your assessment, the key steps in the planning and preparation process will be listed in turn throughout the following pages. These do not necessarily come in chronological order and some must be dealt with simultaneously.

Planning is a complex activity. In designing a plan you should keep your SWOT analysis in mind. A number of further things need to be kept in mind about planning:

A plan must suit the capacities of those implementing it. Do not prepare a plan that you know you cannot execute because there is insufficient money, human resources, time, etc.



Step 1

- Plans must be defined in terms of an operative objective. An operative objective is some result that can be measured in concrete terms: "X guns collected and destroyed in town Y".
- "No plan survives contact with reality". What this means is that, no matter how good your plan is, there will always be unanticipated factors that can upset it. The environment may change, or an event might happen that will upset the program, or anything else. Contingency planning should be taken into serious consideration, as it always proves useful to have a back-up plan.
- Your plan should also include plans on how to reach and interact with all other key players, such as government and other partners, vigilantes and other target groups.
- It is also important that the plan is transparent and made known to everyone concerned. Publicizing a plan is an excellent way to enlist people in the cause of collecting and destroying small arms. Many people would hesitate to act on their own, but if they know there is a plan in place, and it is being implemented by a reliable organization(s), they will be glad to help. Moreover, making the plan known to all can ensure that there would be a framework for others to work in, as well as a way of assessing what has been, and what needs to be done, even if the individual(s) who made the plan leaves or is unable to carry it through.


#### Case study:

Annex I: "Goods for Guns", 105-135.

#### Questions for case study:

Do the planning steps used by MPCD in El Salvador also apply to your organizational context? If not, what would you change? List the relevant steps required for your program and compare them to the case study.


Remember: a changing attitude, as well as other activities and programs that are either directly or indirectly related to small arms, can have an effect on an small arms collection program.



#### For example:

- New legislation may be approved (or disapproved) by many officials, which means a collection program will have to cope with a change of attitudes.
- Previous weapons registration drives may have been carried out with a great deal of disruption and lowered trust in the security forces.
- Demobilized ex-combatants may be feared and their motives mistrusted.
- Collected weapons 'disappearing' from a military warehouse where they were being stored.
- Collected weapons are being sold on.
- The government of your country suddenly decides that it is no longer interested in SALW collection and destruction, and is being un-cooperative.





Step 11

All of these elements above will have an effect on your own program, and must be factored into your planning. Sometimes these activities will have a positive effect on your own program, and can be exploited – the so-called 'halo effect' (see glossary). In other cases, they may have made the public very wary of any initiatives to deprive them of their weapons.

#### **Exercise 1: Brief discussion**

Have there been any small arms or other activities in your community that might have an effect on your small arms program?

- What were they?
- How can you enjoy and capitalize on the positive effect of these activities (programs that the public view as benign), or counter the bad ones (programs the public views as damaging)?



Step 8

## Step 3: Rationale and goals



AK-47 "Dove of Peace", Credit: Craig M. Bennett

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
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## Goal – Objective: a slight but critical difference

For the purposes of this module, we would like to differentiate between and use the terms 'goal' and 'objective' in very specific ways. While, generally speaking, both terms relate to a target one is trying to reach, there is a slight but critical difference between them.

A **goal** is a desired but not necessarily a measurable target. For example:

- Making people satisfied.
- Ridding a community of firearms.
- Decreasing violence in society thereby making communities safer.



An **objective**, however, is a target that is **measurable**. To turn a goal into an objective, try to think of ways you could measure the goal. Using the examples given above:

| Goal                             | Objective  |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Ridding a community of firearms. | By 2006, there will be no more than 10 firearms in the community.          |
| Decreasing violence in society.  | The number of violent acts will drop by 50% compared to the previous year. |

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
**Example**: you can state a goal as a general statement of a desired end-state – such as decreasing violence in society - and then break it down into a number of subsidiary objectives:

- By February, violent acts will have dropped by 20%.
- By June, violent acts will drop a further 30%.
- By November, violent acts will drop a further 50%.

Note: objectives should be "SMART": Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Timebound.

As we have previously discussed, SALW collection and destruction can take place in a variety of environments. While the objective of any effort is generally to collect and destroy as many SALW as possible, the broader goals may include, but are not limited to:

- Collecting specific types of weapons that are particularly dangerous or misused.
- Removing weapons from the possession of specific actors.
- Preventing weapons of war from re-inciting conflict.
- Mobilizing society to deal with violence in general.
- Discredit weapons and change the mindset of people to emphasize bad aspects of weapon possession.
- Preventing theft from government arsenals.
- Drawing attention to the relationship between weapons and violence.
- Minimizing criminal incidents involving SALW.
- Reducing the number of weapons available on the black market.
- Reducing domestic violence, suicides, accidents and other incidents related to the availability of SALW in the home.
- Removing SALW as a means of resolving conflict.



#### **Exercise 2: Discussion**

The list above is not exhaustive. Can you think of other goals that may be served via SALW collection and destruction?



step 11

#### Case studies:

Annex III: "Viva Rio", 5-10.

Annex I: "Goods for Guns", 105-120.

Questions for case studies:

- Are the objectives listed in this case study similar to yours?
- Each of these cases has either a direct objective, a broader goal, or both. Can you identify them?

Step 8

## Step 4: Choosing incentives



Credit: UNDP Sierra Leone, Arms for Development Project

Step 4

Encouraging individuals or groups to turn in their weapons is the key challenge. Choosing the right incentives is essential to the effective implementation of SALW control activities. This choice heavily depends on the reasons *why* people possess and (mis)use weapons; therefore the question of 'what incentives will motivate people to give up their weapons' needs to be explored in greater detail.

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The offer of amnesty and anonymity may be enough, but generally some material benefit – whether it be for the individual, collective or a combination of both – is needed to motivate individuals or groups who, for whatever reason, are holding on to their weapons. Often, weapons are seen to possess monetary or symbolic value, as well as utility for self-defense. Additionally, the security or development framework in which SALW collection and destruction takes place may also serve as an incentive, since people may be looking for increased security or an economic opportunity in order to put down their weapons.

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Both positive and negative incentives can be used to remove weapons from a society.

#### Positive incentives

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Civil society can and should work out ways to provide positive incentives that encourage people to give up their weapons voluntarily. This can be done by ensuring that the value of what they receive for giving up their weapons is greater than the value of retaining them.

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Can be individual: individuals receive some direct benefit.

Can be collective: an entire community or group of people benefit.

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## Negative incentives

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Can only be issued under the authority of the government, judiciary, and security forces.

These include fines, arrests for breaking firearm laws, or other police acts.

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### Table 1: Individual and collective incentives

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
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| Type of incentive | Cash  | In-kind   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|-------------------|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Intended target   |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individual        | Spending cash   | <ul> <li>Food</li> <li>Tools and agricultural Implements</li> <li>Medicines</li> <li>Clothing</li> <li>Computers and cell phones</li> <li>Tickets to sporting events</li> <li>Training/education</li> <li>Employment in public works</li> </ul> |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Collective        | <ul><li>Budgets for<br/>development or<br/>salaries</li></ul> | <ul> <li>Bridges and roads</li> <li>Clinics</li> <li>Schools</li> <li>Water wells</li> <li>Parks</li> <li>Sports facilities</li> </ul>  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

12



The choice of what incentives to use is one of the most delicate features of any SALW collection and destruction program. A balance must be struck between several factors:

The attractiveness of the incentive to individuals and to communities.

The often great potential for corruption and profiteering from weapons trafficking, and the risk of people bringing in more weapons to enjoy more of the incentives.

The existence of strong incentives to keep SALW (e.g., if the incentives are collective, but people believe an individual cash incentive program might be offered later, they will be less ready to give up their arms).

The budget and the actual stocks of weapons: in many cases, the planning underestimated the numbers of weapons that will be offered by people, and some weapons were not collected. Future SALW collection campaigns were not, therefore, trusted.

All of these factors depend on local conditions, and you must honestly and realistically assess them before deciding on a course of action.

### Case study-Karamoja, Uganda<sup>13</sup>

Several challenges/weaknesses of the voluntary weapons collection program (see case study-Karamoja, Uganda) have also been noted. For example, because the incentives offered for the voluntary surrender of weapons were individual and not collective ones, they did not serve to promote community cohesion and trust between the Karamojong groups. In addition, not all of the tools distributed by the voluntary program were appropriate to the terrain or useful to the Karamojong people. The arms collection centers were also located in district headquarters as opposed to rural centers, meaning that community members had to travel long distances to reach them. Compared to the incentives being offered – as well as the cost of buying the weapon in the first place– this distance was not always worth travelling.

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Remember: one serious problem with individual incentives is that, under certain circumstances, they may seem like rewarding those who have possessed illegal weapons, or who have caused the most harm. Young men or criminals hold a disproportionately high number of arms in society, while many gun victims are women and children who do not hold small arms. Cash incentives paid to these gun owners can very easily be seen as a reward to them for having the weapons, and might even encourage them to acquire more weapons in order to be rewarded again.




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While individual incentives, especially cash, are often most attractive to weapons owners, they are problematic. Programs rewarding the individual with cash, so-called "buy-back-prgrams" have proven to have a lot of negative side-effects. For example, a lot of money handed out was spent on alcohol, drugs or the acquisition of a new and more modern weapon. A shift away from such programs can be observed over the last 5 years.



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
Communal or collective incentives have the advantage that the whole community can benefit from these incentives. This works particularly well in communities where SALW are perceived as a public good, but is likely to be difficult in communities where arms are seen as an individual property.

In many societies it is only men who own weapons. If they receive cash in exchange for weapons, the money might be used only for their personal interest, and in the worst case, is taken directly to the next bar. Thus, neither their families nor the community benefit from this incentive. Alternative incentives are tools, seeds, household equipment, or schoolbooks from which women and children will also benefit. However, men and women might also have different preferences among these alternative incentives. For example, in a given culture men might opt for a bike while their wives prefer a donkey, because a) they are not allowed to ride bikes, but b) can use the donkey to carry their goods to the market. It is generally believed that women are better when it comes to budgeting and saving money. This should be taken into consideration when thinking about which incentives to offer.

In another case, training was offered to men living in a rural area, which they accepted. As the men were being trained elsewhere, however, their fields could not be cultivated, as this type of work was considered to be a "man's job." As a result, there was a significant loss of crops because the gender implications of this incentive were not considered.


The above examples therefore demonstrate the **importance of keeping gender** dynamics in mind when choosing the appropriate incentives.

In Table 5 below we summarize the advantages and disadvantages of various types of incentives.



# Table 2: Advantages and disadvantages of types of incentives

| Incentiv  | ve Advantage  | Disadvantage  |
|-----------|---|---|
| Cash      | Can be a starting point for<br>creating new income possibilities.   | Could increase black market for arms.   |
| 0 10      | Widely needed by most sectors of<br>society.  | Is often quickly spent (and wasted)<br>on alcohol or entertainment.   |
|           | May be the only way to motivate<br>more difficult target groups.  | <ul><li>Creates sense of buy/sell transaction.</li></ul>  |
| ep 9      | Often cheaper than the provision<br>of training, development, etc.  | The 'right sum' for a weapon is<br>difficult to estimate.   |
|           |   | Does not contribute to overall development.   |
| 8         |   | Only the individual benefits;<br>wrongdoers are rewarded.   |
|           |   | Turns a weapon into a valuable good.  |
| 7         |   | Only short-term individual benefits.  |
| In-kind   | Less likely to create a black<br>market.  | <ul><li>Requires knowledge of incentives<br/>desired by target group.</li></ul>   |
| 6         | More likely to receive donations<br>of in-kind goods from businesses  | Still requires placing an in-kind value on each weapon turned in.   |
|           | <ul><li>and community.</li><li>Minimizes the focus on economic transaction.</li></ul>   | Only the individual benefits;<br>wrongdoers are rewarded.   |
|           | Individual benefit which makes it attractive.   |   |
|           | Can create a new source of<br>income and support a person's<br>family.  |   |
| Collectiv | and civic-mindedness.   | <ul> <li>Often ambiguous as to criteria<br/>for how many weapons need to be<br/>submitted in order to benefit.</li> </ul> |
|           | <ul> <li>Eliminates economic transaction<br/>aspects.</li> <li>Provides needed development<br/>projects and funding.</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>If collective benefits are slow<br/>coming can cause mistrust and<br/>frustration.</li> </ul>                    |
|           | <ul><li>Families benefit.</li><li>Strengthens existing social</li></ul>   | Communal resources can be monopolised for private gain by one person or a group of persons.                               |
|           | structures  | Less attractive to the individual.  |
|           |   | Depends on the local context.   |



Step 11

What we have said about incentives is *not* intended to dissuade you from using incentives. To the contrary, positive incentives are an extremely useful tool in collection campaigns, and can be combined with other important issues such as local development and poverty campaigns. However, in incentives as in all other issues, it is critically important that you use a mix of imagination and local knowledge to develop the best set of incentives for your particular circumstance/context.

# Box—Incentives used in weapons collection programs in Sierra Leone and Liberia – lessons learned

As Liberia and Sierra Leone have struggled to emerge from West Africa's cycle of conflict, the need to remove the large numbers of weapons from the community has become a clear priority. These collection and destruction programs have been tied to each country's process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DD&R). The incentives used to encourage disarmament were primarily, in both cases, cash payments issued on an individual basis. However, in Sierra Leone there are also community incentive packages of US\$20,000. The communities have to decide on a development project to be implemented with the money. So far, communities have chosen health centers, schools, agricultural projects and community centers. Such packages can be obtained by the establishment of a 'weapons-free-environment'. These 'weapons-free-environments' are verified by regular, independent searches by the police. Further community benefits included the funding of health centers, garbage collection, schools and the establishment of water sources.

The most worrisome aspect of Liberian and Sierra Leonian DD&R programs was the difference in number between fighters disarmed and weapons actually collected. In Liberia this problem was worsened by the fact that during its December 2003 DD&R program, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was overwhelmed by a much larger turnout of ex-combatants than expected. UNMIL subsequently had to postpone the completion of the program, but upon its restart, the requirement for participating in the disarmament process had been scaled back from the original 'one weapon per fighter' policy down to a mere 150 rounds of ammunition. Naturally this cut deeply into the actual number of weapons collected, lessening the program's effectiveness.

In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, cash incentives were distributed in two installments of \$150. Particularly in Liberia, this amount was the cause of further problems due to the fact that in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, many of the weapons targeted for collection would actually bring in a better price (in fact, up to 900\$), so the natural preference for selling guns over the border meant that those weapons were simply recycled back into yet another regional conflict. This is despite the fact that US\$300 was a better price than the rate offered for firearms in much of Liberia. The problem here was that by submitting the relatively inexpensive 150 rounds, and then receiving US\$300, ex-combatants were actually able to go out and purchase another weapon with that money. It was clear that ex-combatants began to view these weapons as commodities to be exchanged with the UN for cash. Unfortunately, these funds were often spent on alcohol and consumer goods.

In Sierra Leone, the main obstacle to effective implementation of the disarmament program was caused by the delay of the delivery of promised cash incentives. This caused unrest in the east of the country, near Liberia. However, the Sierra Leonian

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
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## Civil Society Action on SALW Control

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DD&R program was viewed as being very fair to the various factions, with no preferential treatment for one community or another.<sup>16</sup>

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In addition, the fact that shotguns were not accepted as weapons for disarmament meant that the Civil Defense Forces, who mostly fought with shotguns and knives, were not properly targeted. Moreover, the initial criteria of one weapon per combatant meant that most women associated with fighting forces ("bush wives" and domestic slaves) did not benefit from the reintegration packages.

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Two other factors depend on local factors and social constraints:

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The effects of individual versus collective incentives, and

Step 9

People's experience with, and ability to work within, a collective framework.

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#### Box—Collective versus individual incentives

Many communities were deeply disrupted, and individuals in many areas rarely lived within the same community structures that had existed before the war. However, most people were tired of war and happy that peace had finally come. Because of the disruption of communal structures and the general mistrust that grew between people under the stress of continued war, there was no likelihood of communal incentives and, in many cases, no coherent community to reward in the first place. Instead, TAE, a local civil society organization offered people individual incentives in the form of metal roof covering sheets and cash incentives. A great many weapons were (and continue to be) collected in this way. Individuals with knowledge of arms caches have often revealed this information for cash reward. Communities have not

In Mozambique, a civil war raged for twenty years after a lengthy war of independence.

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By contrast, in Albania during the Balkan war, most people returned to live in community structures because the war – however bitter and sharp – was relatively brief. As a result, SEESAC, with the aid of local civil society groups was successful in offering a range of communal incentives such as improving local infrastructure, sports venues, and training, mixed with individual incentives such as lottery tickets, access to housing,

benefited except indirectly, as people who have received incentives have lived in the

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Exercise 3:


and so on.

community and spent money there.

Form groups of 2 to 4 people. Each group should choose a country context that at least one of the members of that group is familiar with. Next, choose a target group within that community who is in possession of SALW. Target groups could, for example, be youth, ex-combatants, etc. Discuss:



What incentives – cash, in-kind or collective – would be attractive to the target group?



Case study:

Annex I: "Goods for Guns", 237-255.

Questions for case study:

- Why do you think the specific incentives were used in each of the case studies?
- Is there a better incentive or does it rely on the given situation?

Please support your answer with as much evidence as possible.

# **Step 5: Organizing coalitions**

As we have discussed so far, civil society can play a variety of roles in SALW collection and destruction. Civil society, including the private sector and the media, can lead or, in most cases, assist in WCDPs. National and local governments, including police and military forces, and national, local and international organizations all play important roles in this process.

If you already have many contacts and alliances through previous work, you need to take a closer look at which of these would be beneficial to an SALW control effort, as all of the areas (political, social, legal and technical) will be required, even though there are some countries where the rule of law and legal structures are not highly developed.

**Note:** if you don't have any partners yet, we suggest you keep the following points in mind. They are the skills and capacities you are looking for in your potential partner or ally. It is always beneficial if you work together with a number of partners such as the church, other civil society organizations and people from your community, as the common cause of your work will strengthen your community. What is important is that the organizers and implementers have the right combination of political, social, legal and technical skills and capacities (see Table below).

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# Table 3: Skills and capacities needed for coalition building

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| Skill/capacity | Key components   | Potential partners/allies   |
|----------------|--|---|
| Political      | <ul> <li>Support from the executive branch that facilitates the WCDP.</li> <li>Support from police, military and others.</li> <li>Support from political parties and legislators.</li> <li>Support for local governance structures.</li> <li>International support.</li> </ul> | President, ministers, government officials, mayors, or governors, legislators, political party leaders, local leaders, key church leaders, other key figures, international organizations, traditional leaders, elders, local representatives, politicians, local and national police, unions, lobbies. |
| Social         | <ul> <li>Support from general population.</li> <li>Coverage by media.</li> </ul>   | Other civil society organizations, NGOs, church leaders, unions, journalists, media owners, editorial page editors, youth, elders, people from your community/ Neighbourhood, local or (inter) national famous and popular people such as soccer players, local actors/actresses, theatre, etc.         |
| Legal          | <ul><li>Support legislative action.</li><li>Legal expertise.</li></ul>   | Legislators, political parties, lawyers, legal associations.  |
| Technical      | Capacities to receive,<br>evaluate, secure, store,<br>transport and destroy<br>weapons.  | Ministries of Defense, Interior,<br>Police, Armed Forces, de-<br>mining organizations.  |

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| In cases where the distrust is so great that they cannot play a role, international   |
| military and security observers or local formal groups such as fire fighters can play |
| similar roles.  |
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#### **Trainee Note**

These kinds of incentives are not always trusted. In Colombia for example, Indumil, a Colombian weapons producer, and the Department of Control of the Small Arms Trade of the Ministry of Defence confirm that this action causes an increase in the production of home-made weapons. The collection of weapons, therefore, becomes a means of generating income. With the money received from the collection of SALW, one can buy 3 or 4 ,home-made' weapons, which in turn can be handed in to obtain further awards or incentives. According to Indumil and the Department of Control of the Small Arms Trade of the Ministry of Defence in Colombia, this strategy of providing financial benefits to the individual handing in weapons, is more of an opportunity to generate an income for a certain period of time rather than a method which ensures a decrease in SALW possession and/or circulation.

You now need to take an inventory of what alliances and partnerships you already

Step 12

Step 11

have, and carry out a SWOT analysis (see Annex VIII) of each potential collaborator before deciding to approach them. Then you will have to identify the gaps and develop a strategy for obtaining the collaboration of all actors necessary.

Some important principles when organizing a coalition that will eventually implement SALW collection and destruction are:

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You need to **establish clear lines of authority and responsibility** in order to avoid miscommunication to target groups and the community at large.

Some coalition participants may share the same immediate objectives and goals, but not the long-term vision. **Encourage this cooperation in such a way that differing views may find common ground** in the course of working together.

Women are an important actor in WCDPs and often more willing to support them, and many WCDP initiatives were started by women organizations. Often, women have a considerable influence on their husbands or sons; they might be able to convince them to participate in the program and to hand in their weapons. Also, in educating their children they can convey a positive attitude towards peaceful conflict resolution and antipathy against SALW and violence. Thus women can be valuable coalition partners.

However, never push them to support you or to provide you with information, you might endanger them!

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Collaboration with the police or other security forces needs to be especially clear in cases where these institutions are distrusted by many in society.

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It is **important to obtain sponsorship**, **support and co-operation** from politicians, civil society organizations, community groups and leaders, religious figures, businesses and the local media, many of which may be able to provide resources for the incentives you propose to offer.

Step 5

Remember: choosing the right partner is crucial to the success of your project.

Step 4

# Case study—The involvement of churches in weapons collection campaigns in Brazil<sup>17</sup>

Step 3

Since the end of 2004, Brazilian churches have been mobilizing their local communities to open stands to receive weapons in parishes and other community centers. Weapons handed in are then turned over to the government's "Voluntary Weapons Collection Campaign". The aim of the official campaign is to collect weapons without asking "difficult" questions about their origin. Moreover, people turning in non-registered firearms receive between 100 and 300 Reais (USD 40-120) per weapon, depending on its type.

Step 2

The reception points in churches operate on Saturdays in order to encourage people who are unable to come during the work week. Additionally, that kind of venue encourages those who are reluctant to approach a state agency to hand over their

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# Trainee Note (Threats from rebels, militia groups, etc)

If you for example decide to link up with a national and international organization please be aware that staff of humanitarian and civil society organizations have continuously become targets of non-state actors, and subject to harassment, arrests and sometimes torture by rebel forces in attempts to obstruct their work and reporting. Actors who oppose any kind of change in the present situation can become a serious security threat, which you need to be aware of. In case the security situation deteriorates it might be better to stop your work for a while until the situation has calmed down. Remember: the personal security of your staff is top priority!

## Trainee Note (Selection of partner organization(s))

This could lead (and has led in the past) to limited access to information from the police, if the local NGO does not possess prior ties to the authorities. Ultimately, this can have a negative impact on any weapons collection components, as the police are a vital partner.

# Trainee Note (The quality of reporting)

This is particularly true for an international NGO seeking national and local partners in the field, as it has to understand that problems at the local level are dealt with in a different way – sometimes not even spoken about – and that the quality of reporting of these local organizations often varies from that of their own.

weapons. "Many people are more confident approaching a church than a police

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station," says Lutheran pastor Ervino Schmidt, secretary general of CONIC (the National Council of Christian Churches). This is partly due to the image that the population has of the police and to the fact that nine out of every ten guns turned in are illegal.

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These kinds of incentives are, however, not always trusted. In Colombia for example, Indumil, a Colombian weapons producer, and the Department of Control of the Small Arms Trade of the Ministry of Defence confirm that this action causes an increase in the production of home-made weapons. The collection of weapons, therefore, becomes a means of generating income. With the money received from the collection of SALW, one can buy 3 or 4 'home-made' weapons, which in turn can be handed in to obtain further awards or incentives. According to Indumil and the Department of Control of the Small Arms Trade of the Ministry of Defence in Colombia, this strategy of providing financial benefits to the individual handing in weapons is more of an opportunity to generate an income rather than a method that ensures a decrease in SALW possession and/or circulation.

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However, **problems can occur, particularly** when you have chosen one or more partner organizations that you have not previously worked with. Problems can include:<sup>24</sup>

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When your partner is used to working in a different way and does not appreciate the way you or your organization operates.

Threats from rebels, militia groups and other non-state actors.

While it is usually beneficial to select a partner organization on the basis that it was already working in the target areas or had some infrastructure from previously implemented trainings or projects, the disadvantage of this can be their existing alignments and ties to influential people.

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The quality of both narrative and financial reporting often varies between organizations, and you should make sure that you understand the local customs surrounding your partner organization.

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Sometimes, attitudes within the highest levels of the National Government, or of the National Commission, can be very sceptical of the role of NGOs in conducting public awareness related to weapons collection. This needs to be kept in mind. On the other hand, in some cases attitudes at the local level have changed dramatically, showing enthusiasm and a high willingness to cooperate once the partnership has been set up.


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Remember: no matter how difficult it might seem at times to keep the coalition together, fighting for the same cause and against a common threat will unify and strengthen your coalition. Problems will nevertheless always occur; deal with them in a calm, professional manner by trying to discuss the issues and find a common solution.

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# Step 6: Technical and logistical support. Co-operating with official partners: governments and security organizations

One of the greatest deterrents for civil society participation in SALW collection and destruction is the need for specific expertise in how to handle, transport, store and destroy weaponry in a safe and effective manner. Most NGOs *do not* have the expertise or legal mandate for such activity. Remember: never handle SALW! Always assume that they are loaded and therefore very dangerous! SALW can be very inaccurate. Bystanders can be unintentionally injured or killed. Do not remain near a person who is about to fire a shot!



In most countries a variety of police and military institutions are the only institutions legally permitted to carry out such activities. However, their involvement in these activities can, in most cases, be difficult because of a general lack of trust between civil society and the security sector. However, in practice, co-operative efforts between these sectors on SALW collection and destruction have proven to be great confidence building measures time and time again. It can further prove useful to ask for support from a more neutral actor, such as international peace missions, representatives from the UN or other international organizations, international observers, or international NGOs, etc.


#### **Exercise 4: Discussion**

- Has your organization collaborated with the police and/or military before? If so, in what context?
- If the police or military are not able to participate, what other actors could provide some technical support?



#### Exercise 5:


Imagine you are working in a poor area inhabited by pastoralists. The police are not able to stop the theft of animals, and sometimes those thefts result in violent raids leaving people dead and injured. It's guns that rule: pastoralists protect their families and herds, and once in a while steal animals from their neighbours. The weapons they use are automatic rifles. This results in an escalation of violence as well as in an economic and social catastrophe: villages lose their daily income and mistrust each other. The government has created an auxiliary police to bring the situation under control. These policemen are poorly paid and trained, so they are hardly able to fulfill their duty properly. They nevertheless appear to be motivated. Please answer the following questions:



- 2. What could be done to solve the problems? Who could do it?
- What could your organization realistically do?



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- Your organization thinks about supporting a WCDP in the region.
  - a) What are the actors involved? What role are they likely to play?
  - b) Will they be in favor or against the WCDP?
  - c) How can you convince them to support your idea?
  - d) Which obstacles do you have to consider?
  - e) Develop a draft plan for the WCDP.

Case studies:

- Annex IV: "Weapons for Development", 13-30.
- Annex I: "Goods for Guns", 131-206.

Step 8

Questions for case studies:

■ Is there a possibility for similar cooperation as stated in the case study above?

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# Step 7: Funding

Resources are of great importance to any SALW collection and destruction effort, and a lack thereof can often become a main obstacle to the implementation of these activities. Recent programs where weapons have been collected and destroyed received money from international organizations such as the EU, UNDP, OAS, OSCE and the governments of donor countries, the private sector and national and local budgets. Additionally you can obtain funding by:

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- Public fundraising.
- Street collections.
- Events.
- Selling items (e.g. handmade cards, etc) at a flea market.

Remember: prior to all fundraising activities, always make sure that you check business and/or tax regulations so you do not get into trouble!



# Box—"Whom to approach for funding"19


A number of donor countries have funds available for NGO action on small arms. In order to obtain such funding, we suggest that you:

■ Talk to development agencies and embassies of donor countries based in your country. They know the policies of donors with respect to your country, but they may be unaware of funds particularly set aside for small arms action.

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Find out more about available funds by looking at the websites of those development agencies and governments already working in your country. These development agencies can be UN agencies, such as UNDP (www.undp.org), or international organizations, such as Oxfam, Saferworld, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ, www.gtz.de), etc.



- Consult independent organizations, such as the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA, www.iansa.org), Saferworld (www.saferworld.co.uk), Safer Africa (www.saferafrica.org), Oxfam (www.oxfam.org), International Alert (www.international-alert.org), BICC (www.bicc.de), etc. While these organizations may not be able to provide funds themselves, they can give you advice on where to request funding.
- Try and consult your own government and ask for its help in seeking funds.

As we have just discussed, government and non-governmental agencies can also provide in-kind support or allow collection and destruction activities to overlap with other related mandates. Examples include:


- Input for campaigning (e.g. organization of events, getting support from celebrities, etc).
- Donations of merchandise or services for incentives.
- Vehicles for transportation of persons or weapons collected.
- Free or discount airtime on television, radio or space in newspapers.
- Selection and facilitation of religious institutions, community centers or other places where people will feel comfortable turning in weapons.
- Independent monitoring or accounting of resources and results so as to guarantee transparency.
- Medical services.

In order to acquire funding for your activities, it is vital that you and your organization obtain basic proposal writing skills in order to approach donors with concrete and well-documented objectives, should you not already possess these skills. Funding is usually a marketing strategy, so acquiring such basic knowledge would be highly valuable to you and your organization.

Research on organizations that specifically deal with arms issues would be a place to start. You should find out their objectives and focus on those in the proposals. Sometimes donors do not necessarily fund money but may fund in- kind, either by providing materials necessary to carry out the campaign or facilitating the appearance of a notable personality. All these possibilities should be well considered when approaching such organizations.

# Guidelines for writing a proposal for funding

The next step in acquiring funding for your SALW action is to write a good funding proposal. Keep in mind that different donor agencies have different criteria for awarding these funds. We therefore recommend that you find out in advance what these criteria are, so that you can write and structure your funding proposal accordingly.



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Some organizations for example prefer to receive a brief letter of inquiry concerning the suitability of the proposed activity before the proposal is handed in. This preproposal should briefly outline all elements which will then also be part of the proposal, such as goals of the planned activity, objectives, planned activities, timetable, estimated cost, etc. It is important that the relevance of the proposed activity be made very clear to the donor. Some donors provide guidelines on how to write a proposal; if the organization you find most useful provides such guidelines make sure you follow it closely. See Annex XI for a step-by-step-guide for writing a funding proposal.


However, despite good intentions funders and supporters sometimes do not provide resources on time for the collection and destruction effort or just cannot provide enough funds to match the overall demand. In cases where there are no longer resources to serve as incentives, organizers must consider whether or not issuing such things as vouchers is appropriate and, if so, under what conditions.

Because SALW collection and destruction efforts vary so greatly in context, scope and duration there is no standardized formula for calculating their costs. However, the list below identifies some of the key areas where expenditures are made or an inkind contribution is required.

# Table 4: Costing of a large-scale SALW Collection Campaign — an example

| Item  | Quantity  | Time  | Cost  |
|---|---|---|-------|
| Media, public<br>awareness and<br>advertising | 20-75 billboards, posters, stickers, if at all possible TV and radio advertisements, newspaper advertisements as regularly as possible. | 2-4 months prior<br>to the actual<br>collection |       |
| Collection facilities                         | Tents, rented facilities or public spaces such as community centers, pagodas, etc.  | 7-10 days prior to actual collection            | Total |
| Technical support and security                | Tables and security for the weapons collected. Transport for the collected weapons to a temporary secure storage site.                  | 2-5 days  |       |
| Social work and outreach collection sites     | 3-4 seminars, workshops or community meetings, 2-5 sites outside designated collection area.  | 2-4 months                                      |       |
| Transportation and fuel                       | 5-10 trailer trucks, 200-250 liters of fuel.  | 2-3 months                                      |       |
| Storage facilities                            | 5-7 warehouses to be built, several to be improved.   | 1-2 months                                      |       |
| Incentives                                    | Cash or in-kind contribution.   | 6 months and more                               |       |
| Total   |   |   | ,     |

The list above is by no means comprehensive and does not address the costs related to destruction, which is an even more difficult area to estimate potential costs without knowing how many weapons you need to destroy and what method you will choose.



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#### **Exercise 6: Discussion**

- What government or international agencies present in your society would be willing to fund SALW collection and destruction?
- What could they provide?
- What would you do if you ran out of incentives, but people continued to want to turn in weapons for destruction?

These are very real issues that one or another SALW campaign has run up against. It is important that before you proceed, you have a clear idea of the *commitment* donors are prepared to provide, whether or not they are likely to *fulfill* those commitments, and what your *obligations* (and situation) will be if these commitments are not fulfilled.


It is sad but true that quite often donors do *not* follow through with the promises they have made, sometimes for objective reasons, or sometimes because once the rush of publicity has died down, they do not feel as obligated. The CSO organizing the campaign, however, will be the one people turn to when funds, incentives or promises are not forthcoming. It is therefore extremely important to plan and prepare for this scenario ahead of time.

# Step 8: Place and time

The 'where and when' you implement your collection and destruction effort can have a significant impact on its overall success. In order to start any kind of collection and destruction program, the situation has to be stable enough. If the location is not accessible or does not inspire confidence and trust, people are less likely to show up. Your target group will also affect the day or time you choose to engage in events and activities. Some additional considerations for place and time:

- Religious buildings, community centers, schools or union halls are usually preferred weapons collections points, as they are usually perceived as being less threatening to potential participants. This also gives civil society organizations that are not actively involved an opportunity to participate and contribute.
- If there are strong ethnic, political or other factional rivalries in the community it may be necessary to have separate collection sites. In such a case, it may be useful to have representatives of each party at the other's collection site, so they can see that all are participating equally.
- In some places mobile collection and/or destruction units can pass through communities. A prerequisite is a good publicity and information system that will inform locals of the event, and sufficient local commitment and security to make the process cost-effective.
- In addition to the target group, other local factors such as working hours gender roles, religion, harvesting seasons and holidays will affect the proper choice of day and time. While weekends and holidays may be some of the most opportune moments to carry out SALW collection and destruction, some holidays may be considered sacred and meant for rest or other activities.





One should avoid transporting weapons very late in the day. This might help avoid assaults by bandits and other armed groups, prevent unnecessary accidents involving persons and volatile materials where roads and visibility are often poor and lower the possibility that collected weapons will be diverted.

## Exercise 7: Discussion on weapons collection points

- In your community what would the best place(s) and time be to implement a SALW collection and destruction effort, and why?
- Where/when would you avoid implementing SALW collection and destruction?
- Is one centralized collection point preferable over several points?



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Annex I: "Goods for Guns".

Annex III: "Viva Rio".

Case studies:

Questions for case studies:

- Which of the destruction approaches mentioned in the case studies appeal to your organization?
- Why is that?

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# Step 9: Raising public awareness

Another element, which is crucial in the process of SALW control, is public awareness. The success of any SALW control action also depends to a great extent on this third element: making people aware of the problems of SALW, new policies, laws and consequences, and the solutions to the problem.


**Note:** please bear in mind that children and youth are a crucial factor for the sustainable success of SALW control measures, as they are the future generation of every society. Young men in particular can make a valuable contribution by acting as 'peacebuilders', convincing their peers that guns are not "cool" but rather dangerous and stupid. Therefore, try to engage youth and children as much as possible in events that suit their age group; for example, in distributing flyers, creating posters, organizing fundraisers, etc.

Examples for general SALW advocacy messages, as well as for specific target groups, can be found in the table below, developed by SEESAC:20

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
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|                    | SALW ADVOCACY MESSAGES <sup>43</sup>  |
|--------------------|---|
| General            | All weapons, ammunition and explosives are dangerous.   |
|                    | They are designed to kill   |
|                    | <ul> <li>It has been claimed that around half a million people are victims of small arms every year<br/>worldwide. That means that while we are talking, two people have been killed by small arms:<br/>perhaps someone you know?</li> </ul>  |
|                    | <ul> <li>It has been claimed that around half a million people are victims of small arms every year worldwide, and that in the 1990's two million children were killed by guns and over 50 million people were maimed. Therefore think how much you really need a gun? Do you put yourself and other people around you at a more dangerous rather than safer position?</li> </ul> |
|                    | Military-weapons in the community are endangering your community and country – help to<br>change that   |
|                    | Weapons are dangerous, they kill women, children and are a destabilizing factor for the entire country  |
|                    | They are generating violence in the families, where victims are usually women and children  |
|                    | Weapons are generating and stimulating crimes. Hundreds of people have been killed in your region; many hundreds more have been wounded or handicapped  |
|                    | Choose peace, stability and a better life – hand in weapons   |
|                    | Do something useful for yourself and your country: return weapons   |
|                    | You have a right to a safe environment, one without weapons   |
|                    | <ul> <li>Military weapons in the hands of civilians are endangering your community and country – help<br/>to change that</li> </ul>   |
| Children           | <ul> <li>Weapons can take away your mother, father, brother, sister – forever. Tell your parents how<br/>sad that would make you feel</li> </ul>  |
|                    | You deserve a better future that is without weapons. Ask your parents to build your future  |
|                    | Tell your parents you want a safe life  |
|                    | Ask your parents to think of you and give up the weapons  |
| Parents            | Think how much you really need a gun – it puts you and your family in danger instead of protecting them   |
|                    | <ul> <li>Your children deserve a better future – help them to build it by giving up weapons</li> <li>When you see weapons, think what it can do to a young child's body</li> </ul>  |
| Women              | Weapons at home can kill your child and your hope for the future. Talk to your neighbours<br>and your friends and help spread the message   |
|                    | <ul> <li>You can play a huge role in your family to convince your children, your brothers, and your<br/>husbands to give up weapons</li> </ul>  |
|                    | Save lives – say no to the weapons  |
|                    | Weapons are made to kill life – you want to build it  |
|                    | You have borne your child and you know best how to safeguard his/her life   |
|                    | Talk to your neighbour or to your friends so as to spread the message   |
|                    | The battle for a better life is won without weapons   |
| Teenage boys/young | Gunmen only look cool in the movies. Life is not a movie; people really get killed by weapons <sup>44</sup>   |
| men                | <ul> <li>You want to be someone, to be noticed and respected. If you think that a gun will make that possible you're wrong – people will laugh and say that you are weak and hiding behind the gun.</li> </ul>  |
|                    | <ul> <li>Some still think it is cool to have a gun, but the time of gunmen is over. Look around you – we are in Europe, and Europe does not need those with personal arms.</li> </ul>   |
| Teachers           | You have a vital role to play in teaching tolerance and non-violence to the young   |
|                    | Teach children not to play with weapons; teach them to teach other children   |
|                    | Your role is to convince your pupils and students to reject weapons   |
|                    | Teach the children to teach their parents to give up weapons  |





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| Police                       | <ul> <li>Your function is essential to inform people about the dangers of having SALW at home; to<br/>tell children not to pick up a SALW if they find one, to leave it where it is and to report to the<br/>nearest police station, to an adult or to authorities</li> </ul> |
|------------------------------|---|
|                              | Messages/training about safe handling and safe storage (refer to SEESAC 'safety cards'  |
| The media <sup>45</sup>      | People need accurate information from you about the damage weapons are doing and about campaigns against them   |
|                              | Sporadic and sensationalist reporting will not help to change people's mentality  |
| NGOs                         | This is the biggest challenge for our society – we need your help in raising the awareness of<br>people towards the dangers of SALW   |
|                              | Less arms will improve the possibility for you to have development projects   |
|                              | Small arms kill – act against them whenever possible  |
| Local and central government | More security, more investments – more development of the country without arms     Foreign investment will not come while armed people disrupt public order and create instability  |
|                              | Our citizens have a right to a safe environment without weapons   |
|                              | To be accepted by Europe and the outside world, we must have rule of law, less crime and a better image – weapons prevent us achieving this   |
|                              | <ul> <li>It is therefore essential to inform communities about the dangers of possessing and misusing<br/>weapons</li> </ul>  |
|                              | Weapons collection campaigns are important to improve safety in communities   |

Footnotes from SEESAC, Small Arms and Light Weapons Awareness Support Pack (SASP 2003), Table 10, pp. 59.60, 43 Many of the following messages are adopted from materials produced by UNDP Albania's SALW control project (SALWC), most others are invented.

44 Adapted from Yugoslav Red Cross campaign 'For Life- without Weapons'.

45 The media should not just be seen as a conduit for information but also a target group for campaigns.

# Activities for raising awareness can be in forms of:


Community meetings or public awareness workshops.

#### They aim to:

- Enable members of your community to come together.
- Raise awareness on the destabilizing effects of small arms on society.
- Encourage the civilian population to voluntarily hand in their illegal weapons.
- Allow for the discussion of sensitive issues and encourage immediate feedback on the issues/ideas discussed.
- Encourage dialogue and cooperation between the local population, civilian authorities, security authorities and civil society organizations on the issues of security and small arms.



Community meeting held in a pagoda in Cambodia. Credit: EU ASAC



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Community meeting. Credit: UNDP Sierra Leone, Arms for Development Project

**Disadvantage:** community meetings and public awareness workshops usually do not reach a large number of people. Also, there is the problem of criteria for the selection of participants. For example, oftentimes, only a limited number of people can participate due to the size of the venue.

## Public performances

Shadow puppet theatre or other stage performances (music, etc) are a very useful tool in disseminating an important message. They are enjoyable and usually attract a lot of people. These events also leave room for a discussion after the play, or once the music has finished.

These performances are able to facilitate the understanding of complex issues by means of a story, and often allow questions from the audience at the end of the performance.



Traditional actors in Cambodia integrate the local police into their performances to encourage local residents to voluntarily hand in their weapons. Credit: EU ASAC.



Credit: UNDP Sierra Leone, Arms for Development Project

**Disadvantage:** participation from the audience is usually very limited, or often non-existant.

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
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## Fundraising

Youth can make an important contribution through fundraising activities. Every organization working on a specific issue area needs funds in order to operate and affect change on the ground - the small arms issue is no exception. Through fundraising activities, youth can help raise awareness among their peers, get their friends and families involved, generate funds for their own or your organization's activities and, perhaps most importantly, feel like they're making a difference.

In order to get youth involved in these activities, they will need your guidance and supervision. Remember that fundraising techniques and strategies vary in every culture and community; there is no one-size-fits-all approach. As such, we can only offer some general tips for getting your youth started, as well as ideas for action in SALW-affected or non-affected areas. The actual process and content of your activities must be adjusted to and appropriate for your local context.

#### Getting started:

- Fundraising is often most effective if it is combined with awareness raising activities. Encourage youth to select a specific problem of SALW – whether it is the problem of violence in their schools or SALW proliferation in their community – and use this as the basis for a campaign that will not only generate funds but also bring attention to the broader issue.
- Once a specific case/topic has been chosen, encourage youth to come up with a strategy for their fundraising campaign. This should involve the selection of a campaign title or message, a logo or corresponding design, and one major campaign event/idea. To come up with a successful fundraising event or idea, encourage youth to do some research and explore what events were most successful in the past. What do youth find most interesting? What would appeal to the majority of their peers and community members? This also requires that youth select a target audience for their campaign (i.e. students, community members, professionals, politicians, etc.)
- 3. You will also need to assist youth in determining what they want to do with the money raised and to communicate this as part of their overall campaign. For example, funds can be raised toward the following activities:

#### In SALW-affected contexts

- Start-up costs for the creation of a new youth organization against small arms;
- To host a conference/gathering of youth from the region to discuss strategies of addressing the problem of youth and small arms;
- To carry out presentations in other schools or youth groups on the dangers of small arms;
- To start a sports club for youth affected by small arms violence;
- To sponsor the rehabilitation of youth affected by small arms violence.

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| _    | Sor | me useful links which should be able to assist you further:  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|      |     | Africa Network of Young Peacebuilders – toolkit <a href="http://www.unoy.org/Africa_WG_Small_Arms.htm">http://www.unoy.org/Africa_WG_Small_Arms.htm</a>  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| )    | -   | The Worldwide Fundraisers Handbook (subscription needed) <a href="http://www.resource-alliance.org/">http://www.resource-alliance.org/</a>   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | =   | International Campaign to Ban Landmines – So you want to do fundraising? <a href="http://www.icbl.org/resources/campaignkit/docs/fundraising.pdf">http://www.icbl.org/resources/campaignkit/docs/fundraising.pdf</a>   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | -   | Mines Action Canada - Working with young people for a mine free world: how to engage young people in campaigning <a href="http://www.dangermines.ca/site/index.cfm?fuseaction=LEAPmanual">http://www.dangermines.ca/site/index.cfm?fuseaction=LEAPmanual</a> |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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|      | -   | United Nations Association in Canada <a href="http://www.unac.org/learn/wwwp/youthaction.html">http://www.unac.org/learn/wwwp/youthaction.html</a>   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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#### In non-affected contexts

- Donating the funds raised to support the activities of your organization in this area;
- Supporting the activities of other local, national or international campaigns against small arms (i.e. the Control Arms Campaign);
- Supporting a specific project on or a youth group in an SALW-affected community or country working toward addressing the small arms problem;
- Raising awareness of the issue in the broader public and lobbying local, regional and/or national policymakers to take concrete political action on the issue.
- As part of their campaign, encourage youth to reach out to other groups and local partners to inform them of their activities. Opportunities to join forces with these groups and create an even wider campaign can result in more funds and awareness raised. In addition, you should help youth reach out to the local media generating media coverage will not only inspire and motivate your youth on the importance of their work, but also generate broader attention to the issue.
- Emphasize to your youth that the purpose of their work is not only to raise funds, but also to get people interested in the issue and for them to have fun in the process! Setting monetary goals for fundraising may be a motivating factor for youth in some cases, though it should never be the sole measure of success. Be prepared to assist your youth in revising their original goals if they are not able to raise enough funds as they had hoped. Also try not to let them get discouraged by this explain to them that there is always a greater need for work than funds available to do it, and that making the most of what you have is one of the key factors of success.

# Media (radio shows, TV series/soap operas, etc)

These modes of communication are able to reach many people and are generally seen as more interesting than public awareness workshops. Further, they can discuss a certain topic in depth.

**Disadvantage:** if the type of communication is anything other than in the form of a discussion, the participation of the audience is non-existent or very limited, and no immediate feedback or answers to any questionscan be given. The monitoring of broadcasted information can be difficult. Furthermore, this form of communication is much more expensive.

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# Sport events or festivals

They are both enjoyable and usually attract big crowds of people, which make the dissemination of a message very easy. These can be, for example, a "run for peace", a cricket game, or a boat race (e.g. the boat race at the annual Water Festival in Cambodia, see photo below).



Credit: Craig M. Bennett

**Consider setting up a table** at concerts, rallies, festivals, holiday picnics, election events, and other high traffic areas. A bright sign and friendly people can often generate new interest for a particular issue or organization. Greet your visitors and let them know what you have available. Your table could include something eye-catching, a sign-up sheet to receive more information, handouts, and some quick on the spot action like a petition to sign or a postcard. <sup>21</sup>

**Note:** though the UNICEF run was not connected to SALW, runs such as this and the one in Bangladesh and marathons are good tools for youth to raise awareness on SALW problems and voice their concerns.

# Arts (drawing, printing, etc)

You or your civil society organization can support a public awareness campaign by drawing or printing **posters**, **slogans**, **stickers**, **or producing a video**, etc. which you will then distribute, exhibit or show during special events such as public performances, festivals, sports events, etc.



Sticker. Credit: EU ASAC



Credit: FOSDA




"New Arms Law". Credit: EU ASAC

Step 1

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
"Turn in your weapons" Public Awareness Poster. Credit: EU ASAC



Credit: CIVIL



"Weapons have negative social effects" Public Awareness Raising Poster. Credit: EU ASAC



Credit: CAMP

# House Party<sup>22</sup>

House parties are also a good opportunity to inform people about an issue they are interested in, but lack information about this issue. Invite friends, co-workers, members of local organizations, and anyone else who might be interested. Show an educational video or have a guest speaker, and then hold a discussion afterwards.

# Work with college students and faculty<sup>23</sup>

Colleges and universities are usually good places to gather resources and support for civil society actions. Work together with faculty and student organizations to create an educational event. If at all available, school papers can cover campus events and campus organizations. Some professors are willing to creatively involve their classes in grassroots actions or to open their class to a guest speaker.

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## Reach out to school students<sup>24</sup>

High school students are often concerned about the world in which they live, but feel they have no control over the events. Reach out to church and community groups where there are natural connections. Certain issues may be compatible with social studies classes, and some high schools actively seek opportunities for students to be involved in community projects. You will not only help build support for your issue, you will help build students' skills for promoting long-term change.

# Overview of SALW awareness raising activities.

TRESA Table 5, SEESAC Table 11 (p.63) of the SEESAC "Small Arms and Light Weapons Awareness Support Pack (SASP 2003) compares interactive and one-way communication methods." <sup>26</sup>

**Note:** these activities are partly the same as the ones discussed above, but also contain new activities that were not mentioned earlier.

Table 11: Interactive and one-way communication methods compared

|   | EXAMPLES  | ADVANTAGES  | DISADVANTAGES  |
|---|---|---|--|
|   | IN  | TERACTIVE ACTIVITIES AND USE OF MED   | IA   |
|   | Games Competitions Interactive puppet/theatre shows Discussions/meetings Role plays TV/Radio programmes (when participation from audience is required) Demonstrations/marches Petitions Community art workshops | <ul> <li>When delivered by people who can obtain the respect of the target group, has high credibility</li> <li>Allows sensitive issues to be discussed</li> <li>Gives immediate feedback on ideas, messages and practices</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Extremely time-consuming</li> <li>High-intensity interpersonal contact – can increase cost per head</li> <li>Reaches only a small number of people</li> <li>Field-workers must first receive training and ongoing support</li> <li>Qualifications, sex, ethnicity, age and other personal characteristics place limits on who can gain respect of the target group</li> </ul> |
|   | ONE-WAY   | COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES AND USE  | OF MEDIA   |
| • | Lectures Exhibitions Puppet/theatre shows (when not followed-up) TV/Radio spots and programmes  | When delivered by people who can obtain the respect of the target group, has high credibility     Can deliver information to a large audience     Can tackle a specific topic in depth  | <ul> <li>Monitoring of information delivery can be difficult</li> <li>No immediate feedback from audience</li> <li>Participation of audience is limited or nonexistent</li> <li>Interest of audience can be limited</li> <li>Can be boring</li> </ul>  |

|  |  |   |  |                                  |                                      |                                 |                                    |                             |                                |                                  |  | •                                |                                    |                                   |                                |                             |   |                                |                           |                                  |  |                              |                             |   |                                |  |                                 | • (                       |              |
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| •  |  |   |  |                                  | •                                    |                                 |                                    |                             |                                |                                  |  | •                                |                                    |                                   | •                              |                             |   |                                |                           |                                  |  | •                            |                             |   |                                |  |                                 | • •                       |              |
| •  |  |   |  |                                  |                                      |                                 |                                    | •                           |                                | •                                |  |                                  |                                    |                                   |                                |                             |   |                                |                           |                                  |  | •                            |                             |   |                                |  |                                 | • •                       |              |
|  |  |   |  |                                  |                                      |                                 |                                    |                             |                                |                                  |  |                                  |                                    |                                   |                                |                             |   |                                |                           |                                  |  |                              |                             |   |                                |  |                                 | • •                       |              |
|  |  |   |  |                                  |                                      |                                 |                                    |                             |                                |                                  |  |                                  |                                    |                                   |                                |                             |   |                                |                           |                                  |  |                              |                             |   |                                |  |                                 | • •                       |              |
|  |  |   |  |                                  |                                      |                                 |                                    |                             |                                |                                  |  |                                  |                                    |                                   |                                |                             |   |                                |                           |                                  |  |                              |                             |   |                                |  |                                 | • •                       |              |
|  |  |   |  |                                  |                                      |                                 |                                    |                             |                                | •                                |  |                                  |                                    |                                   |                                |                             |   | •                              |                           |                                  |  |                              |                             |   |                                |  |                                 | • •                       | 0            |
|  |  |   |  |                                  | •                                    |                                 |                                    |                             |                                | •                                |  |                                  |                                    |                                   | •                              |                             |   |                                |                           |                                  |  |                              |                             |   | •                              |  | •                               | • •                       |              |
|  |  |   |  |                                  |                                      |                                 |                                    | •                           |                                | •                                |  |                                  |                                    |                                   | •                              |                             |   | •                              |                           |                                  |  |                              |                             | •                                       |                                | •  | •                               | • •                       | b            |
|  |  |   |  |                                  | •                                    |                                 | •                                  |                             |                                | •                                |  |                                  |                                    |                                   | •                              |                             |   | •                              |                           |                                  |  | •                            | •                           |   |                                |  | •                               | • •                       |              |
|  |  |   | <b>R</b>   |                                  |                                      |                                 |                                    |                             |                                |                                  |  |                                  |                                    |                                   |                                |                             |   |                                |                           |                                  |  |                              |                             |   |                                |  |                                 |                           |              |
| ra   | iine   | ;e  | IV   | 0                                | te                                   | ,                               |                                    |                             |                                |                                  |  |                                  |                                    |                                   |                                |                             |   |                                |                           |                                  |  |                              |                             |   |                                |  |                                 |                           |              |
| nrea<br>estr<br>i <b>ha</b> i  | nt of<br>ruction<br>na, I                                      | on E<br><b>Vla</b> c                                      | Day<br>cec   | w v<br>l <b>o</b> b              | ith<br><b>ni</b> a                   | gu<br><b>a,</b> l               | un<br>Mo                           | de<br>oza                   | str<br>ml                      | uc<br>pic                        | tioı<br>ue                               | ns<br>, <b>P</b>                 | tak<br><b>Phi</b> l                | ing<br>lip                        | j pl<br><b>pir</b>             | ace                         | e in<br>s, S                            | 11<br><b>p</b> a               | cc<br>in                  | un<br>, <b>T</b>                 | trie<br><b>an</b>  | es<br><b>za</b>              | (B<br>ni                    | ra:<br>a,                               | zil<br>To                      | , C  | ca<br>o,                        | m<br>U                    | k            |
| hrea<br>Destr<br>Ghar<br>Jene<br>On 9<br>Iwar  | nt of<br>ructiona, l'<br>ezue<br>July<br>enes                  | on E<br><b>Mac</b><br>e <b>la)</b><br>y 20<br>ss ra       | Day<br>cec<br>. I<br>00!<br>aisi                                   | / W<br><b>do</b> i<br><b>n</b> : | ith<br><b>nia</b><br><b>20</b><br>wh | gu<br>a, l<br><b>005</b><br>nic | un<br>Mo<br><b>5</b> ,<br>h        | de<br>za<br><b>an</b><br>NO | str<br>ml<br>ot                | uc<br>oiq<br><b>he</b>           | tioi<br>ue<br><b>er</b> l                | ns<br>, <b>P</b><br>Inte         | tak<br><b>Phi</b> l<br>err<br>rate | ting<br>lip<br>nati<br>ed         | pl<br>pir<br>on<br>by          | aco<br>nes<br>al<br>h       | e in<br>s, s<br>Gu<br>old               | 11<br><b>pa</b><br>n D<br>ing  | in<br>es                  | un<br>, <b>T</b><br>tru<br>un    | trie<br><b>an</b><br>ictie<br>de   | es<br><b>za</b><br>on<br>est | ( <b>B</b><br>ni<br>D       | <b>ra</b> :<br><b>a</b> ,<br>ay<br>icti | zil<br>To<br>20                | , <b>C</b><br>og<br>00                           | <b>Ca</b> ll<br><b>O</b> ,<br>5 | m<br>U<br>wa              | k<br>Ji<br>a |
| Destr<br>Ghar<br>Jene<br>on 9<br>awar  | nt of<br>ruction<br>na, l<br>ezue<br>July                      | on E<br><b>Mac</b><br>e <b>la)</b><br>y 20<br>ss ra       | Day<br>cec<br>. I<br>00!<br>aisi                                   | / W<br><b>do</b> i<br><b>n</b> : | ith<br><b>nia</b><br><b>20</b><br>wh | gu<br>a, l<br><b>005</b><br>nic | un<br>Mo<br><b>5</b> ,<br>h        | de<br>za<br><b>an</b><br>NO | str<br>ml<br>ot                | uc<br>oiq<br><b>he</b>           | tioi<br>ue<br><b>er</b> l                | ns<br>, <b>P</b><br>Inte         | tak<br><b>Phi</b> l<br>err<br>rate | ting<br>lip<br>nati<br>ed         | pl<br>pir<br>on<br>by          | aco<br>nes<br>al<br>h       | e in<br>s, s<br>Gu<br>old               | 11<br><b>pa</b><br>n D<br>ing  | in<br>es                  | un<br>, <b>T</b><br>tru<br>un    | trie<br><b>an</b><br>ictie<br>de   | es<br><b>za</b><br>on<br>est | ( <b>B</b><br>ni<br>D       | <b>ra</b> :<br><b>a</b> ,<br>ay<br>icti | zil<br>To<br>20                | , <b>C</b><br>OO<br>OO                           | <b>Ca</b> ll<br><b>O</b> ,<br>5 | m<br>U<br>wa              | k<br>Ji<br>a |
| estr<br>har<br>end<br>n 9<br>war   | nt of<br>ructiona, l'<br>ezue<br>July<br>enes                  | on E<br><b>Mac</b><br>e <b>la)</b><br>y 20<br>ss ra       | Day<br>cec<br>. I<br>00!<br>aisi                                   | / W<br><b>do</b> i<br><b>n</b> : | ith<br><b>nia</b><br><b>20</b><br>wh | gu<br>a, l<br><b>005</b><br>nic | un<br>Mo<br><b>5</b> ,<br>h        | de<br>za<br><b>an</b><br>NO | str<br>ml<br>ot                | uc<br>oiq<br><b>he</b>           | tioi<br>ue<br><b>er</b> l                | ns<br>, <b>P</b><br>Inte         | tak<br><b>Phi</b> l<br>err<br>rate | ting<br>lip<br>nati<br>ed         | pl<br>pir<br>on<br>by          | aco<br>nes<br>al<br>h       | e in<br>s, s<br>Gu<br>old               | 11<br><b>pa</b><br>n D<br>ing  | in<br>es                  | un<br>, <b>T</b><br>tru<br>un    | trie<br><b>an</b><br>ictie<br>de   | es<br><b>za</b><br>on<br>est | ( <b>B</b><br>ni<br>D       | <b>ra</b> :<br><b>a</b> ,<br>ay<br>icti | zil<br>To<br>20                | , <b>C</b><br>OO<br>OO                           | <b>Ca</b> ll<br><b>O</b> ,<br>5 | m<br>U<br>wa              | ו<br>כ       |
| nrea<br>estr<br>har<br>en<br>n 9<br>war<br>ank   | nt of<br>ructiona, I<br>na, I<br>ezue<br>July<br>enes<br>a, U  | on E<br>Vlac<br>ela)<br>y 20<br>ss ra<br>K). <sup>2</sup> | Day<br>cec<br>. I<br>00!<br>aisi<br>27                             | / W<br>doi<br>n :<br>5,<br>ing   | ith<br>nia<br>20<br>wh               | gu<br>a, l<br>nic<br>roc        | un<br>Mo<br><b>5</b> ,<br>h<br>gra | de<br>an<br>NO              | str<br>ml<br>ot<br>60:<br>s (  | ruc<br>piq<br>he<br>s (          | tionue<br>ue<br>r I<br>cele<br>Can       | ns<br>, <b>P</b><br>Intebr<br>mb | tak<br>Philerrate<br>rate          | ting<br>lip<br>nati<br>ed<br>lia, | j pl<br>pir<br>on<br>by<br>Gr  | acones<br>al<br>nar         | e in<br>S, S<br>Gui<br>old<br>na,       | 11<br>pa<br>n D<br>ing<br>Ma   | in<br>es<br>g<br>ce       | ur, <b>T</b><br>tru<br>un<br>do  | atrie  | es<br>za<br>on<br>est<br>, S | (B<br>ni<br>D<br>tru<br>ser | ra:<br>a,<br>ay<br>acti<br>neg          | zil<br>To<br>20<br>ior<br>gal  | , <b>C</b><br>D <b>g</b><br>00<br>n e<br>, S     | Ca<br>lo,<br>5<br>eve<br>Sor    | ml<br>U<br>Wa<br>en<br>ma |              |
| estr<br>hai<br>ene<br>n 9<br>war<br>ank  | at of<br>ructiona, I<br>ezue<br>July<br>renes<br>a, U          | on E<br>Mad<br>ela)<br>y 20<br>ss ra<br>K). <sup>2</sup>  | Day<br>Cec<br>. I<br>000!<br>aisi                                  | / W<br>doi<br>n :<br>5,<br>ing   | ith<br>nia<br>20<br>wh<br>p          | gu<br>a, l<br>nic<br>rog        | un<br>Mo<br><b>5</b> ,<br>h<br>gra | de<br>oza<br>an<br>NC<br>im | str<br>ml<br>ot<br>SO:<br>s (  | ruc<br>oiq<br><b>he</b><br>s (   | tioi<br>ue<br><b>er I</b><br>cele<br>Cai | ns<br>, P<br>Intebreb<br>mb      | tak<br>Phil<br>err<br>rate<br>pod  | ting<br>lip<br>nati<br>ed<br>lia, | j pl<br>pir<br>on<br>by<br>Gł  | acones<br>al<br>al<br>nar   | e in<br>S, S<br>Gu<br>old<br>na,        | 11<br>pa<br>n D<br>ing<br>Ma   | in<br>es<br>g<br>ce       | un, T<br>tru<br>un<br>do         | trie<br>an<br>octio<br>de<br>nia   | es<br>za<br>on<br>est        | (B<br>ni<br>D<br>tru<br>ier | ra:<br>a,<br>ay<br>icti<br>neg          | zil<br>To<br>20<br>ior<br>gal  | , <b>C</b><br>DO<br>DO<br>DO<br>DO<br>DO         | Cai<br>IO,<br>5 Seve<br>Cor     | ml<br>Wa<br>en<br>ma      |              |
| estr<br>har<br>ene<br>n 9<br>war<br>ank  | at of<br>ructiona, I<br>na, I<br>ezue<br>July<br>enes<br>a, U  | on E<br>Mac<br>ela)<br>y 20<br>ss ra<br>K). <sup>2</sup>  | Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day                             | doi<br>n:5,<br>ing               | ith<br>nia<br>20<br>wh<br>p          | gu<br>a, l<br>nic<br>nic        | un<br>Mc<br>5,<br>h<br>gra         | de<br>Dza<br>an<br>NC<br>Im | str<br>ml<br>ot<br>GO:         | ruc<br>piq<br>he<br>s (          | tioi<br>ue<br>er I<br>cele<br>Cai        | ns<br>, <b>P</b><br>Intebr<br>mb | tak<br>Phileern<br>rate            | king<br>lip<br>nati<br>ed<br>lia, | j pli<br>pir<br>on<br>by<br>Gr | acones<br>al<br>al<br>har   | e in<br>S, S<br>Gu<br>old<br>na,        | 111 pan Ding                   | in<br>les<br>g<br>ce      | un, <b>T</b><br>tru<br>un<br>do  | trie<br>an<br>actio<br>de<br>nia   | es<br>za<br>on<br>est<br>, S | (B<br>ni<br>D<br>tru<br>ier | ra:<br>a,<br>ay<br>icti<br>neg          | zil<br>To<br>20<br>ior<br>gal  | , <b>C</b> D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D | Cai<br>lo,<br>5<br>eve<br>Sor   | ml<br>Wa<br>en<br>ma      | 1 2 3        |
| rea<br>estr<br>har<br>ene<br>ene<br>war<br>n 9<br>war<br>k   | nt of<br>ructiona, I<br>na, I<br>ezue<br>July<br>renes<br>a, U | on E<br>Mac<br>Ha)<br>y 20<br>ss ra<br>K). <sup>2</sup>   | Day<br>cec<br>. I<br>000!<br>aisi                                  | / W<br>doi<br>n :<br>5,<br>ing   | ith<br>nia<br>20<br>wh               | gua, l                          | un<br>Mc<br>5,<br>h<br>gra         | de<br>Dza<br>an<br>NC       | str<br>ml<br>ot<br>GO:         | ruc<br>piq<br>he<br>s (          | tionue ue r I cele Can                   | ns<br>, P<br>Intebr<br>mb        | tak<br>Phileerrate<br>pood         | ting<br>lip<br>nati<br>ed<br>lia, | j pl<br>pir<br>on<br>by<br>Gh  | acones<br>al<br>v h<br>nar  | e im<br>s, s<br>Gu<br>old<br>old<br>na, | 111 ipa                        | in<br>les<br>g<br>ce      | oun<br>, T<br>tru<br>un<br>do    | trie<br>an<br>actie<br>de<br>nia   | es<br>za<br>on<br>est<br>, S | (B<br>ni<br>D<br>tru<br>ier | ra:<br>a,<br>ay<br>acti<br>neg          | zill<br>To<br>20<br>ior<br>gal | , <b>C</b>                                       | Cai<br>lo,<br>5<br>eve<br>Sor   | ml<br>Wa<br>en<br>ma      |              |
| estri<br>har<br>ene<br>n 9<br>war<br>ank   | at of<br>ructiona, I<br>na, I<br>ezue<br>July<br>enes<br>a, U  | on E<br>Macela)<br>y 20<br>ss ra<br>K). <sup>2</sup>      | Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day                                    | / W<br>doi<br>n :<br>5,<br>ing   | ith<br>nia<br>20<br>wh<br>pr         | gua, l                          | un<br>Mo<br>5,<br>h<br>gra         | de<br>oza<br>an<br>NO<br>im | str<br>ml<br>ot<br>s (         | ruc<br>piq<br>he<br>s (          | tion<br>ue<br>er le<br>cele<br>Can       | ns<br>, P<br>Intebreach<br>mk    | tak<br>Philerrate<br>pod           | ting<br>lip<br>nati<br>ed<br>lia, | j pl<br>pir<br>on<br>by<br>Gh  | acones<br>al<br>al<br>haar  | e in<br>S, S<br>Gu<br>old<br>na,        | 111<br>ipa<br>n C<br>ing<br>Ma | cciin es                  | un, <b>T</b><br>tru<br>un<br>do  | trie<br>an<br>actie<br>de<br>nia   | es<br>za<br>on<br>est        | (B<br>ni<br>D<br>tru<br>ser | ra:<br>a,<br>ay<br>icti<br>ieg          | zill<br>To<br>20<br>ior<br>gal | , <b>C D G O O O O O O O O O O</b>               | Cai<br>O,<br>5<br>eve<br>Sor    | ml<br>Wa<br>en<br>ma      |              |
| estriction in the control of the con | nt of<br>ructiona, I<br>ezue<br>July<br>renes<br>a, U          | on E<br>Macella)<br>y 20<br>ss rask).2                    | Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day<br>Day               | / W<br>doi<br>n :<br>5,<br>ing   | ith<br>nia<br>20<br>wh<br>poi        | gua, l                          | un<br>Mo<br>5,<br>h<br>gra         | de<br>an<br>NO              | str<br>ml<br>ot<br>SO:<br>s (  | ruc<br>piq<br>he<br>s (          | tionue<br>uer I<br>cele<br>Can           | ns<br>, P<br>Intebr<br>mb        | tak<br>Phil<br>err<br>rate<br>pod  | ling<br>lip<br>nati<br>ed<br>lia, | j pli<br>pir<br>on<br>by<br>Gh | aco<br>al<br>v h<br>nar     | e ime<br>S, S<br>Gu<br>old<br>old       | 111 pan Diing                  | ccin<br>less g<br>ce      | un, <b>T</b><br>ttru<br>un<br>do | trie<br>an<br>actie<br>de<br>nia   | es<br>za<br>on<br>est<br>, S | (B<br>ni<br>D<br>tru<br>ier | ra:<br>a,<br>ay<br>icti<br>neg          | zill<br>To<br>20<br>ior<br>gal | , <b>C D G O O O O O O O O O O</b>               | Callo,                          | ml<br>Wa<br>en<br>ma      |              |
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# What topics to address in public awareness campaigns

Public Awareness Campaigns are of the utmost importance in any SALW control process. As there are many issues that interlink with and are important to the success of any SALW control program, we plan to introduce these issues as key focal points for public awareness campaigns. This provides you or your organization with a guide to the proper steps to follow in order to engage in a successful campaign.

#### Checklist

Step 9

Step 8

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Step 7

Step 6

Step 5

Step 4

Step 3

Step 2

Step 1

| Topic   | Goal(s)  |
|---|--|
| Awareness raising                             | Make aware of the devastating effects of SALW,<br>including accidental or intended wounds/death to a<br>friend, family member, and/or bystander.   |
|   | Make aware of SALW laws (about civilian possession):     Is it legal to own weapons as a civilian? If it is illegal, make aware of the possible consequences illegal gun ownership will have when weapons are found. |
|   | Make aware of possible alternatives to small arms<br>possession in economic activities.  |
| Securing individually and publicly owned SALW | Registration of all arms possession.   |
| owned SALW                                    | Weapons owners can be traced (whether this is an individual or an official body such as the police).   |
|   | Restriction of criminal use of guns.   |
|   | If necessary or relevant, spread information about new SALW control policies and/or laws.  |
|   | Lobby for safe storage in order to ensure that guns are<br>less easily available, and less likely to be stolen and<br>misused.   |


Wherever weapons cannot be destroyed for a number of reasons, a second best choice is to ensure that **privately and publicly owned SALW are properly secured** so that they are not the answer of first resort in a quarrel or dispute.

Proper storage ensures that guns are less easily available, less likely to be stolen and misused, and therefore that the environment is safer. A safer environment is more conducive to development, which can then lead to more economic opportunities and better living standards.





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Ensuring that SALW are secure has two related aspects:

Registration of all arms held ensures that should a firearm be used, its owner can be traced (whether this is an individual or an official body such as the police), and thus the criminal use of guns restricted.

Proper storage ensures that guns are less easily available, less likely to be stolen and misused, and therefore that the environment is safer.

Step 10

Step 9

Step 8

#### **Exercise 8: Discussion**

- What are the most widely disseminated media sources in your society?
- Would they collaborate with SALW collection and destruction?
- Who are the journalists that cover these types of issues?
- Who do you anticipate will be most opposed to SALW collection and destruction? Why?
- Has your organization participated in other public awareness campaigns? What was the topic and who did you work with? Would you be able to work with them again?



Step 7

#### Case study:

Annex III: "Viva Rio".

Questions for case study:

- How effective do you think the campaigns mentioned in the case studies would be in your situation?
- How would you modify them to suit your situation?

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Step 6

Step 5


Step 4

Step 3

Step 2

Step 1

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# Step 10: Registration

Step 1

Step 10

Step 9

Step 8

Step 7

Step 6

Step 5

Step 4

Step 3


Step 2

Step 1



Credit: Mike Ashkenazi

#### Whatever is to be done with the weapons, they must be registered.



When collecting illegal weapons, you will find that many of them are locally made and therefore do not have a serial number. What the UNDP AFD Project is doing in Sierra Leone is producing their own "serial numbers" on stickers. One sticker is then placed on each collected weapon and it becomes the number that will appear on all forms and receipts given to both the police and the owner.

The two lists should be compared and discrepancies noted and acted upon.

The registration role could be taken on by civil society. Civil society is often more trusted than the security services to carry out this process in many places. Even if the registration is carried out by the security services, it is worth insisting that a civil society representative be present and help receive and secure the registers, and follow the registration process from start to finish.

Copies of the weapons registry should be made and stored securely so that, in cases where supposedly 'destroyed' weapons resurface or weapons kept by the security services are used in criminal activity, there will be an audit trail.



CSA 05B02 Section 3 to roce Social



# Step 11: Destruction

Step 11

Step 10

Step 9

Step 8

Step 7

Step 6

Step 5

Weapons destruction in Cambodia.



Credit: Craig M. Bennett

Weapons destruction in Sri Lanka. A bulldozer crushing more than 30,000 guns in Sri Lanka.



Credit: SASA-NET (Sri Lanka)

Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) members destroy Free Aceh Movement (GAM) surrendered weapons in Banda Aceh, Aceh, Indonesia, September 15, 2005<sup>28</sup>



Credit: AMM 2005, Council of the European Union, 2000-2005

One way of helping to restore people's feeling of security is to destroy SALW publicly. In fact, some of the most successful SALW destruction programs have been made into a public ceremony.

However, SALW destruction generally should not be carried out directly by a civil society organization. Even more than collection, transport or storage, this is an activity that requires technical expertise and extreme security measures. Civil society can collaborate in public destruction events by planning them or assisting in their planning, and by publicizing or even attending the event, as we have discussed earlier. The military or the police, depending on the type of weapons being destroyed, are responsible for the destruction itself.

Step 4

Step 3

Step 2

### Destruction and its alternatives

SALW collection can also take place without destroying the collected weapons. Quite often, the security services or the government are against destruction for various reasons (see table 6).

Step 1

| Trainee Note (Re-sold to the public)  |   | Trainee Note (Re-sold to the public)  This last option is usually <i>not</i> the preferred one, but some authorities claim that it is legitimate to take SALW out of the hands of illegal holders and sell them to legally authorized and law abiding citizens as a way of generating resources for public security However, this argument is losing credibility over time. | es          |                 |                   |                   |                                 |
|---|---|---|-------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
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# Table 6: Pro- and con- destruction arguments

Step 11

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Step 1

Step 2

| Reason   | Counter-argument  |
|--|---|
| The collected weapons can be used by the security services:  | Civilians will not hand in their<br>weapon if they fear that there is a<br>risk that it will be turned against<br>them in the future. |
|  | Security services generally have fa<br>more weapons than they need.   |
|  | The state of collected weapons is<br>generally bad and they are of<br>various kinds, which does not allow<br>for quality control.     |
|  | There is the danger of weapons<br>loss, theft or misuse.  |
| The weapons represent a valuable national resource.          | The weapons represent a serious national threat.  |
|  | The weapons constitute threats to individuals.  |
| We need to keep the weapons in case of a national emergency. | The weapons are a national emergency.   |
|  | There are sufficient weapons to<br>protect the state from an outside  |


When weapons are not destroyed they can be:

- Stored in a police, military or judicial warehouse.
- Re-used by police and military forces.
- Re-sold to the public.

Some key reasons to promote immediate destruction of collected SALW destruction are:

intervention.

- The symbolism of destroying the tools of violence, especially in war torn societies does much to encourage an atmosphere of peace and to make a public and symbolic commitment to moving from a war society to a peace society.
- Immediate destruction guarantees those that surrendered weapons that these will never be used against them, their families or community.



Step 10

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Step 2

Step 1

- Weapons that have been immediately destroyed cannot be diverted into the hands of troublemakers or criminals, and thus the destruction enhances security.
- Destruction is often the most cost-effective solution as providing proper storage facilities and security for stored weapons is expensive.
- In some instances the scrap metal from the weapons may have some economic or industrial value.

There are a variety of methods available for destroying weapons that have individual advantages and disadvantages. These include burning, cutting, crushing and melting. The appropriate method depends on the quantity and types of weapons to be destroyed, cost, safety and risk to the environment and cultural and social meanings attached to each technique (e.g. the burning might have a special meaning in some cultures/religions). For details on industrial and non-industrial techniques that can be used, please refer to Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for Collection and Destruction of SALW (BICC and SAND (MIIS), 2000) and TRESA module Management of Weapons and Ammunition Destruction Programs (MWA06).



# What happens when SALW are not destroyed?

It is very common to find that in many SALW collection programs, a decision is made, for whatever reason, not to destroy the collected weapons. These reasons can be based on a combination of financial, political and/or legal issues.

# Retention by legal parties


Once the weapons are collected, they can, in theory, be directed to three legal receivers:

- The national security forces.
- Resale to the public.
- Return to the possession of the original manufacturer to dispose of as they please.

# Illegal diversion

The presence of large numbers of firearms, sometimes poorly protected, often in transit, is a target of theft and corruption for several reasons:

- Firearms are often used by criminals to achieve their ends through intimidation or the use of force.
- Illegal firearms can be sold on the market to other criminals, civilians or to armed opposition groups.
- SALW can be diverted and sent to support armed groups in neighboring countries (as happened in Liberia and Sierra Leone), effectively exporting instability and violence.



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# Some prerequisites civil society should insist upon if weapons are not destroyed:

- Whoever is keeping the weapons, safe storage and safe use must be guaranteed. The security forces ought to be compelled to demonstrate their capacity and procedures to store the weapons.
- All the firearms collected, whether given to the military, sent overseas, or sold to civilians, must be fully and properly recorded.
- Strong and effective legal procedures must be in place, and sentences must be carried out, in case of illegal diversion and improper use of the weapons.

Generally, as a matter of both principle and strong evidence, we suggest that **civil society always argue strongly for the destruction of collected weapons**, since the risks of not destroying them are simply too high.

Remember: overall, and not only from the point of view of civil society, immediate destruction is the preferred option. All other options are less desirable, though they may have to be accepted in order to be able to tackle the problem of SALW.




# SALW destruction side-event(s)

Rather than taking part in the actual destruction, civil society:

- Is often ideally placed to make a public event out of a collection and/or destruction process, by organizing and carrying out side-events.
- Youth and other local groups can also be encouraged to provide performances, a budget for refreshments can be arranged, etc. The idea is to emphasize that giving up the gun is a socially responsible and positive thing to do.

The activities that can be planned to accompany weapons destruction are essentially the same as those for public awareness campaigns.

One important thing to take into consideration is *the time between the collection and destruction of weapons*. The longer the time lapse between the two, the greater the possibility of theft and diversion, as well as heightened suspicions that collected weapons are being transferred to others. It is therefore crucial for organizations to consider before staring the collection process how the destruction process will be implemented and safely realized.



Step 11

Exercise 9:

Divide into two or three groups. Each group should try to come up with some locally desirable events that can be undertaken. The events should have as either a central or peripheral theme the idea of peace and a weapons-free society. Compare the different suggestions and combine the best ideas, keeping in mind:



- Required resources.
- How much organization would they require?
- Are all sectors of the population able to enjoy these activities?

Step 9

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Step 10

Some examples from former campaigns:

Artists, architects and students can participate in activities to design monuments or other works of art with the destroyed weapons. These can be done on site as part of an art-event, or can be stored and used later, as was done in Mozambique, or Cambodia.



Credit: Wolf C. Paes



Credit: Chor Sokunthea29



Credit: Tim Page/PAPC30




"Angkor Wat", Credit: Craig M. Bennett

Step 2

Step 1

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## Civil Society Action on SALW Control

Step 12

In cases of public destruction events, NGOs and other groups can organize any number of public awareness activities and side events to coincide with the destruction.

Step 11

Parts of, or the entire weapons to be destroyed can be destroyed in public events and festivities: the "Flame de la Paix" in Mali (see photo below) exemplifies such an event.

Step 10

Step 9

Step 8




Credit: Weapons collection in Mali, March 1996 by Robin Poulton

#### **Exercise 10: Discussion**

Step 7

- If you were to build a monument or some artistic design with the destroyed weapons, what would you make?
- Where would you put it?



Step 6

If you were to destroy weapons in a public event, where would you do it and who else could you get involved?

Step 5

What kind of public event could you organize? (e.g. burning ceremonies, crushing by caterpillar, etc)

Who in your community or country could execute your design?

Step 4

Case study:

Annex III: "Viva Rio", 95-135.

Step 3


Questions for case study:

How viable are such activities in your organization?

Step 2

Step 1

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Step 12: Problems with implementation

Step 12

Step 11

Steps 1-9 above outline the possible steps relevant for the planning process of a SALW control activity, and further provide a number of activities that can be organized and issues to be addressed. **Note:** the steps above serve as a general guideline and may not always be applicable to the situation you are facing in your country.

Step 10

It is most important to remember for all those participating in a civil society program that the definition of civil society action implies a high degree of voluntarism. It is thus essential to keep in mind the need to allow all those concerned to express their opinions and to contribute where they are able. Implementation also faces a number of barriers. These include:

Step 9

Opposition from interested groups. The security services, criminal organizations, gun-lobbiers and gun manufacturers may actively *oppose* gun collection and destruction programs, feeling that these may have an undesirable impact on their activities.

Step 8

Members of the community may feel too unsafe to give up their guns. This is particularly true in post-conflict or high criminality/corrupt security services situations.

Step 7

Civil society may be poorly organized, with many NGOs and other organizations competing for scarce resources for their own programs.

Lack of resources.

Resistance from the government.

Step 6

There are no fixed formulas for dealing with all these issues. Three principles may be helpful:

Step 5

Try to understand, and if possible, diffuse the opposition. Security forces can be brought to understand that civil society is strengthening, rather than detracting from their function.

Step 4

■ Communicate. Make sure your message, and the objectives you are trying to attain are publicly well known.


Step 3

■ Be prepared to search for common interests, or to work towards mutual goals with other programs. For instance, SALW collection programs can be easily combined with programs to reduce poverty, if communally valued investments are used as incentives to hand in small arms.

Step 2

Step 1

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## Summary of section 3

- Other organizations must be able to see where they can fit into the wider WCDP. Being able to articulate this when recruiting is crucial.
- A 'goal' is a desired, though not necessarily measurable target, while an 'objective' is a target that is measurable.
- In order to choose the most appropriate incentives and to minimise negative effects, the specific situation on the ground has to be carefully assessed. Advantages and disadvantages of incentive-options have to be analysed.
- With their community-oriented outlook and composition, civil society organizations are the ideal entities for forming coalitions. There are four primary areas for which skilled and capable organizations should be recruited:
  - Political.
  - Social.
  - Legal.
  - Technical.
- SALW have to be handled by experts only.
- Acquring the resources to undertake a WCDP is imperative. Most vital to the securing of these resources (e.g. free/discount media exposure, donations of merchandise/services, vehicles for transport) is the ability to write a convincing funding proposal.
- Time and location of WCDPs can often determine a program's success or failure and have to be chosen carefully.
- Activities for raising public awareness of these programs can take the form of:
  - Community meetings.
  - Public performances.
  - Public awareness workshops.
  - Radio/TV shows/discussions.
  - Sports events or festivals.
  - House parties.
  - Children and student and outreach programs.
- Destruction is the preferred way of dealing with collected SALW. The public act of destroying SALW can help restore a community's sense of security. Destruction always needs to be undertaken by experts only!

Registration of the collected SALW is crucial, no matter what is to be done with the weapons after their collection.

# Section 4

# Assessment and evaluation

## Objectives and Goals of Section 4

- To highlight the importance and necessity of an assessment and evaluation segment to any weapons control program.
- To display the different levels and type of assessments and evaluation that are available to civil society actors in WCDPs.
- To show how to go about carrying out a process of assessment and evaluation.

The final step in your program should be the twin actions of **assessing** the program's impact, and **evaluating** its performance.


There are two general types of evaluations that can be associated with SALW collection and destruction: process and impact evaluations.

## A process evaluation plan can include:

- Accounting for the funds (goods) received and expended or distributed to participants.
- A detailed description of the implementation of all aspects of SALW collection and destruction.
- A detailed description of how those implementing SALW collection and destruction have performed their duties and tasks.
- A full accounting and verification of the weapons collected and their final disposition.

## An impact assessment can include:

- Evidence as to whether stated goals and objectives were achieved.<sup>31</sup>
- Evidence from the participants (voluntary or observed) as to why they turned in their weapons.
- Any other information generated from implementing the program, such as lessons learned, unexpected benefits or negative consequences.
- Evidence as to whether the program had an effect on the vision that drives the project: greater peace, less insecurity, more development, etc.



Remember: an evaluation process is *not* a policing or punitive measure. A person participating in the process must be reassured that there is no intention of punishing or criticizing anyone. It is intended to examine the process *together*, with all participants from civil society, in order to learn lessons that can be applied later to avoid mistakes and improve actions for future projects/programs.



There are numerous ways to carry out an evaluation. These range from purely external evaluations to strictly internal ones. In an external evaluation, someone from the outside will be brought in to interview participants, and try to trace what was done, by whom, what the results were, etc.

We recommend that even though an external evaluation must be conducted, an internal one should be done as well.

One good way to conduct a final, informal, and purposeful evaluation is to make a social event of it.

- Gather all significant actors together and provide some refreshment.
- Appoint a secretary/recorder: someone everyone regards with respect and trust, who may *not* be a participant in the campaign.
- Have each key actor make a brief statement (someone can be appointed to keep the time) for their group, in which:
  - What they did is described as objectively as possible (*not* what others did, or what they thought others did).
  - They reveal their worst problems, mistakes and greatest successes.
  - They list how much of their activities required input from other key actors (not whether they received that input).
  - They identify three things they think they can do to improve their performance in the future.
- Appoint someone to summarize the findings, write them up, and distribute to all.

#### Box—Indicators for Evaluation


There are a variety of quantitative and proxy indicators that can be used to evaluate and assess the success of SALW collection and destruction programs; however, one must be careful in trying to attribute causality when these programs may have only been one of many weapons-specific activities or contextual factors going on at the time.

Below is a *partial* list of potential indicators for assessing the results and impact of SALW collection and destruction:

#### Quantitative<sup>32</sup>

- Percentage of weapons recovered (based on legal registries or estimates of illegal markets) from total stocks.
- Percentage change in armed confrontations.





- Percentage change in armed crime, homicide and injury.
- Percentage change in black market price of weapons.
- Project cost per weapon recovered.

#### Qualitative<sup>33</sup>

- Public perception of change in community security conditions.
- Resettlement of areas once abandoned because of conflict or high levels of crime.
- Change in movement of people and goods across certain transportation routes
- The initiation of development projects and/or local or foreign investment in business projects where they once were stalled.
- Perception that the incidence of violence have changed, at least in terms of visibility.
- The level of awareness of SALW and the risks and dangers they pose has risen among members of the community.
- SALW are less visible in community or society.


To date, there is no sufficient evidence to prove that SALW collection and destruction alone reduces arms proliferation and violence. However, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that they are often a good way of drawing attention to the role of weapons in society, temporarily intervening in the black market, removing specific types of weapons from circulation and bringing together civil society groups and security forces in a collaborative environment. It is important to begin to collect substantive data before you begin SALW collection and destruction – even if the data is not perfect – as a baseline from which to measure your results. Oftentimes in the middle of trying to organize SALW collection and destruction, the collection of data for evaluative purposes later on is overlooked or not considered a priority. Without this information, your evaluation will be more difficult to do and less meaningful in the end.

Impact assessment is helped by good record keeping during the registration phase that precedes destruction.

### **Exercise 1: Discussion**

- Is there good data available on armed crime and violence in your country or community? If not, what other measures and ways of would you use?
- Has your organization ever carried out an evaluation on its activities? What did you focus on? What methodologies did you use?





#### Case study:

Annex I: "Goods for Guns".

Questions for case study:

■ Would you use the same benchmarks as the MPCD to evaluate your campaign? Why or why not?

## 1. Assessment

An assessment is an attempt to analyze whether changes in the possession and availability rates of SALW were affected in any way by your program. It is important and necessary to be able to determine the effect of civil action for several main reasons:

- To ensure that the actions and steps taken are having a positive impact and increasing security in the community.
- To ensure continued support from both civil society and the local population.
- To provide lessons and empirical evidence on the success/failure of civil society participation. This has repercussions for future programs of SALW collection and destruction.

There are two key words that will help in assessing the effect of any SALW collection and destruction program: *impact* and *process*.


# Impact of activities

The impact of any SALW activity can be determined by comparing the situation before to the situation either during or after the activity was implemented. Questions that any impact assessment should ask are: what has changed? Is this change clearly visible, easily detected, and for the better? Some examples of measuring impact include:

- Example 1: Before the action was initiated, every second household in the town had some form of firearm. One year after the action, only one household in five had a firearm.
- Example 2: Before the action was initiated, there was an average of three people with firearm wounds in the hospital every night. Six months after the action, there were three people per-week with firearm wounds.

**Note:** this form of assessment will work even better if the same assessment was conducted prior to the start of the program and you can compare statistics.

Carrying out an impact assessment is not a simple procedure, as it is often unclear whether the resulting change is the direct outcome of the program implemented, or just a side-factor that helped speed up the changes that would have occurred naturally.



Testable criteria need to be established to give a quantifiable, accurate and objective assessment of impact. To learn more about data collection, please consult TRESA Module Basic Principles of Field Research on Small Arms Action (BPF04).

# 2. Evaluation


Evaluating a program is the process of analyzing whether the program worked effectively, and whether it's targets were achieved. Some general principles should be kept in mind:



- An evaluation is best conducted by someone other than the ones running the program.
- An evaluation can only be properly carried out if a program has clear-cut, empirical objectives.
- Evaluations should cover financial aspects of a program (though this should be properly carried out by an accountant) but more importantly, should examine the ways in which people within the program interacted with one another.
- Evaluations should be seen within the framework of constructive criticism: they should be intended as feedback to the program allowing course corrections and not as a punitive or policing measure. A corollary is that those involved in the program should be involved in designing the evaluation, and be consulted during the process.

Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of conducting external and internal evaluations

|          | Advantages   | Disadvantages  |
|----------|--|--|
| Internal | <ul> <li>The evaluation is timely, and can be done as an ongoing process so it feeds back into the collection campaign/program.</li> <li>Full local knowledge about the area and people helps to assess the impact acheived.</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>In a coalition, members of different organizations may feel that blame (or praise) will be fixed inappropriately.</li> <li>Lack of professional knowledge/experience in conducting evaluations.</li> <li>Possibility of bias in assessing the results.</li> <li>Lack of objectivity in measuring local impact.</li> </ul> |
| External | <ul> <li>Less potential for bias.</li> <li>An external evaluator often has a more detached perspective and can deal with things without being invested emotionally.</li> <li>An external evaluator can be a professional evaluator with a great deal of professional competence and experience.</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>May be seen as some form of policeman.</li> <li>Lack of familiarity with the context, events and processes.</li> <li>Additional costs.</li> </ul>   |



#### Summary of Section 4

This section has dealt with assessment and evaluation as the final step in a WCDP.

- Assessing a program's impact is a particularly difficult task. In the case of implementing a WCDP, an assessment will likely ask: 'were the availability rates of SALW affected by our program?' An evaluation, on the other hand will deal with questions such as 'why and how?'
- Assessment is important for three main reasons:
  - To ascertain that the program actually had a positive impact on human security in the community.
  - To ensure continued support from both civil society and the local population.
  - To provide lessons and empirical evidence as to the value of the implemented program. This can be reviewed in deciding on the form of action in subsequent projects.
- Evaluation attempts to ascertain the value and success of the project relative to its initial goals.

#### Annex I:

#### Case study El Salvador

# "Goods for Guns": an assessment of a voluntary weapons collection program<sup>34</sup>


"This Goods for Guns program looks at a weapons collection program implemented by the business community in El Salvador as a result of the high circulation of arms in the country and the impact it was having on the economy. The program removed thousands of military-style weapons from circulation and helped to create a public security dialogue that has resulted in a more dedicated effort to confiscate weapons in the black market and implement progressive community policing efforts."

## 1. Problem: Destabilized society due to excessive proliferation of military-style weapons.

By the fall of 1995, El Salvadoran society was suffering from the negative effects of the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons left over from a civil war that raged from 1981 to 1992. The peace brokered by the UN in 1992 featured a major emphasis on disarming and demobilizing both the opposition forces of the FMLN (Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion National) and government forces of El Salvador (FAES). However, the nature of weapons acquisition and recirculation during the war resulted in many thousands of weapons not being turned in as part of the peace process. It was these weapons and their well-documented negative effects that became the target for action by societal groups and the international community in 1995.

### 1.1. Incomplete disarmament during peace operations

In what was considered one of the most successful disarmament operations in UN history, more than 11,000 guerillas surrendered more than 10,000 weapons, 74 missiles and 9,000 grenades at the conclusion of the war in 1992. The weapons of the FMLN were destroyed while those of the 30,000 troops of the Government of El



Salvador (FAES) were collected and stored. Table 1 in the Appendix provides a detailed breakdown of the weapons turned in by the FMLN. Due to twelve years of warfare that saw frequent ambushes and the free flow of weapons that were rarely accounted for by either side of the conflict, massive amounts of weapons were left uncollected in El Salvador. The Government, the FMLN and the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) estimated that approximately 360,000 military-style weapons remained in circulation and in caches.

### 1.2 Destabilizing factors to be dealt with by El Salvador

As a result of incomplete disarmament and the widespread availability of weapons, by fall of 1995 the following conditions remained to be dealt:

- Criminal acts with military style weapons.
- Arming of private citizens and development of private security groups.
- Emboldening of disaffected citizens.
- Threat to post-conflict political development and democracy.
- Threat to the process of economic development.
- Increasing harm to civilians.

## 1.3 Impact of incomplete disarmament on El Salvadoran society: identifying and responding to structural and proximate indicators

The arrival of peace brought about the resolution of the underlying issues that sparked civil war. Yet, a lack of resources and growing insecurity placed undue stress on the country. Crime and violence were high in El Salvador, with citizens increasingly calling on the Government and the newly formed civilian police force (PNC) to invest more resources and effort in fighting crime and restoring civilian security. Violence was considered by a large majority of Salvadorans as the country's most pressing problem. In a poll published by the influential newspaper *El Diario de Hoy* on 29 July 1995, 90% of those interviewed said they had been the victims of street theft. The Government expressed the same concern, as did human rights activists and community leaders.

With little opportunity or hope for a prosperous future, thousands took up arms and formed apolitical criminal gangs (*maras*) that were responsible for much of the violence in El Salvador. Every week, public transportation was attacked and disrupted by criminals – at one point, 50% of bus services in San Salvador had to be suspended for security reasons. Hand grenades were becoming the country's main weapons of terror.

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All of this violence, aided and abetted by a seemingly unlimited supply of small arms and light weapons, was taking place in an economy with a 50 percent unemployment rate. New businesses began to suffer since customers were afraid to travel. Similarly, assaults taking place along the country's main roadways were threatening the disruption of commerce, transportation and security.


There was little evidence that this growing criminal violence was connected in any way to broader political conflict. The FMLN had given up their arms in 1993 based on a promise of participation in a democratic political system, which by 1995 was a reality.

Further, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants had been formally completed. As a matter of fact, the ex-combatants were now operating as a single voice demanding that the government meet their commitments for compensation agreed to in the DDR process.

## 2. The emergence of the voluntary weapons collection concept as appropriate to the Salvadoran context

As armed violence reached the critical stage in El Salvador in 1995, it became clear to all actors in society that the excessive availability of the tools of violence had to be addressed along with the root causes. Immediately following the Peace Accords, the Government developed a weapons collection effort asking citizens to turn in weapons to designated army posts. Unfortunately, few weapons were turned in. In 1995, since the formal DDR process had been completed, it was not possible to have the UN reinstitute a weapons collection program.

In November 1995, a citizens group in El Salvador, including leaders of the business community, alarmed by the impact of armed violence on the economy formed the Patriotic Movement Against Crime (Movimiento Patriotico Contra la Delincuencia-MPCD). By April 1996 MPCD had decided to conduct a weapons collection program. The organization was formed as a result of three main issues: first, the Association of Distributors (consumer goods) of El Salvador (ADES) were continually having their delivery trucks assaulted by men armed with military-style weapons. Second, ADES members were becoming increasingly concerned with the security of their employees in transit between work and home. Finally, ADES was looking to collaborate with government and civil society to reverse the growing violence affecting all Salvadorans. It should be noted that this was not a grass roots program. No attempt was made to be inclusive of all levels of society. Had the opposition parties, especially the FMLN, been involved in the planning and implementation, the outcome would have been different, certainly spreading beyond the urban areas.



#### 3. The Goods for Guns program

MPCD agreed on the following course and sequence of action for the weapons collection program:

- Develop Strategic Plan
- Seek the support of the Rotary Club of El Salvador, Catholic Church, Legislative
- Assembly, public security and defense authorities
- Designate a fundraising committee
- Design paperwork, forms, publicity, campaign materials and logistical details
- Seek the participation of the Association of Salvadoran Advertisers (AMPS) and that of all other modes of national mass communication
- Contract the services of a respected auditing firm
- Design a system for storage, transport and elimination of armaments
- Estimate the quantity, and designate the final destination, of the weapons to be collected and destroyed
- Erect a peace monument (location, design and construction)


It was decided that the program would not be a 'buy-back' one in the sense that the MPCD would be providing cash for the return of weapons. Rather, citizens would be compensated for contributing to the development of a peaceful and secure future of El Salvador. The act of turning in weapons was the most important objective. As long as citizens continued to turn in weapons, the program was considered a success. (Kiflemarian, BICC: *Report 12*, 1997)

#### 3.1 Coordination with government

From the beginning the MPCD program was closely coordinated with the government. One reason for this was the fact that the organizations involved were those that reflected the interests of the middle and upper classes of El Salvador. These groups represented the key supporters of the ruling ARENA party of then President Armando Calderon Sol.

Another reason for close coordination with the Government was that the MPCD decided to focus on military-style weapons. This clashed with the recent passage of a law on firearms, ammunition and explosives, which prohibited civilians from possessing weapons exclusive to the military. Since this law would be an obstacle to the implementation of any 'Goods for Guns' program, it was necessary to attain a temporary legislative decree that would allow all citizens to bear illegally held military-style arms strictly for the purpose of turning them in at designated collection sites. After extensive lobbying by the MPCD, the Legislative Assembly issued Decree 819, which allowed the MPCD to implement, in strict keeping with the law, the Goods for Guns program.

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The military and new civilian police force agreed to provide technical support to evaluate, store and destroy the weapons. They participated unarmed and out of uniform so as not to intimidate potential participants, with armed police officers still available nearby. The Catholic Church provided its installations as collection sites throughout the country, while the national association of advertisers provided free publicity on television, radio and in print media. The Rotary Club also agreed to serve as an independent monitor of the entire process and provided observers at each collection site.

At the first collection session on 21-22 September 1996, citizens turned in not only firearms, but also ammunition, grenades, explosives and other articles not contemplated in the legislative decree. For that reason, the MPCD initiated new discussions with the legislature to amend the original decree. This facilitated collection of the previously authorized firearms, ammunition, explosives and similar devices exclusively to the FAES and any other type of weapon not prohibited by the law and permitted for civilian use.

### 3.2 Weapons collection as part of a broader strategy to fight crime

From the beginning, the Goods for Guns program was undertaken as part of a larger concern for crime. It also took place within the broader context of other programs designed to deal with armed violence. The development of the PNC was a major part of this, as the international community (e.g., UNDP) was assisting in programs designed to develop expertise in weapons tracing, seizure, and collection and destruction techniques. By January 1997, the PNC had succeeded in improving security in the two major areas where weapons, especially hand grenades, were being used: urban market places and public transportation.<sup>38</sup>

There is no evidence that the program was formally linked with larger public social and economic development programs funded by external assistance. The program was conceived and implemented by the business community, designed to create a climate more conducive to the development of the private sector economy in El Salvador, mainly San Salvador. Although some funding was secured from the governments of Canada, Norway, Mexico, Sweden, Luxembourg and the OAS, half of the funding came from the Government of El Salvador and the national private sector. There were no formal links to the international community.

#### 3.3 Timing and duration

Goods for Guns was designed as a multi-phased program from the beginning. This fit with the longer-term objectives of raising awareness and fostering citizen participation in combating crime. The program was designed around collection weekends that were preceded by extensive publicity. In total, 23 collection weekends took place between September 1996 and June 1999. While the MPCD did make several marginally successful efforts to collect weapons in the country's interior, almost all of the collection efforts took place in the capital. The Catholic Church consistently provided the Cathedral in the heart of the city and Christ the Redeemer Church on the outskirts as weapons collection sites.

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#### 3.4 Storage and destruction

Given the sensitivity of collecting military-style weapons, whose possession is against the law, extensive procedures were developed by the Government of El Salvador to receive, store and destroy the weapons collected. The Logistics Division of the Ministry of Defense developed a set of procedures that called for the public destruction of arms that were collected. These were much more than technical procedures. Objectives listed in the decree included:

- Effectively cutting the flow of weapons into the black market through collection and destruction
- Influencing public opinion in favor of the programs' continuity
- Publicizing the primary aim of the MPCD's Goods for Guns program as facilitating and providing incentives for the civilian population to exchange firearms and explosives exclusive to the FAES.

In addition to the military, the PNC also participated in this phase of the operation. A very detailed set of procedures for the transportation and destruction of explosive materials collected by MPCD were developed by PNC Weapons and Explosives Division, charged with transporting and destroying all the explosive material. These procedures also recognized the larger goals of the program.

#### 3.5 Collection and destruction procedures

Due to the failure of a previous government program which used army bases as collection sites, as previously mentioned, the Goods for Guns program used churches as collection sites from the very beginning.

Each collection site was staffed by a minimum of nine people from the PNC, Ministry of Defense (MoD) and civil society.

The sites operated simultaneously from 8 am to 4 pm. Procedures for turning in a weapon included a welcome, a valuation of the weapon by the military, distribution by MPCD of a voucher for supermarkets, drug stores or clothing, and the recording of serial numbers. Every Monday morning following a collection weekend, weapons were stored and the MPCD gave a press conference in the PNC storeroom. After the press conference was over the PNC transferred control of all weaponry to the Ministry of Defense for destruction.

#### 3.6 Documentation, transparency and publicity

Each weapon received was documented individually, with every form signed by representatives from the MPCD, Rotary Club, PNC and the MOD. All of the forms and paperwork provided a paper trail that ensured the transparency and legitimacy of the Goods for Guns program. Since the exchange was anonymous, no prosecution of the persons surrendering weapons could take place. However, all weapons that were once part of government inventory were noted and reconciled with their own accounting of property.

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The collaboration of the AMPS (Association of Salvadoran Advertisers) allowed for a strong publicity campaign throughout the twenty-three rounds of weapons collection. The week prior to the start of the collection, the MPCD began to advertise the program daily in the country's two largest print newspapers, *El Diario de Hoy* and *La Prensa Gráfica*. In rural areas, the message was disseminated by radio during the lunch hour, when many people listen to the national news. As a result, peasants from far away places came to turn in their weapons during every collection weekend. Television was also used, mostly on the day preceding the round of collection.

#### 3.7 Incentives

The incentives for turning in weapons were vouchers for supermarkets, pharmacies and shoe stores. The relative exchange value of these items is listed in Table 2 in the Appendix. During the first rounds of the program, US\$ 15 was given for grenades and mines; however, the large quantities of these artifacts made it impossible to sustain this level of reward. MPCD received ammunition but did not provide compensation. It is important to note that the MPCD did not "purchase" the weapons but rather "compensated" the person turning in his or her weapon as a gesture of peace and goodwill.

#### 3.8 Scope of collection


A wide variety of citizens participated in the twenty-three rounds of collection. It should be noted that weapons were not turned in as part of the disarmament of militias or similar groups. By and large, such groups had ceased to exist as a result of the DDR process. Weapons had proliferated widely among the citizenry who possessed them for a variety of reasons. Because the surrender of weapons took place on anonymous terms, very little testimony and information was gathered from the program participants, and there was no analysis of *why* the people had the guns, or what motivated them to turn them in.

#### 4. Program results and evaluation

By the end of the 23rd rounds of the Goods for Guns program in June 1999, thousands of pistols assault rifles and grenades had been turned in. Table 3 in the Appendix lists the total number of arms collected as of that time.

No systematic polling of the population took place with regards to the efficacy of the Goods for Guns program. The only evidence of its effectiveness available is the steady stream of citizens that continued to turn in weapons during the 1996-1999 period. By far, the most impressive aspect of the Goods for Guns program is the camaraderie between the different collaborators and the expression of goodwill (albeit undocumented) by those turning in their arms.

In its report on the MPCD program, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) concluded that "private and state initiatives similar to that sponsored by the MPCD have had a psychological as well as practical impact in El Salvador; the perception



that a weapon is necessary for protection and self-defense has diminished. In a recent survey around 15% of San Salvador's citizens polled supported the view that owning a gun might be necessary for self-protection. Nevertheless, there is still a widespread concern over the levels of gun ownership, especially in the capital where 52,270 people carry weapons." (BASIC, 1997)

The *Tutela Legal del Arzobispado de San Salvador* (Archbishop's Office for Human Rights) qualified the Goods for Guns program as a positive experience in that citizens were persuaded to surrender instruments of death and violence. However, the *Tutela Legal* did not think the program was efficient, but rather that the money spent on program administration and incentives could have been better spent elsewhere. They pointed out that El Salvador was no less armed than at the end of the conflict; in fact, 48,620 new firearms were legally imported into the country during the Goods for Guns collection period, which does not take grenades and other military equipment into account. The legal firearms imported from 1 January 1996 to 1 June 1999 are listed in Table 4 in the Appendix.


The argument can be made that most of the legally imported weapons are not designed to military specifications, and therefore less of a threat. However, add to this the unknown quantity of weapons in the black market and it is easy to see that El Salvador was still a society armed to the teeth. If the MPCD's original and only goal was to remove a specific percentage of weapons from circulation in El Salvador, than this program can be considered a failure; but this was not the case. Nevertheless, it cast doubts of the efficacy of the Goods for Guns program given a lack of restraint on the legal arms market.

At the same time, it is important to note that, beyond the weapons collected, there are significant intangible benefits of the Goods for Guns program, primarily in the area of civil society and governmental collaboration in reducing crime and violence. Unfortunately, the lack of reliable statistics on firearm-related crime, injury and death within El Salvador, especially outside of the capital, makes it difficult to evaluate the impact of Goods for Guns on violent crime. However, from a public health standpoint, at minimum 9,527 weapons were collected and more than 100,000 rounds of ammunition, which represents thousands of accidents that did not occur. As a result, more money can be spent on providing preventive health care to poor Salvadorans.

It would be naïve to believe that organized criminals and gangs would turn in their weapons to a program that provided mainly non-cash incentives at below black market value. However, the MPCD and Goods for Guns program have been successful in drawing attention to the fact that guns are designed to hurt and kill people. The collaboration with the PNC has helped to create a public security dialogue that has resulted in a more dedicated effort to confiscate weapons in the black market and implement progressive community policing efforts. Although the PNC is far from perfect, it is a significant improvement over its predecessor. As of May 1999, the Salvadoran people qualified the PNC as the second most trustworthy public institution in the country behind the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights, and ahead of the military and judicial system (IUDOP, 1999).

The MPCD also established a degree of credibility and a reputation that permitted the institution to affect the passage of a new law on arms and munitions, which passed

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by the Legislative Assembly in June 1999. This law is far from perfect, and is even considered pro-firearms by some. Nevertheless, it is a step toward increased control and scrutiny of weapons in society.

In conclusion, the MPCD Goods for Guns program has:

- Removed thousands of military-style weapons from circulation, comparable in quantity to those collected during the 1992 UN peace operation, thus preventing their continued circulation in an already saturated black market
- Demonstrated its autonomy and ability to mobilize resources from the public and private sectors within El Salvador
- Provided a systematic and well-documented set of procedures that can provide a model for programs to be developed in other countries
- Fostered relationships built over time between the private sector, civil society, media, government, police and military
- Demonstrated the possibility of conducting a public relations campaign on a national scale with the support of the media
- Demonstrated that it is possible to collect highly lethal and operating weapons from civil society concerned with their misuse in criminal activities

### Shortcomings of the Goods for Guns program:

- Funding, especially by donor states, was very uncoordinated due to the fact that small arms and light weapons was a very new on the international agenda. Those states and international organizations supporting the program did so mainly because of the global lack of programs addressing the small arms problem.
- The organizers of the program were concerned primarily with the impact of small arms and light weapons on crime involving the middle and upper classes. As a result, there was only a limited number of negative effects from these weapons highlighted by the program. For example, the use of these weapons to violate the human rights of citizens was not widely publicized. As a result, no link was made between this program and the overall economic development of the country. This result was considered a failure of the program to move outside of the city of San Salvador.
- There was no attempt to use the collection program to foster the development of other types of violence prevention programs (e.g., gang violence reduction programs, firearms surveillance systems, etc).
- While useful linkages developed between the private sector and the government, the program was not used as part of community building *per se*.



- Other than having citizens continue to turn in weapons, there were few programmatic objectives that could be used in evaluating the program. In addition, no attempt was made to interview participants as to their motives, experiences, etc. – a technique that has been used successfully in other collection programs.
- The program was not linked to policies designed to limit the re-supply or restocking of weapons into the country during the program period. This factor was critical in donor states discontinuing their support of the program.

#### 5. Final note

A final point must be made about the impact of the Goods for Guns Program. By 2000, the donors had lost their enthusiasm for a supporting program that did not reduce the number of weapons in circulation.<sup>39</sup> There was no announced end to the program, but rather a trickling away of interest that eventually led to a halt. However, the program had succeeded in developing enough awareness of the issue that the media continued to cover the problems associated with small arms and light weapons well beyond the year 2000. This heightened awareness resulted in the government requesting the UNDP to implement a small arms control program in the country. 40 This program addresses the small arms problem as a multidimensional one and involves government, academic and NGO participants. To date, achievements include the establishment of a PNC firearm and violence database, anti-violence campaigns in schools, and a legislation reform project. Interestingly, the project only contemplates a weapons collection component when other preparatory steps have been completed.<sup>41</sup> While it cannot be said that the MPCD program led to the current UNDP program, it is true that the publicity of the Goods for Guns program played an important role in making government action imperative.

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


Table 1: Weapons Collected by ONUSAL 1992-93

| Pistols                           | 411       |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|
| Assault rifles                    | 8,268     |
| Sub-machine guns                  | 239       |
| Machine guns                      | 271       |
| Grenade launchers                 | 662       |
| Mortars and cannons               | 379       |
| Missiles                          | 74        |
| Munitions                         | 4,032,606 |
| Rockets                           | 140       |
| Grenades (hand, mortar and CN.57) | 9,228     |
| Explosives                        | 5,107.1   |

Source: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, 1993

Table 2: Exchange Values for the Goods for Guns Program (US dollars)

| Old or deteriorated pistols or rifles            | 60-85             |
|--|-------------------|
| Pistols, .22 caliber rifles and semi-auto rifles | 60-175            |
| Automatic rifles such as AK-47, M-16, Galil, etc | 350               |
| Grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and mortars | 115               |
| Grenades and mines                               | 3 (cash exchange) |

Source: Patriotic Movement Against Crime (MPCD), July 1998

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Table 3: Weapons Collected by MPCD 1996-99

| Pistols and short arms             | 1,354   |
|------------------------------------|---------|
| Long arms including assault rifles | 3,043   |
| Grenades                           | 3,180   |
| Grenade launchers                  | 44      |
| Law Rockets                        | 290     |
| Detonator cord                     | 84      |
| Detonators                         | 1,042   |
| Blocks of TNT                      | 277     |
| C-4 explosive                      | 147     |
| Mines                              | 55      |
| Mortars                            | 4       |
| RPG-7                              | 6       |
| SAM-7 projectiles                  | 1       |
| Sub-total                          | 9,527   |
| Magazines                          | 3,157   |
| Ammunition                         | 129,696 |
| Total                              | 142,380 |

Source: Patriotic Movement Against Crime (MPCD), August 1999

Table 4: Legal Firearms Imports to El Salvador 1996-99

|         | 1996   | 1997   | 1998   | 1999  | Total  |
|---------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|
| Pistols | 10,853 | 9,984  | 12,934 | 4,293 | 38,064 |
| Rifles  | 5,942  | 2,802  | 4,609  | 1,860 | 15,213 |
| Total   | 16,795 | 12,786 | 17,543 | 6,153 | 53,277 |

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#### **Acronyms**

**FMLN** Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional

FAES Government Forces of El Salvador

ONUSAL UN Observer Mission in El Salvador

**PNC** Civilian Police Force

**DDR** Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

MPCD Patriotic Movement Against Crime (Movimiento Patriotico Contra la

Delincuencia)

ADES Association of Distributors of El Salvador

**AMPS** Association of Salvadoran Advertisers

MoD Ministry of Defense

BASIC British American Security Information Council

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
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#### Annex II:

## Case study Mozambique "Guns into ploughshares"

In 1995, the Mozambican Council of Christian Churches (CCM) – the coordinating body of the Anglican churches of Mozambique – began the Tools for Arms project (TAE) as one of the first civil society bodies to ever embark on such an effort. Almost ten years later, the TAE project is still in existence.

SALW are an important symbol in Mozambican society. The AKM assault rifle is emblazoned on the national flag due to its role in the war of independence. After independence was won from Portugal in 1974, an even bloodier civil war ensued until 1992, leaving at least one million people dead and even more displaced from their communities. Following the end of the war, the United Nations sponsored a peace process that demobilized more than 100,000 fighters and collected and destroyed some 214,000 weapons. Despite this success, hundreds of thousand of weapons continued to circulate in Mozambique threatening the peace-building and development processes. Police reform had made major progress in Maputo, the country's capital, but had less impact in the interior of the country where many ex-combatants live.

Senhor Sousa Manuel Goao, 44, lives in the village of Boane Gegege near Maputo. In 1981, at age 23, he was kidnapped at gunpoint by anti-government rebel troops and forced to march 150 miles to a training camp in the bush near the border with South Africa.


"They made us march barefooted so we couldn't run away. Anyone who did try and run was lined up in front of us and shot," says Goao. In order to survive, his unit would hunt wild animals, raid farms or attack civilians.

"Five or six of us would stand across the highway and stop cars while the rest of our unit would shoot them under cover of the bush. We would take what we wanted food for example - and kidnap men to train as soldiers. 'We were indoctrinated - trained to win at any cost. We had no thought as to whether we were killing soldiers, men, women or children. It didn't matter."

When the cease-fire was agreed in 1992, United Nations troops were mandated to disarm both sides. They collected some weapons, but most remained hidden. Former soldiers like Goao know where many of these hidden guns are and admit they remain a temptation to the dispossessed by providing a means to threaten, rob and kill fellow Mozambicans.

But today Goao is happy. He is voluntarily handing over his guns - four AK47s and an automatic rifle. He is not giving them up to the UN or to the state authorities, but rather to a small church-based charity, the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM).

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Annex II

In return, he will receive a sewing machine - he already has two of them for guns he previously handed in.

Those who give up their weapons are given tools - ploughs, bicycles and sewing machines. In a land where many struggle to make enough money to eat, a simple plough can be the difference between life and death. The CCM staff knows how crucial this project is to the safety and security of Mozambican society, as several of them have been car-jacked and one was shot twice in the shoulder while having his car stolen.


The Mozambique Government supports the operation since they are aware that former rebels are unlikely to hand in weapons to the authorities out of fear of prosecution. The Government also does not have the capacity to deal with SALW collection and destruction beyond its joint border collaboration with South Africa, as it has many other priorities such as promoting economic development and dealing with natural disasters. The CCM was therefore able to fill this gap and set out to collect weapons primarily from ex-combatants. In exchange, they provided tools, destroyed the weapons for artists to transform into works of art, and educated communities about the dangers of weapons.

Between 1995 and 2003, the CCM collected almost 8,000 weapons and more than 400,000 rounds of ammunition and explosives in exchange for bicycles, sewing machines, food commodities, zinc roofing sheets, construction materials and a wide range of tools. The funding came primarily from international donor governments and NGOs, while the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) provided personnel on a regular basis to support the program's implementation.

In some cases, individuals or groups of individuals brought weapons directly to the CCM and its provincial offices, or provided information on where a weapons cache could be found. The point of the weapons exchange process was to provide resources to ex-combatants to assist the, in generating income for their beneficiaries and families, though it has been difficult to determine the outcome of this process. Both the police and the military seconded officials as full time employees to work with the TAE project as technical support staff for collection, safe storage and destruction. A formula was developed for determining the value of incentives for information or weapons: one operational weapon is equal to twelve non-operational weapons, which is equal to 520 units of ammunition, which is equal to 10 zinc sheets (which itself is equal to 1 used bicycle, etc.).

The entire TAE project teams consists of a national coordinator, seven project officers, a driver, security guard, two technical staff mentioned above and consultants from international volunteer agencies. Other NGOs also provide moral support and ad-hoc collaboration, such as the Foundation for Community Development, the Association of Demobilized Soldiers and the peace group, PROPAZ. The project has enjoyed the endorsement of both major political parties in Mozambique as well.

The weapons collected are cut up in CCM's compound in Maputo and the pieces handed over to a group of Mozambican artists who make sculptures with them. These artists have even make chairs and coffee tables out of cut-up Kalashnikovs. While these works of art have not yet traveled all over the world, they have served



as an effective marketing tool and thus extremely helpful in obtaining additional international support for the continuation of the TAE project.

"It is a practical solution based on the bible," says Mozambican Bishop Dinis Sengulane, chairman of CCM's peace and reconciliation committee. "I say to people that sleeping with a gun in your bedroom is like sleeping with a snake - one day it will turn round and bite you. We tell people we are not disarming you. We are transforming your guns into ploughshares, so you can cultivate your land and get your daily bread."

"We are transforming them into sewing machines so you can make clothes. We are transforming them into bicycles so you don't have to spend money travelling to work and so you can collect the fruits of your fields to sell," he adds. "The idea is to transform the instruments of death and destruction into instruments of peace and of production and cooperation with others."

Thanks to CCM, which is supported by Christian Aid, Goao and thousands like him are celebrating a new-found prosperity. He, his brother and an uncle use their sewing machines to make dresses, which they sell in a local market. "I am so happy now there is peace," says Goao. "I am free and go where I want. And I thank CCM for these machines. Without them I would have been forced into banditry to live and to support my wife. I used to sell fruit and vegetables on the streets but often we'd have nothing to eat for days. Now we eat well every day."

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# Annex III:

# Case study Brazil Viva Rio

The NGO Viva Rio was created in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1993 in response to the August 1993 killings of eight street children and 22 urban poor by the provincial police. Since its creation, Viva Rio has worked on violence and SALW issues in the State of Rio de Janeiro, as well as on issues of social and economic justice, urban environmentalism and education for the poor. It is a large grassroots NGO with more than one thousand full-time and part-time employees, including extension workers in the communities.


Since 1993, Viva Rio has worked to combat a growing wave of urban violence—a problem that mainly affects young people—in Brazilian cities. Campaigns for peace and against the proliferation of small arms, as well as projects aiming to reduce criminal behavior and armed violence, are the hallmarks of the organization's work. Activities to confront problems associated with the proliferation and misuse of firearms are carried out at the local, national, and international levels. Viva Rio concentrates its work in this area on three main objectives:

- To reduce the demand for guns (actions to sensitize civil society to the risks involved with using or carrying firearms and to respond to the gun industry lobby);
- To reduce the supply of guns (curb illicit arms trafficking and control the production, sales, exports and imports of small arms and ammunition); and
- To improve stockpile controls (destruction of excess guns and improvement of secure storage facilities).

The main activities of the Viva Rio arms reduction project over the past years are:

# Disarmament campaigns

- Public awareness campaigns on the need for civil disarmament (so that "honest citizens" and their families do not become victims of their own guns in accidents or do not fall victim to armed assailant if they try to defend themselves with a gun) and in favor of a culture of peace (through the peaceful resolution of conflicts between individuals), with a focus on youth, women, public health, and the mobilization of churches:
- Campaigns to reform permissive and inefficient legislation on arms controls, seeking to end the civilian use of firearms (a new law in Rio, for example has made it much more difficult to purchase firearms). Pressure on the Brazilian Congress to combat the strong influence and well-funded lobbying of the gun




- industry, so that the ban on civil use of firearms can pass at the national level (78% of Brazilian have declared that they are opposed to allowing civilians to carry guns, and 60% say they support a total ban);
- Campaigns to promote voluntary weapons collection programs, with church-based support.

### Arms destruction

- The public destruction of 100,000 guns on June 24, 2001 in Rio de Janeiro was the largest simultaneous gun destruction in the history of the world;
- On July 12<sup>th</sup>, 2002, in support of International Gun Destruction Day (July 9), 10,000 guns that had been apprehended by police in irregular situations were destroyed. The Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, as well as representatives from the UN, the OAS, and PNUD were present at this year's public act. A documentary film is currently being made about this destruction.
- Develop research, together with ISER, to produce reliable information on the consequences of the use of firearms and their proliferation, as well as on ways to reduce the number of gun-related deaths. These include: the impact of gun use on public health (including the economic impact), victimization (who are the most frequent victims of armed violence, under what circumstances accidents and murders occur), legislation, illicit arms trafficking, and children and young people involved in organized armed violence.
- Reform the classification methods and conditions for stockpiling small arms at the Civil Police facilities in Rio, aiming to create a standard applicable to the whole country, to increase the security of stockpiled weapons and to allow seized weapons to be traced so that the routes of illicit trafficking come to light; a classification manual for the data collected on seized weapons is being put together for the Rio de Janeiro state Secretary of Public Security.
- Creation of a database with information on 750,000 firearms registered and/or seized in the state of Rio de Janeiro, in partnership with the Arms and Explosives Control Division of the Rio Civil Police (DFAE). Detailed lists and information on these weapons is available on the website <a href="www.desarme.org">www.desarme.org</a>. This, coupled with public events organized with the Rio state Secretary of Public Security, draw attention to data on Brazilian and foreign weapons seized by the police and encourage international cooperation to trace the routes of small arms used by criminals.

# Events in support of civil disarmament

Popular activities (marches, shows, murals, etc.) that seek to reduce the demand for guns, such as free concerts in urban shantytowns (favelas) in Rio, with hip hop artists whose music discourages involvement in criminal gangs and the use of guns. The "Mural of Pain" was exhibited in Rio and at the national congress in Brasilia. It is currently being showed around cities in the United States, with support from the World Council of Churches.



### Film production

In a contribution to NGO training and best practice sharing among NGOs involved in the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Viva Rio is currently seeking support to produce short informational films. Topics include the following: women and armed violence, the impact of violence on public heath and economics, community policing, voluntary small arms collection programs, and advocacy for gun control legislation. The film production team is currently producing a documentary film on small arms destructions to train NGOs and law enforcement agents.

## MERCOSUR network and regional training


- A network of NGOs from the MERCOSUR region (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) that work on disarmament was formed and meet periodically for workshops;
- Encourage research centers in Brazil and Latin America to develop works that reveal the harmful effects of the proliferation of small arms;
- NGO training in campaigns and research;
- This past July 12, a website on disarmament and human security was launched (www.desarme.org), with content in Spanish and Portuguese. The site contains news and information, updated daily, as well as research, links, and photos.

#### International activities

- Participation in the international movement against the proliferation of small arms, through participation in various networks of NGOs whose objectives are to reduce the impact of firearms on the population and build a culture of peace. The main international network is the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), which brings together more than 500 NGOs from all over the world.
- Participation in national and international conferences, with the objective of learning from the experience of countries that were successfully able to reduce urban violence and to publicize share the experiences of Viva Rio. A particularly important conference was the UN Conference on Illegal Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in New York on July 9-20, 2001.
- Cooperation with other NGOs, national governments, and international organizations to identify the routes of illegal small arms trade in and out of Brazil.

# Legislation

■ Viva Rio has recently completed a research paper entitled harmonizing laws for the prevention of illicit firearms transfers: analysis of the firearms control laws of MERCOSUR countries and their compatibility with OAS-CICAD's model regulations.



Consistent work to collaborate and pressure state and federal governments to take more effective measures to contain small arms proliferation.

### Children and armed violence

Research that seeks to define the problem of children affected by organized armed violence, in the national context as well as internationally, and to develop solutions that offer alternatives and press for policy change. Direct work with at-risk children to get them out of crime and armed violence.

### "Brasil Sem Armas", Gun-Free March

(14/09/2003)

The Gun-Free March supporting the Disarmament Statute was organized by Viva Rio on Copacabana beach and brought together various actors of civil society. Despite the cold rain, 50,000 participants gathered that day. Following the structure of a carnival parade, the march was divided into groups: victims of gun violence, law enforcement forces, members of the justice system, and a special group with actors from the highly popular local sit-com "Women in love", with full support and broadcasting by the TV Network Globo. In total, more than 20 different groups integrated the march.


According to a recent survey conducted by IBOPE (18-22 October, 2003) with 2,000 citizens in 147 Brazilian cities, 80% of the surveyed are in favor of a ban on gun sales for civilians and 65% believe that the measures of the Disarmament Statute could contribute to reducing gun violence

### International Day of Weapons Destruction

(09/07/2002)

The International Day of Weapons Destruction celebrated on the 9<sup>th</sup> of July was established by the UN in 2001 so that the local governments could promote the destruction of the firearms surplus and could debate with the society about the proliferation of firearms and the increase of crime rates, searching for a solution that would involve the action of the governments, of the society and of the military institutions.

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of July 2002, the State Government and Viva Rio promoted the destruction of 10 thousand weapons apprehended by the police in 1997. A tractor smashed pistols, revolvers, machine guns, and rifles. Most of these weapons had been taken from criminals. On the same day, ambassadors of 27 countries that produce this kind of armament (such as USA, ,Spain, Argentina, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Austria and the Czech Republic) participated on a meeting that discussed the illegal weapons traffic in Rio de Janeiro.



### "Choose Gun Free! It's Your Weapon or Me!"

(05/05/2001)

Mobilization of women in support of the disarmament movement to take an active role in disarming their husbands, boyfriends, sons, brothers or friends.

### "Mother, Disarm Your Son!"

(01/01/2001)

Through hip hop shows and gun destruction, this campaign appeals to mothers in low-income communities to protect their sons from the dangers of firearms.

### "Put Down That Gun"

(01/10/2000)

A national campaign that intends to inform society about the need for civil disarmament, expanding the campaign initiated in Rio de Janeiro to other states.

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# Annex IV:

# Case study Cambodia Voluntary weapons collection from the civilian population

Thirty years of violent conflict have left Cambodia with anywhere from 500,000 to more than a million SALW. The transition from a post conflict society to a culture of sustainable peace, security and development is hampered by the possession of illegal weapons and explosives by the civilian population. EU ASAC (EU Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia) has supported the weapon collection efforts of the Royal Government of Cambodia through a strategy called "Weapons for Development" (WfD) combined with a police capacity-building project. This strategy aims to provide a sense of security after people have turned in their weapons and to improve police-community relations.


In 1998, the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR) in Cambodia began advocating publicly for the government to take action on disarmament and small arms control.

In 1999, by request of the Government of Cambodia, the European Union (EU) assisted the Cambodian Government in the drafting of a weapons law on use, possession, trade and transport of weapons; the safeguarding and registration of weapons in the hands of the military; public awareness on the destabilizing effects of possession and use of weapons and the link between weapons security and development; the voluntary collection of weapons possessed by the civilian population through a process of exchange for community-owned development projects and the destruction of the army surplus of weapons and of the weapons collected from the civilian population.

The WGWR did not participate directly in the SALW collection and destruction component of the EU-supported program, but its advocacy was, and continues to be very important for obtaining the attention of the international community as well as providing preliminary baseline data regarding the SALW problem in Cambodia.

# Weapons for Development (WfD)

In 2001 -2002 in Snuol District, Kratie Province and Bakan District, Pursat Province, EU ASAC implemented pilot projects using community-owned development incentives such as water wells and schools to encourage the voluntary hand in of weapons. EU ASAC rejects the practice of a direct exchange for cash and demonstrating the progressive link between peace, security and development lies at the heart of the WfD philosophy.



The two major projects involved advocacy and awareness; community involvement in deciding the collective rewards for disarmament in the form of development projects; improving capacity of local authorities; and weapons collection and public destruction. The minor projects only dealt with public awareness-raising and SALW collection.

# Police support

Increasing local confidence in the capacity of the police forces to provide protection is extremely important in promoting a sense of local security. EU ASAC therefore also provided technical support, good governance and human rights training to local police forces, as well as income-generation training to their families to help build this confidence.

By the end of 2002, EU ASAC had brought together representatives from the Training Department of the National Police, the WGWR and national human rights NGOs to set up a training curriculum for police officers at commune level to improve relations between police and the community and to draft a police training manual. In 2003 this training curriculum was implemented. The cooperation between the Cambodian Ministry of Interior and Cambodian NGOs during the training made this program very unique. These training manuals are now being used by the Training Department of the National Police for training new policemen.


# Local NGO participation

In 2002, 7 local NGOs conducted workshops and provided water wells in return for weapons in the provinces of Pailin, Kampot, Takeo, Kompong Spue, Kompong Cham, Kompong Som and Battambang. Between May 2002 and May 2003, approximately 1500 weapons were voluntarily handed in to the police by the civilian population in the target areas.

In 2003, EU ASAC supported local NGOs in conducting public awareness workshops in nine provinces; Kompong Thom, Kampot, Preah Vihear, Pailin, Battambang, Kompong Cham, Kompong Spue and Kompong Chhnang. When sufficient numbers of weapons were voluntarily handed in to the police, water wells were provided in return.

## Mine awareness

In areas affected by landmines and UXO, EU ASAC cooperates with the Cambodian Mine Action Center to send one of their representatives to EU ASAC public awareness workshops to integrate the topic of mine awareness into the SALW awareness message, which is being disseminated



# Capacity building of the commune councils in matters of security and specifically weapons security.

In 2004, in co-operation with the Department for Local Administration, EU ASAC set up a project to train commune councils and provide capacity to work on security and the problems caused by illegal weapons in the community. This complements EU ASAC's police-training program, as both programs aim to improve co-operation between the police, the community and the commune councils.

The Cambodian Government claims that, with the EU support, they were able to increase the number of collected weapons, decrease the number of armed crimes, and increase the sense of security and confidence in the police. Weapons handed in to the authorities were destroyed in local Flames of Peace as a symbolic demonstration of the shift to a culture of peace.

Public knowledge of the project in and outside the target areas is a clear indicator that the project has gained an appreciated place within civil society and with local authorities.

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# Annex VIII:

# SWOT analysis for SALW collection and destruction<sup>42</sup>

To be effective it is important to develop your program of work based on a realistic assessment of what is feasible and where your organization's actions will be productive and successful. This is largely dependent upon analyzing your internal capabilities and matching them with the needs of the external environment. One common way to assess the environment and your organization's role is to carry out a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats).

The SWOT analysis organizes information by breaking it down into the following categories:

**Strengths** (internal): the positive aspects of your organization related to SALW collection and destruction, such as resources and capabilities that can be used as a basis for developing a competitive advantage. Examples of such strengths include:


- Knowledge of the area.
- Knowledge about SALW.
- Good organizational experience.
- Relations with public figures.
- Previous experience in SALW.

**Weaknesses** (internal): the factors *within* your organization that might make working on SALW collection difficult. Examples include:

- Lack of previous experience in this field.
- Insufficient budgetary resources.
- Poor organizational skills.

**Opportunities** (external): the factors in society that could positively affect your participation in SALW collection and destruction. Examples include:

- A popular demand for getting rid of firearms.
- The end of a conflict.
- Support from international organizations.



**Threats** (external): the factors in society that could negatively affect your ability to participate in SALW collection and destruction activities. Examples include:

- Lack of local security.
- High degrees of corruption.
- Lack of local perception that SALW are a problem.

The following box has four quadrants, one for each of the SWOT categories. Once you fill in the information, you should use it to consider:

- How you can address and minimize your weaknesses and the threats you identify.
- How you can maximize your strengths and take full advantage of your opportunities.


| Weaknesses  |
|---|
| What are the factors within your organization that might make working on SALW collection difficult?                                     |
| 1.  |
| 2.  |
| 3.  |
|   |
|   |
|   |
| Threats   |
| What are the factors in society that could negatively affect your ability to participate in SALW collection and destruction activities? |
| 1.  |
| 2.  |
| 3.  |
|   |
|   |
|   |

# Annex IX:

# Research tools in brief 43

| Research tool   | Pros   | Cons   |
|---|--|--|
| Structured key informant interviews: the interviewer asks the same questions to every respondent, following a pre-determined questionnaire.   | <ul> <li>Avoids biases of interviewers to a certain extent.</li> <li>Allows the inexperienced interviewer to make sure all questions have been dealt with, and helps him/her direct the interview.</li> <li>Allows reliable data comparison.</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>Makes it difficult to follow-up on interesting, unexpected points made by the interviewee.</li> <li>Makes an exchange of views and thoughts impossible.</li> <li>Does not allow for a learning process and adaptation from one interview to the next.</li> <li>Could give the interviewee the impression that the researcher is insecure and/or lacks expertise</li> <li>Can make the interviewee feel as if s/he is being interrogated rather than interviewed.</li> </ul> |
| Semi-structured key informant interviews: the interviewer has determined broad themes and some specific questions in advance, but retain the possibility to create questions during the interview, probe the interviewee's answers, and control the general direction of the interview. | <ul> <li>Allows making maximum use of an interviewee's knowledge.</li> <li>Allows for correcting the focus and the questions during an interview (and from one interview to the next), if the interviewer realizes that preparations were inadequate.</li> <li>Can install a more friendly atmosphere in which the interviewee feels more comfortable to speak.</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>The friendly relationship sometimes installed can make interviewers less prone to probe and critically assess information provided in the interview.</li> <li>Possibility of biases.</li> <li>Interview is less direct and can derail if the interviewer is not used to interviewing.</li> <li>Can make the interviewee feel that s/he is loosing her/his time if not sufficiently structured.</li> </ul>   |

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Large-scale household surveys: Normally >1,000 persons from as many households, randomly sampled, answer a set of identical questions, either by phone, or in face-toface interviews (the interviewer goes from house to house).

- Information obtained, if valid and reliable, is scientifically sound.
- If identical questions can be posed across countries, cross-country comparisons can easily be made.
- Respondents, who will by necessity know very little about the research and its goals, might lie about a sensitive topic such as guns. Enumerators, in contrast to interviewers, have limited possibilities to control for this.
- Household surveys tend to generate the "socially accepted" truth, rather than solicit the preferences and opinions of the respondents (so if guns are considered "bad" in a society at large, the individual will claim often that he believes guns are bad, even if this is not his true opinion).
- Question design is complex, given the sensitivity of the issue.
- Phone interviews should be avoided, given the sensitivity of the gun issue. House-to-house interviews are more expensive.

Focus groups: A focus group meeting is a flexible, non-formal, interactive discussion on pre-set topics with a group of individuals selected because they are believed to be representative of some category of people. It normally involves between 8-12 people, takes 2-3 hours and involves 1-2 facilitators (leaders of the discussion) and a note-taker.

- Gives richer information than household surveys.
- Can fit well with a sensitive topic such as small arms, if categories of participants are carefully selected.
- Requires a skilled facilitator, who can lead the discussion without biasing it

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# Annex XI:

# Step-by-step-guide for writing a funding proposal.

1) The guide below has been adapted from Table 3.3: "What to include in a funding proposal" of the Action Against Small Arms, A Resource and Training Handbook.44

Your proposal should consist of ALL the elements below:

### 1. Summary:


- A brief statement of the overall aim of the program;
- A short description of the project in question;
- An explanation of the amount of money required for the project; and
- A brief description of your organization.

### 2. Rationale:

- This section should provide an explanation of the need for your project:
- Define the specific problems that you want to address, and support your argument with evidence and statistics;
- Try to demonstrate that your project is workable: that it can be done within a reasonable time, by you, and with a reasonable amount of money;
- Avoid exaggeration and excessively emotional appeals;
- Refer to the work of others in this field and explain how your work complements, but does not duplicate their work.

### 3. Objectives:

- What are the planned outcomes of the project?
- Your objectives must be specific, measurable and achievable in a specific time period. Do not promise what you cannot deliver.



### 4. Project Partners:

- Who are the project partners?
- What is the division of responsibility between them and you?

### 5. Methods and Activities:

- What will the project actually do?
- How will it be conducted?

### 6. Project Timetable:

- What are the major activities, and when will they take place?
- Activities should fit under each objective, contributing to attaining the objective.
- Estimate the time-scale in weeks or months if you cannot give precise dates.
- Include the points when evaluation and report writing will take place.

### 7. Staffing Needs:


Which staff will be deployed on the project, and for how much of their time?

### 8. Budgeting:

- Bear in mind restrictions of the funder (e.g. some refuse to fund salaries) and compensate in your budget accordingly.
- For most projects, costs should be grouped into sub-categories.
- If costs are simple and obvious, narrative explanations are unnecessary.

# 9. Monitoring and Evaluation:

- Who will monitor the activities during the project time frame?
- How will the activities be monitored?
- What criteria will you use to measure the difference that has been made (impact assessments)?
- Make provision for a final evaluation at the end of the project.



### 10. Description of your organization:

Briefly outline:

- When your organization came into existence.
- Its mission, and how your proposal relates to this mission.
- Your organization's structure programs, and special expertise.
- Staffing, including the number of full-time and part-time staff, and their levels of expertise.

### 11. Conclusion:

Summarize your case and try to end it with a powerful appeal for your project.

In order to write a successful proposal, you must be as critical as possible towards what you have done. Keep in mind that the donor will be very critical, since many applicants apply for limited amounts of money. Here are a series of steps you ought to consider.

### Step 1 Define your objectives.

You can start by describing the situation in your area or country by way of background. This serves as your rationale for the program. You should explain why you (and not, for instance, the government) is to do undertake this initiative.


You can then state what, in general, needs to be done (your goal), for example "Reduce firearm-induced injuries."

You should then clearly and unambiguously state what you intend to do. For example "We want to engage in a five month collection campaign starting in April 200\_. We will use that time to (a) engage in a publicity campaign (3 months); (b) Collect and store firearms in exchange for community incentives for one month; (c) destroy the collected weapons (one month)."

### Step 2 List your resources

Here you should list what competencies and resources you have that will be relevant to the program, including:

Your organization (who will be running/organizing the proposed project, and what qualifications they have. Do not list everyone in the organization, only the keypersonnel for this project), its capacities (for example, one sentence descriptions of previous programs you have implemented successfully), and its resources (for example "we are allocating 3 trained full-time people for the project. We will be assisted by 23 part-time volunteers who have already signed up. We hope to recruit another 15 during the campaign"). You should also list your existing partners/supporters and potential supporters (for example "We have had commitments by three legislators, and by the governor of the province to support this project with necessary legislation and permissions," or "We shall be working together with NGO X to share trained personnel.")



### Step 3 List what is needed for the project

Time, personnel, vehicles, running costs needed to accomplish the object of the project. Justify why you need these things to accomplish your objectives.

### Step 4 Write the proposal

Using the list you have made in the previous steps fit the information into the proposal elements described.

### Step 5 Have someone else read the proposal and comment on it

- 1. Is it easy to understand?
- 2. Is it clear what you want to do?
- 3. Is it clear how you want to do it?
- 4. Is it clear why you are the best organization for the job?
- 5. Is it clear what will happen to the money you are asking for, and that it is justified by the situation and by your stated objectives?
- 6. Is it clear why the donor should give you the money (does the proposal suit the donor's policies and stated objectives)?

If your readers' answer to all of these questions is "yes", then print the proposal out in at least three copies. Keep one for yourself, send at least two (or as many as are required by the donor) to the donor.

### Step 6 Checking

A week or more after you expect the proposal to have arrived to the donor, call them up (or send an e-mail) asking courteously whether the proposal has been received. **Do not ask what the results were**: the donor will certainly inform you if you are succesful, according to their procedures. The call is meant to reassure your organization, and to put a 'human face' behind the project proposal.

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
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
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
- 1 GTZ and BICC, Organizing Civil Society Campaigns for Small Arms Action, p. 33.
- 2 The concept of human security Human security is a concept that focuses on the security of individuals as opposed to the security of the State. It emerged in the 1990s in response to the 'new' security threat from within the borders of a country, resulting from civil conflict, displacement and genocide. These threats made it increasingly evident that secure borders weren't enough to ensure the well being of individuals and consequently, whole communities. The concept of human security can therefore be narrowly defined as the protection of individuals from the threat or incidence of violence, or more broadly considered as a means of promoting human development by addressing such things as poverty, disease, malnutrition and environmental degradation. A focus on human security does not substitute the goal of national security, but rather is complementary to it - both national and human security are needed in order to ensure the security of individuals, to promote productive societies and to maintain a sustainable peace. For a more in depth look at this concept, refer to the Human Security Report 2005 at http:// www.humansecurityreport.info/
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- 15 According to Wolf-Christian Paes, fewer than 28,000 guns were collected, while over 100,000 fighters were demobilized in Liberia. It was approximately one gun for every four fighters (Wolf-Christian Paes, 'The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, No. 2, summer 2005, pp. 1-9). From 1998-2002, Sierra Leone registered 76,000 combatants and collected and destroyed 42,330 weapons (Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War, (Oxford, Geneva: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- 16 Ibid. p. 278.
- 17 Juan Miche (Member of the Evangelical Church of the River Plate in Buenos Aires, Argentina) "To disarm, body and soul: Brazilian churches participate in national disarmament campaign", *Viva Rio News* (http://www.vivario.org.br/english).
- 18 Christine Beeck, *Project Description: Weapons for Development 2003*, the EU ASAC internal document, Phnom Penh, March 2003, and GTZ and BICC, *Organizing Civil Society Campaigns for Small Arms Action*, Manual for NGOs, pp.10—12.
- 19 GTZ and BICC, Organizing Civil Society Campaigns for Small Arms Action, p. 33.
- 20 The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), *Small Arms and Light Weapons Awareness Support Pack (SASP 2003)*, Table 10, pp. 59-60, (http://www.idea-com.com/sasp/english/publications/handbook/05\_Designing.pdf).
- 21 See, Friends Committee on National Legistlation, *Grasroots Toolkit: Reaching out to your Community* (http://www.fcnl.org/getin/resources/community\_outreach.htm).
- 22 See, Friends Committee on National Legistlation, *Grasroots Toolkit: Reaching out to your Community*.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 See, Friends Committee on National Legistlation, *Grasroots Toolkit: Reaching out to your Community* (available at http://www.fcnl.org/getin/resources/community\_outreach.htm, accessed July 2005).



- 25 IANSA, "International Gun Destruction Day 2005" (http://www.iansa.org/action/2005/gun-destruction-day.htm).
- 26 SEESA, Small Arms and Light Weapons Awareness Support Pack (SASP 2003), p.63.
- 27 IANSA, "International Gun Destruction Day 2005" (http://www.iansa.org/action/2005/gun-destruction-day.htm).
- 28 The Council of the European Union, "Aceh Monitoring Mission", *AMM press releases* (http://ue.eu.int/cms3\_fo/showPage.asp?id=957&lang=EN).
- 29 Peace Art Cambodia (http://www.peaceartprojectcambodia.org/photo\_gallery.php?pic=0008).
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Please refer to Section 3 (p. 58) for an explanation of the distinction between goals and objectives.
- 32 For a more detailed discussion of these indicators, see John Hughes-Wilson and Adrian Wilkinson, *Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction: A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures* (New York: UNDP, 2001), (http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/docs/sa\_prac\_meas.pdf.).
- 33 For a more detailed discussion of these types of indicators, see Geoffrey Mugumya, Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: Weapon Collection Programmes Assessed by Local People (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2004).
- 34 Edward J. Lawrence was a consultant to the United Nations in 1995 and developed a UN weapons collection program for El Salvador. In addition from 1995 he directed the Security and Development Program (SAND- http://sand.miis.edu) at the Monterey Institute, which focused extensively on the weapons circulation and violence problem in El Salvador, as well as weapons collection programs globally. William Godnick joined SAND in 1997 and conducted a process evaluation of the Goods for Guns program in El Salvador in 1997-98.
- 35 At this time, a new concept to address the tools of violence had emerged in other parts of the region. UN peace operations in Nicaragua (1992) and Haiti (1994) had employed for the first time a "gun buy-back" approach, in which citizens were asked to turn in weapons in their possession in exchange for rewards of some kind. In the Dominican Republic (1995) this approach was used in a country suffering from gun violence that was not part of a civil war but rather apolitical crime.
- 36 Second author's interview with MPCD staff, July 1998.
- 37 The UN weapons collection proposal of 1995 was inclusive, with the FMLN due to play a major role.
- 38 Interviews with PNC officials, January 1997.
- 39 Between 1994-1999, El Salvador imported 70, 889 weapons from the United States and was the sixth highest recipient of U.S. arms. William Godnick with Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink. Stray Bullets: The Impact of Small Arms Use in Central America. Occasional Paper No. 5. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, October 2002), p. 7. <www.smallarmssurvey.org>



- 40 The program is described at <www.violenciaelsalvador.org.sv/proyectos/armas\_ligeras.html>
- 41 William Godnick and Helena Vasquez. Small Arms Control in Latin America. International Alert, March 2003, p. 28. < http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/SP\_english.pdf>
- 42 This material adapted from Jim Coe and Henry Smith, *Action against Small Arms: A Resource and Training Handbook.* (London: International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld, 2003), pp. 84-87.
- 43 See TRESA module, *Basic Principles of Field Research in Small Arms Action* (*BPF04*), Section 2, p. 13.
- 44 Coe and Smith, Action against Small Arms, p. 161.



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