



Bonn International Center for Conversion

B · I · C · C

bulletin

No. 64

October–December 2013

Security–Industrial Complexes

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Concerns with the production and use of surveillance software, biometric sensors and drone technology have so far been largely a matter for criminologists and human rights activists, who rightly draw attention to the dawn of an Orwellian era of control. But does the study of 'civilian' security technologies also belong on the agenda of peace research? To what extent do the production, proliferation and use of these technologies pose a veritable challenge to peaceful coexistence?

First of all, it is important to realize that the borders between research on military and civilian security technologies are permeable and vague.¹ This is due to the inherent dual-use qualities of many surveillance technologies. Drones, for example, can be used for the purpose of civilian disaster management as well as for military reconnaissance. As it were, policy-makers seek to exploit precisely such overlaps. In May 2009, the EU defense ministers tasked the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Commission to develop a framework to "support both EU military and civilian capability development processes and facilitate synergies between these processes as appropriate".² The 7th EU Research Framework Programme, which financed projects on civilian security at a volume of euro 2.8 billion from 2007 to 2013, shows what such synergies look like. A major part of the projects supported by this Programme is implemented by large defense corporations.³

It may thus be justified to suspect that new military technologies are being developed under the pretense of supporting civilian research; at the same time, however, European defense companies try to gain a foothold in markets for non-military security technologies. They do this through mergers, joint ventures and acquisitions

as well as by adapting their production processes. Some corporations, such as EADS Cassidian, Thales, BAE Systems and Finmeccanica, have thereby become important providers in the areas of cyber security, surveillance and border control. Although these are mainly non-military products, it would be misleading to liken this development to anything resembling actual 'defense conversion'. For even beyond their strictly military use, the application of certain security and surveillance technologies clearly runs counter to the ethical commitments of peace policy. (...)

Shortly after the political upheavals in the Arab world, a debate about the delivery of Western surveillance technologies to the affected region began. For years, European and North American companies have supplied states such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Syria with the necessary technological infrastructure for filtering the Internet, blocking websites, monitoring e-mail traffic or tapping and locating mobile phones. Among the suppliers are large telecommunications groups, such as Nokia Siemens and Ericsson as well as a good number of medium-sized companies that have specialized in programming spyware. Some of these smaller companies have meanwhile been bought by the defense industry. Indeed, the delivery of such technologies to repressive and authoritarian regimes is potentially no less problematic than the export of assault rifles or battle tanks. Surveillance technologies play a decisive role when it comes to locating, arresting, torturing and even murdering alleged dissidents.⁴ (...)

Since 2008, EADS Cassidian has been furnishing the 9,000 km-long border of Saudi Arabia with a concentrated arrangement of highly sophisticated surveillance tools. Algeria and Libya want to establish similar systems in the Sahel zone. Large defense manufacturers are presently vying for contracts.⁵ As a matter of fact, these endeavors coincide smoothly with the intention of EU Member States to 'externalize' their security and migration policy by directly

¹ Eric Töpfer: „Zivil-militärische Sicherheitsforschung“, *W&F Wissenschaft und Frieden*, 2012: 4, pp. 16–19.

² Council of the European Union: Council conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); 2943rd External Relations Council Meeting, Brussels, May 18, 2009.

³ Ben Hayes: *Neoconopticon. The EU Security-Industrial Complex*, London 2009, p. 18.

⁴ Ben Elgin/Vernon Silver/Hermann Zschiegner: *Wired for Repression*, Bloomberg News, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/data-visualization/wired-for-repression>.

⁵ "Euro Firms Vie To Help Secure Libyan Borders," *DefenseNews*, September 22, 2012; "Algeria considers border surveillance system," *Magharebia*, November 16, 2012.

involving adjacent states in North Africa. Cutting-edge European security technology is to protect extraction installations and production facilities for oil and gas against 'terrorists'. In addition, it is to ensure that illegal migrants are caught and detained in the transit states themselves, long before they reach the European shoreline. (...)

Unlike military weapons, the export of many security and surveillance technologies is not subject to official controls. Whereas the international list of military equipment subject to export licenses, laid down in the Wassenaar Arrangement, was expanded in December 2012, this referred only to selected counter-surveillance technologies, which help individuals to protect themselves from being monitored against their will.⁶ The spyware technologies themselves were not included. (...)

There is still a long way to go (...) to the implementation of a comprehensive, institutionally supported set of rules and regulations, which foresees a general authorization when exporting security and surveillance technologies suited to violate human rights. (...) While the EU wants to support the international competitiveness of the European security industry,⁷ there is a real concern that the ethical implications of such policies are brushed under the carpet.

Extract from Marc von Boemcken. 2013. "Arms markets without borders. New complexes of global insecurity" in Marc von Boemcken et al. (eds.), *Friedensgutachten 2013*. Berlin: Lit-Verlag, pp. 35-45 (translated into English, http://friedensgutachten.de/tl_files/friedensgutachten/pdf_eng/FGA_Heft_2013_pdf.pdf)

⁶ Public Statement. 2012 Plenary Meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. Vienna, December 12, 2012. The member states of the Wassenaar Arrangement have agreed that goods listed in the control list require a national export license.

⁷ European Commission: Security Industrial Policy. Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry, Brussels, July 26, 2012, p. 2.

Staff Spotlight



Ada Hakobyan

Ada Hakobyan joined BICC's advisory team in mid-2012 where she has been supporting the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Commissions in Sudan and South Sudan as a technical advisor. Whereas the focus of the advisory project in Sudan lies in small arms control especially through regional cooperation, the project in Juba supports the demobilization and reintegration process in South Sudan. Working for each project half-time but whole heartedly, Ada contributed to the strategic planning process and the implementation of the DDR pilot program in South Sudan, which kick started in April 2013. In Sudan, Ada's work mostly supported the civilian arms registration process in West Darfur and experts' dialogue in preparation towards the operationalization of the sub-regional arms control mechanism (the Khartoum Declaration).

In January 2014, Ada will take over as project leader of the South Sudan DDR project. Based in Bonn but with substantive time in South Sudan, she will continue supporting the National DDR Commission in its efforts to shape and upscale the national DDR process.

Before joining BICC, Ada worked for the German International Cooperation in the areas of security sector reform as well as voluntary reintegration of internally displaced youth in West Africa.

Ada Hakobyan holds an MA in Intercultural Communication and European Studies with the focus on conflict transformation from the University of Applied Sciences in Fulda, Germany. She did her BA in Armenia and the United States. The key to her success as an advisor though, she says, comes from the practitioner's course in system and organization development she completed in Ghana.

"The Gestalt approach taught me how to notice the non-obvious and feed it back to the system in a way, that it raises essential awareness about the present and mobilizes energy for change. Isn't it interesting?" Apart from the Gestalt approach and Dostoyevsky, Ada loves playing tennis, cooking and hanging out with friends.

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Bonn International Center for Conversion bulletin No. 64

BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion) is an independent, non-profit organization dealing with a wide range of global topics in the field of peace and conflict research centering on conversion studies.

This newsletter is published quarterly by

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Study on the parliamentary control of arms exports

A new study commissioned by the German church aid organizations MISEREOR and Brot für die Welt calls for more involvement of the *Bundestag* in improving oversight mechanisms for arms exports. The BICC study "Parlamentarische Kontrolle und Transparenz von Rüstungsexporten" (in German) compares the control procedures in Germany with those of other European neighboring countries and the United States. The authors Jan Grebe and Sebastian Roßner call for a stronger public debate and more parliamentary control.

The paper describes three different models from abroad: One timely *ex-post* control by a parliamentary commission, such as in Great Britain, one *ex-ante* discussion by an external body that is interlinked with parliament, such as in Sweden, and one combination of detailed rights to information and veto by parliament such as in the United States.

What is important to make all three models function, are stipulations that oblige the government to inform the *Bundestag* about its decisions and explain why certain decisions have been made or not. In Germany, the government is the only deciding and fully informed actor with regard to arms exports policy. The *Bundestag* is excluded from making an informed on a par decision on the export of weapons of war. The public, just like the *Bundestag*, is not sufficiently informed of the government's actions. So far, the Arms Exports Report of the government has been published too late and its contents is inadequate. Available outside sources from which the *Bundestag* can obtain information cannot close that information gap.

Suitable procedures must be found that empower a qualified minority of the *Bundestag* to force the government to give reasons for their decisions and that can be used as a basis for political discussion. These reasons should not only present the foreign- and security policy goals pursued with the arms export, but also give a reasoned prognosis in how far the planned export will be beneficial to these goals.

One can think of various institutional arrangements in favor of parliamentary control. The study, amongst other things, argues in favor of

the creation of a special body which is to relieve the plenary. This body, however, should not be buried under confidentiality instructions which greatly restrict democratic and public control of arms exports.

This study is available at http://www.bicc.de/fileadmin/Dateien/pdf/press/2013/Publications/Other_Publications/REB_2013_f%C3%BCr_Bundespressekonferenz.pdf

→ For further information, please contact Jan Grebe at grebe@bicc.de

Module 'Arms control' online now

The online portal <http://sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de> provides detailed information on war and peace via interactive maps, tables, diagrams and texts (in German). BICC has developed the website in association with the German Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb). The seventh thematic module is online now and deals with 'arms control'.

What countries have ratified which arms control agreements? Have more conventional than non-conventional arms control agreements been ratified? Which countries are free of nuclear weapons? Will the arms race in space continue? And how is space being used by countries at the present time? How many objects in space does a country have? Answers to these and many other questions can be found in the information portal on 'War and Peace'. The module 'arms control' gives an overview of basic information on the topics of the history of arms control, conventional weapons, NBC weapons, and weapons in space.

This information is provided primarily by interactive maps. They are activated when one or more map layers in the map navigation tree to the right of the map window are selected. Additional information can be called up via icons within the map navigation tree.

The module 'Arms control' as well as the other modules contains its own collection of background and info texts, a bibliography and glossary. Anyone who is only looking for 'bare figures' on individual states can find these in the country portraits, which compile information from all the modules regarding a single selected country in tabular and printable form.

→ For further information, please contact Lars Wirkus at wirkus@bicc.de

BICC staff wishes you all
a Happy New Year

Publications

BICC Annual Report. 2013. Susanne Heinke (ed.). Bonn: BICC (in English/German).
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http://www.bpb.de/system/files/dokument_pdf/APuZ_2013-37_online.pdf

challenges of the DDR program in the framework of security sector transformation. The pilot DDR program in South Sudan is financed by the German Foreign Office through KfW and World Bank's Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program. BICC offers technical support.

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On 26 to 27 November, the Interim Office of the Sub-Regional Small Arms Control Mechanism hosted a regional experts' meeting in Khartoum, Sudan. This was supported by the advisory project of BICC and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The two-day meeting brought together national focal points from Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Sudan and South Sudan as well as international experts to share experiences and find ways towards the operationalization of the "Khartoum Declaration". In 2012, the participating countries had adopted the "Khartoum Declaration on the control of small arms and light weapons across the neighbouring countries of Western Sudan" as trans-border approach to address the challenges of arms control in the region. The meeting concluded with the joint statement outlining concrete areas of cooperation, pilot project ideas and formalities of establishing the Khartoum Declaration Secretariat.

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On 12 November, Dr. Michael Ashkenazi attended an extraordinary meeting of CODUN (the EU's coordinating committee on arms exports) on the introduction of smart technology into firearms, in Brussels. This follows on to the BICC-organized international conference on the topic in Berlin in June this year. Along with experts from Saferworld, Bradford University, and the industry, Dr. Ashkenazi analyzed potential policy implications of the technology in the realm of individual small arms control, PSSM, and transport of seized arms in DDR projects.

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BICC Notes

Chairperson, William Deng Deng and Deputy Chairperson, Major Mayor Machar of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) visited German institutions in Berlin and Bonn and presented the current state of the DDR process in South Sudan. The main occasion was the presentation of the results of the mid-term review of the DDR pilot program at the KfW on 2 December. After the event, the delegation proceeded to the German Foreign Office. On 3 December BICC hosted the South Sudanese delegation and the representatives of the World Bank, where the honorable guests talked about the successes and