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BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION · INTERNATIONALES KONVERSIONSZENTRUM BONN



report 14

Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation

*Proceedings
of an International Conference,
30–31 August 1999*

february 2000

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This collection of papers summarizes the presentations made at the conference entitled "The Contribution of Disarmament and Conversion to Conflict Prevention and its Relevance for Development Cooperation", held in Bonn, Germany, on 30–31 August 1999. The conference which was organized by BICC in collaboration with the United Nations Office

for Project Services (UNOPS), the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia was to facilitate a dialogue between several—often distinct and separated—communities: the arms control, disarmament and conversion community, the conflict prevention and conflict management community, and the development cooperation community. The BICC conference presented an opportunity for participants to discuss topics which were at the core of the shaping of international relations: conflicts and conflict prevention, disarmament and conversion as well as human development. The conference gave an opportunity to exchange views on concepts and, more importantly, to share practical experiences. Since all of these communities can profit from the work of the others, the idea was to foster the linkage between such different issue areas.

Editing:
Connie Wall

Cover photo:
Tank cemetery in Eritrea
Hacky Hagemeyer,
Transparent



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*Herbert Wulf, editor
with the assistance of Sebastian Esser*

february 2000

Zusammenfassung

Summary

in German

von Herbert Wulf

Konfliktprävention¹ ist mehr als der Reparaturbetrieb des Krieges

Das Hauptziel der Konferenz "The Contribution of Disarmament and Conversion to Conflict Prevention and its Relevance for Development Cooperation", die in Bonn vom 30. bis 31. August 1999 stattfand, lag in der Gestaltung eines Dialoges zwischen verschiedenen, oftmals separat voneinander agierenden Gruppen:

- Experten für Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Konversion, die sich vorrangig mit Sicherheitspolitik beschäftigen und sich darum bemühen, die im militärischen Sektor investierten knappen Ressourcen zu reduzieren;
- Experten für Krisenprävention und Konfliktmanagement, die versuchen gewaltsame Konflikte zu verhindern, zwischen Konfliktparteien zu vermitteln und einen Prozess der Aussöhnung zu unterstützen;
- Experten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit – Praktiker sowohl aus Geber- wie Empfängerländern –, die an der Stärkung des Prozesses nachhaltiger und menschlicher Entwicklung interessiert sind.

Während der Konferenz kamen diese drei Gruppen zur Diskussion über Konzepte zusammen und – wichtiger noch – zu einem Austausch über die bisherigen praktischen Erfahrungen. Da alle drei unterschiedlichen Arbeitsbereiche voneinander profitieren können, ist es besonders wichtig, Verbindungslinien zueinander herzustellen. In einem Grußwort zur Konferenz (siehe Seite 9) hob der Generalsekretär der Vereinten Nationen, Kofi Annan, die Notwendigkeit zur „fortwährenden Beachtung“ dieser Themen hervor und fügte hinzu: „Für die Vereinten Nationen ist der Zusammenhang zwischen Konversion und Abrüstung sowie Konfliktprävention klar.“

Als die Vereinten Nationen Anfang der neunziger Jahre in einem bis dahin ungekannten Umfang in zahlreichen Fällen gebeten wurden, friedenserhaltende Maßnahmen durchzuführen, wurde auch damit begonnen, Konfliktprävention als ein Instrument der Entwicklungspolitik zu diskutieren. Seither hat sich Konfliktprävention auf der internationalen Ebene grundlegend verändert. Für kurze Zeit unmittelbar nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges wurde Konfliktprävention als das zentrale Instrument im Konzept einer neuen Weltordnung angesehen – einer Weltordnung unter Führung der mit mehr Kompetenz und Verantwortung ausgestatteten Vereinten Nationen. Die tatsächliche Praxis der Krisenprävention gestaltete sich jedoch anders. Während ursprünglich Konfliktprävention ganz im Zeichen präventiver Diplomatie stand, können mittlerweile mindestens vier wichtige Veränderungen beobachtet werden:

- Erstens erfüllten die Resultate verschiedener friedenserhaltender Maßnahmen der Vereinten Nationen die ursprünglichen Hoffnungen nicht (so insbesondere in Somalia und Bosnien, aber auch die Inaktivität der Vereinten Nationen in Ruanda waren enttäuschend).
- Zweitens, eng verbunden mit dem ersten Trend, ist zu fragen, ob die mangelnde Beschlussfähigkeit im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen zur Situation im Kosovo Anfang 1999 und die Militäraktion der NATO ohne ein Mandat der Vereinten Nationen als Präzedenzfälle für die Zukunft in ähnlichen Situationen angesehen werden müssen, und ob damit die Rolle der Vereinten Nationen in der Krisenprävention unterminiert wird.
- Drittens scheint man jetzt schneller zu militärischen Aktionen zu neigen, während präventive Diplomatie das Schlüsselwort der Krisenprävention Anfang der neunziger Jahre war.
- Viertens, und in gewisser Hinsicht im Gegensatz zu dem dritten Trend, sind neue Instrumente der Krisenprävention hinzugekommen, die die kurz- und langfristigen Bedürfnisse in Post-Konfliktgesellschaften berücksichtigen: Katastrophenhilfe, Reintegration von Flüchtlingen, Wiederaufbau der materiellen, sozialen und ökonomischen Infrastruktur sowie Programme sozialer Nachhaltigkeit.

Über den Autor

Herbert Wulf ist Geschäftsführer des Internationalen Konversionszentrums Bonn (BICC).

¹ In der deutschen Zusammenfassung werden Konfliktprävention und Krisenprävention synonym verwendet.

Prävention gewaltsamer Konflikte am Ende dieses Jahrzehnts bedeutet mehr als die Wiederherstellung der materiellen Infrastruktur am Ende von Kriegen und Konfliktprävention ist mehr als der Reparaturbetrieb des Krieges. Eingeschlossen sein muss die Schaffung von Frieden in politischer, wirtschaftlicher, sozialer, kultureller und psychologischer Hinsicht. Obwohl allgemein bekannt ist, dass es billiger ist in Prävention zu investieren als die Kriegsschäden zu beseitigen, bleibt es dennoch schwierig die erforderlichen Mittel für Konfliktpräventionsprogramme aufzubringen. US Präsident Clinton hob in einer Ansprache vor Veteranen am 18. August 1999 in Kansas City hervor, dass sich amerikanische Truppen in weniger Kriegen engagieren müssten, wenn der Kongress genügend Mittel für die Auslandshilfe genehmigen würde. „Der teuerste Friede ist weit billiger als der billigste Krieg.“ Anscheinend fällt es Regierungen, internationalen Organisationen und Entwicklungshilfegebern leichter, Ressourcen für Kriege beziehungsweise die Beseitigung von Kriegsschäden aufzubringen, als die Mittel zur Prävention von gewaltsamen Konflikten zu mobilisieren.

Die Konferenz in Bonn gab den Teilnehmern Gelegenheit, die Themen zu diskutieren, die den Kern der internationalen Beziehungen betreffen: Konflikte und Konfliktprävention, Abrüstung und Konversion sowie menschliche Entwicklung. Keines dieser Themen ist neu, aber zwei Aspekte einer neuen Sichtweise seien hervorgehoben: Erstens garantierte die Zusammensetzung der über 100 Teilnehmer – Experten aus Politik und Wirtschaft, Wissenschaftlern und Technikern – einen einmaligen Austausch an Ideen und Erfahrungen. Die Teilnehmer aus allen Teilen der Welt sind nicht nur Garant für interessante Diskussionen, sondern auch für die Umsetzung von Ideen und Konzepten in die Praxis.

Zweitens ging es nicht darum, die unterschiedlichen Themen getrennt voneinander zu diskutieren – Abrüstung und Konversion, Konfliktprävention und internationale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit – sondern Synergien nutzbar zu machen und aus den Zusammenhängen zwischen den bislang voneinander getrennten Agenden Impulse zu erhalten.

Dieser *report* fasst die Ergebnisse der Konferenz in drei Kapiteln sowie Schlussfolgerungen zusammen:

1. Politik: Erfahrungen in Abrüstung, Konversion und Konfliktprävention mit Beispielen aus Nordrhein-Westfalen, präsentiert von Ministerpräsident Wolfgang Clement; eine Analyse der Entwicklungspolitik in ihrer Bedeutung für Sicherheit vorgelegt von Ministerin Heidemarie Wiecezorek-Zeul, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung; ein Beitrag des früheren belgischen Ministers für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Regionald Moreels; eine Präsentation von operationellen Erfahrungen und Möglichkeiten in der Konfliktprävention der Vereinten Nationen durch Reinhart Helmke, Beigeordneter Generalsekretär der Vereinten Nationen und Exekutivdirektor des United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

2. Konzepte und praktische Erfahrungen bei friedensschaffenden Maßnahmen und Post-Konfliktrehabilitation, bei Konfliktprävention und Konfliktlösung, praktischer Abrüstung, der Reform des Sicherheitssektors und zur Zukunft der Konversion. Die Präsentationen in diesem Kapitel sind eine ausgewogene Mischung konzeptioneller Ideen, zukunftsweisender Programme und praktischer Erfahrungen aus verschiedenen Teilen der Welt.

3. Regionale Erfahrungen: Das dritte Kapitel fasst zahlreiche regionale Erfahrungen aus Europa, Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika zusammen, die von Rüstungskontrolle über Konfliktmanagement bis zu Friedensverhandlungen und vertrauensbildenden Maßnahmen reichen.

4. Schlussfolgerungen: Das letzte Kapitel konzentriert sich auf die zu ziehenden Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen für künftige Programme.

Als Direktor des BICC und Gastgeber möchte ich die äußerst wertvollen inhaltlichen Beiträge der drei Mitveranstalter hervorheben: die Beiträge des United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), des Ministeriums für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) und der Regierung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Gemeinsam gelang es, diese einmalige Teilnehmergruppe nach Bonn einzuladen. Ich möchte mich auch für die großzügige finanzielle Unterstützung durch das Ministerium für Schule und Weiterbildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung der Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen sowie durch das Ministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung der Bundesregierung bedanken.

Introduction

introduction



▲ *Wolfgang Clement (at right) and Herbert Wulf*

Conflict Prevention is More than Repairing War Damages

by *Herbert Wulf*

The main goal of the conference entitled "The Contribution of Disarmament and Conversion to Conflict Prevention and its Relevance for Development Cooperation", held in Bonn, Germany, on 30–31 August 1999, was to facilitate a dialogue between several—often distinct and separated—communities:

- the arms control, disarmament and conversion community, which is mainly concerned with security and trying to find ways to reduce the amount of scarce resources invested in the military sector;

- the conflict prevention and conflict management community, which tries to prevent conflict from becoming violent, mediates between warring parties and assists in post-conflict reconciliation; and
- the development cooperation community, including both donors and practitioners from the developing countries, which is interested in establishing a sustained process of human development.

The conference brought together representatives of these communities to exchange views on concepts and, more importantly, to share practical experiences. Since all of these communities can profit from the work of the others, it was hoped to foster the linkages between their different areas of concern.

In a message to the conference (see page 9 for this message), United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the need for "sustained attention" to these issues and added that, "for the United Nations, the links between conversion and disarmament and conflict prevention are clear."

Conflict prevention was first discussed as an integral part of development policy in the early 1990s, when the United Nations was called upon to carry out an unprecedented number of peacekeeping operations. Since then, conflict prevention at the international level has changed considerably. While it was seen for a brief period immediately after the end of the Cold War as the important tool for the creation of a new world order under the guidance of a more active and responsive

About the author

Herbert Wulf is the Director of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).



Photo: Kent Simon

United Nations, conflict prevention has since then been practiced quite differently. Advocated originally as a corollary to preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention has changed in at least four major ways:

- First, some of the results of the UN peacekeeping operations did not meet the high expectations set for them (particularly in Somalia and Bosnia, but also the lack of activity in Rwanda).
- Second, and closely related to the first point, the question needs to be asked whether the UN Security Council deadlock of early 1999 over the situation in Kosovo and the NATO military action undertaken without a UN mandate will become a precedent for similar actions elsewhere, thus further undermining the role of the United Nations in conflict prevention.
- Third, while preventive diplomacy was the buzzword of conflict prevention in the early 1990s, military action seems to be called for now, and at a much earlier stage in conflicts.
- Fourth, and somewhat in contradiction to the third trend, a new range of instruments has been added to meet the short- and long-term requirements for post-conflict situations: humanitarian and emergency aid, reintegration of refugees, rehabilitation of physical, social, and economic infrastructures, and social sustainability programs.

At the end of this century, prevention of violent conflicts encompasses both removing the root causes of conflict and preventing the re-emergence of conflicts after the end of a war. Conflict prevention is more than simply repairing physical infrastructure after a war has ended. It also includes peace-building, with

▲ *Opening session*

all its political, economic, social, cultural and psychological aspects. Although it is common knowledge that it is cheaper to invest in conflict prevention than to repair war damages, it is extremely difficult to secure the funds required for conflict prevention programs. US President Clinton said in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Kansas City on 18 August 1999 that American troops would have a better chance of being spared fighting in war if Congress would spend more money on foreign aid. "The costliest peace is far cheaper than the cheapest war." However, governments, international organizations and aid agencies apparently find it easier to allocate or raise resources for dealing with wars that have broken out and for war damages than to mobilize the means to prevent conflagrations.



Photo: Knut Simon

▲ *Anke Brunn, chair of BICC's International Board (at right)*

The BICC conference presented an opportunity for participants to discuss topics which were at the core of the shaping of international relations: conflicts and conflict prevention, disarmament and conversion as well as human development. None of these issues is new, but two factors shed new light on the discussion. First, the composition of the group of over 100 participants—including experts from policy and practical economics, researchers and technical experts—facilitated a unique exchange of ideas and experiences. These participants, who came from all over the world, not only contributed to interesting discussions but also facilitated the possibility that these ideas would be put into practice in the years to come. Second, the emphasis was not on separate discussions of the different topics—for example, disarmament, conversion, conflict prevention and international development cooperation—but rather on looking for the synergies and impulses which emerged from the linkages between such often isolated agendas.

This report summarizes the results of the conference. It is organized in three chapters as well as a lessons learned section:

1. Policy: Experiences with disarmament, conversion and conflict prevention are presented in contributions on international conversion efforts by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Germany, by the Minister President of NRW, Wolfgang Clement; analysis of the contribution of development policy to security by the Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development of the German Government, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul; the role of development cooperation, by former Belgian Minister of Economic Cooperation Regionald Moreels; and the opportunities for and challenges to the United Nations in its operational experiences of conflict prevention and development cooperation, by Reinhart Helmke, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Director of UNOPS.
2. Concepts of prevention and practical experiences in the areas of peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation, conflict prevention and settlement, practical disarmament, security sector reform and the future of conversion: The papers in this section represent a well-balanced mix of conceptual thinking, forward-looking programs and practical experiences from different parts of the world.
3. Regional experiences from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, ranging from arms control to conflict management and from peace processes to confidence-building measures.
4. Lessons learned and the agenda ahead, with particular emphasis on the conference results and recommendations for further work.

As the Director of BICC, the host of the conference, I would like to acknowledge the important assistance provided by our co-organizers: the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia. They helped to bring together this unique group of participants and greatly contributed to the substantive debate. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the financial contributions from both the Ministry of Schools and Education, Science and Research of the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

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THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

**MESSAGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
“THE CONTRIBUTION OF DISARMAMENT AND CONVERSION
TO CONFLICT PREVENTION, AND
ITS RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION”**

Bonn, 30-31 August 1999

It gives me great pleasures to convey my greetings to all who have gathered for this important conference. The Bonn International Center for Conversion, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Government of North Rhine-Westphalia merit our recognition for their sustained attention to a key issue on the international agenda.

This conference builds on the Dortmund Conference of 1992, which explored how military conversion following the end of the cold war presented new opportunities for safeguarding the global environment and reinvigorating our work for economic and social development. Seven years later, we take for granted an international situation in which there is little threat of a new world war. Yet we have not succeeded in preventing local and regional conflicts, which are causing widespread human suffering and undermining development.


For the United Nations, the links between conversion and disarmament and conflict prevention are clear. Small arms, for example, are readily available and easy to use and have been the primary or sole tools of violence in almost every recent conflict dealt with by the United Nations. The process of military conversion, meanwhile, allows societies to devote precious human and financial resources to basic needs, such as education and health care, that are typically the first to suffer from the perceived need for military spending.

Prevention is at the heart of the United Nations' global mission. An ancient proverb holds that it is difficult to find money for medicine, but easy to find it for a coffin. I have faith that the international community can do better than that. As we strive to translate the ideas and concepts of conflict prevention into concrete programmes, the United Nations, including the UN Office for Project Services, remains your close partner. In that spirit, please accept my best wishes for a successful conference.

1

Policy: Experiences with Disarmament, Conversion and Conflict Prevention

Photo: Hacky Hagemeyer, Transparent



International Conversion Experiences in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany

by Wolfgang Clement

Over the past 50 years the city of Bonn has played a decisive role in minting the international image of Germany and has reaped large political profits of trust for Germany. Bonn will also play a decisive role in shaping the international image of the country in the 21 century—as a city of international responsibility and partnership which will promote the spirit of 'One World.' At the end of the 20 century we face challenges for which effective responses can only be found beyond the nation-state, such as those of:

- stabilizing democratic developments in eastern and south-eastern Europe,
- controlling migration and development processes, and
- finally, and unfortunately a current challenge, securing peace and peaceful coexistence, even here in Europe.

◀◀ *Tank cemetery in Eritrea*

Bonn will take the lead by providing the impulses for German contributions to the international debate. More than 175 institutions and organizations for international cooperation are based in the Aachen/Bonn/Cologne area; among them, Bonn is the long-term base for six German federal ministries and five UN institutions. These are the fixed points in the new profile of this city—fixed points such as BICC, which I would like to thank for organizing this conference and for its contribution to development cooperation.

There is an important connection between the recent successful changes in Bonn and the topic of our conference: both deal with structural change brought about by political, not economic, factors and with change that is occurring abruptly and does not automatically produce 'winners' unless it has been shaped by policymakers. This is what the state government has been doing since 1990.

Among the challenges Germany has faced since 1990 are the following. Of the former 1.3 million soldiers from nine international armies stationed here, over 700,000 have returned home. This primarily affected the new *Länder*, but North Rhine-Westphalia was strongly affected by the departure of over 83,000 soldiers. Another 25,000 civilian jobs in the German *Bundeswehr* and foreign armies were lost. Over

300 former military sites—barracks, depots, air fields, rocket stations, communication posts and maneuver grounds, occupying a total of more than 8.5 square kilometers—were vacated.

This development will continue, albeit on a smaller scale, beyond the turn of the century. So, for instance, with the complete withdrawal of the British Air Force from Continental Europe, the last British military airport in Niederkrüchten (Kreis Viersen) will have to be closed.

No doubt, from the point of view of foreign and security policy, disarmament and the future reuse of areas formerly used by the military as well as the demobilization of soldiers constitute positive developments. They offer opportunities, but they also create new challenges for:

- the integration of people formerly employed by the military into the civilian job market,
- the conversion of the arms industry to civilian production, and
- the civilian reuse of military land. This is where the state government of North Rhine-Westphalia is focusing the activities of its conversion policy.

The inhabitants of North Rhine-Westphalia once again have an advantage: *first*, because, as the former arms-producing Ruhr area, we have not had any primary arms industry for a long time, and *second*, because we have had long and positive experiences of economic structural change. No other region in western Germany has had to cope with such difficult structural change in the past 20 to 30 years—and none has been so successful in doing so.

About the author

Wolfgang Clement is Minister President of the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

Examples of successful conversion projects in North Rhine-Westphalia:

- The Wildenrath test center for comprehensive testing of rail-based transportation systems of the Siemens company which was built on a former military airfield
- Integration of the former Emilian barracks into the college of Lippe in Detmold
- The new city center around the Preußen museum in the Simeons barracks in Minden
- The housing facilities of the Churchill barracks in Lippstadt
- New housing in the Kleken barracks in Cologne
- The harness racing training ground in Kevelaer-Twisteden, built on the site of a former ammunition depot
- The new nature park and recreation facility in Brüggel-Bracht on the former largest ammunition depot in western Europe.

During this period we created co-operation structures within our regional structural policy. We have developed a network of contacts and negotiation partners in the regions who know each other and can control difficult situations of change. This was extremely helpful to us during the conversion process.

So far, 130 communities have received more than DM 500 million to fund approximately 500 conversion projects. These funds were granted by the federal government, the state and the European Union. However, financial aid is not everything. It is also necessary to have competent management and an organized exchange of conversion experiences.

With this in mind, in 1994 the state government established the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). Its job is to provide advice and services for conversion projects. Another task is to document and disseminate information on and experiences from conversion projects at the international level. BICC does this job exceptionally well. It is not least because of its international character that BICC enjoys such a high standing.

The worldwide disarmament process today is no doubt positive and desirable. However, in Russia, for instance, disarmament has worsened economic and social problems, and conversion can only be carried out there with great difficulty. Here, BICC can offer assistance as a partner. What also comes to mind are the current regions of crisis in our immediate European neighborhood. Demobilization of the military in south-eastern Europe and the establishment of civil society are important tasks in which the international community clearly has a decisive role to play. North Rhine-Westphalia takes this duty seriously: apart from its support of BICC's conversion efforts, North Rhine-Westphalia finances a model project on civilian conflict management in Bosnia and Herzegovina aimed at reuniting the ethnic groups that were separated by the war.

In a further, hitherto unique effort, the North Rhine-Westphalia government supports the vocational training of experts for civilian conflict settlement. Together with these experts, people who are actively involved in settlement efforts can return to crisis regions and assist in the buildup of a stable peace and civil society. These are only a few illustrations of the seriousness with which we take our international responsibilities.

The most recent conflicts in south-eastern Europe clearly show that one cannot do without armed forces in the future. Our soldiers, together with colleagues from many other nations, serve on-site in a real service of peace. I myself was able to obtain an impression of their activities when I visited Bosnia in June, and I would like to say, not without a little pride, that our soldiers truly deserve our thanks and recognition. This is why I have little understanding for the constant juggling with figures on the size of the *Bundeswehr* as long as its future role has not been clearly defined. The examples of Bosnia and Kosovo clearly illustrate the relationship between disarmament and its consequences. In my opinion, these questions must be seen in a wider context, and I cannot imagine any better forum than the Bonn International Center for Conversion and this conference.

The Contribution of Development Policy to Human Security

by *Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul*

Politicians and scholars have far too often and for far too long employed a concept of security based on military categories. In the early 1990s, the then United Nations Secretary-General launched his *Agenda for Peace*, introducing a new perspective into the debate. In 1994 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) presented a concept of 'human security' according to which human development has the potential ultimately to help prevent conflicts and particularly the use of violence as a means of settling them.

Development policy must accept the challenge of making an active contribution to crisis prevention and crisis management. If we want to 'give war no chance,' we need to develop a political blueprint for human security. The seven components of development policy elaborated below can contribute to such a blueprint.

Reducing the causes of violent conflict—fostering justice

Twenty years ago, in his foreword to the report of the North-South Commission, Willy Brandt saw development as a synonym for peace. Economic and social disparities are among the most significant structural causes of crises. As we approach the next millennium, these disparities are again on the increase throughout the world. For instance, it is striking to note that the three richest people in the world have assets worth more than the

aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) of all the least developed countries, with their approximately 600 million inhabitants. More than 80 countries have lower *per capita* incomes today than they had 10 years ago.

The threat to natural life-support systems—the ecological dimension—is also becoming a more significant structural cause of crisis. Access to land, water and mineral resources, in combination with poverty, population growth and unequal distribution, is often at the root of violent conflicts. Large-scale ecological degradation has become a major cause of refugee movements. Migration, in turn, often results in considerable social tension in the host countries. By helping to improve the economic, social, ecological and political situation in our partner countries, development policy can contribute to justice and to the reduction of structural causes of violent conflict. This effort comprises bilateral, pan-European and other multilateral development cooperation, which needs to be more closely oriented to social and ecological criteria, especially in the context of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs. An equally important factor is the design of a global general framework that is conducive to development, especially in the fields of world trade and finance. Greater coherence between the various policy fields is indispensable. We have set an example in this regard with the Cologne Debt Relief Initiative. About one-fourth of the 36 countries potentially eligible for relief aid from the initiative are faced with conflicts.

Developing mechanisms for non-violent conflict resolution—strengthening human rights and democracy

The same constellation of structural causes of crisis may lead to violent conflict in one region but not in another. The reason for this lies in the different capacities of different societies to resolve conflicts peacefully. Participation in the political process and respect for human rights are essential elements of peaceful societies. A country with a thriving civil society is best equipped for peaceful conflict resolution. Another essential element is a functioning legal system.

"The equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security." This quotation is taken from documents presented at the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women. Even women in militarized societies can play a constructive role in the peace process. Since women in the developing countries are often in charge of providing food and security for the family, they have an interest in reconciliation and stable peace. In post-war situations, women often play a prominent role. In practice, too little attention has been given to this fact.

About the author

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Recognizing conflict potential early—orienting development cooperation to crisis prevention

If development policy is to contribute to securing peace, one vital prerequisite is improved recognition of the long-term lines of conflict within society. This is more than 'early warning'. We need constant monitoring of societies and development processes in order to be able to respond early to emerging conflicts. In the field of German development policy, we are currently working to improve our instruments for planning and analysis along these lines.

Projects and programs must be linked and oriented to crisis prevention. Effective prevention of the escalation of violence can only be expected if the donor community succeeds in agreeing on common positions or strategies, as emphasized in the Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee.

We carried out an evaluation of the impact of development cooperation on conflicts which showed that development policy can never play a 'neutral' role, totally detached from the conflict. It will always have some positive or negative impact on the conflict. Fortunately, the evaluation also showed that it was usually possible to make a positive impact when projects and programs were consciously targeted to this end. For instance, a rural development program in northern Mali contributed to peace-building and stabilization in the region at a very early stage after the conclusion of the peace agreement. 'Conflict impact assessment' is required in order to redirect projects and programs in time, when this is necessary. The question to what extent the conditionality of development policy, even using it as a sanction, can be

effective requires further study. Serious thought must also be given to whether the constructive use of development cooperation for crisis prevention and management is not more effective than the withdrawal of the international community.

We need qualified personnel who can be directly deployed in peace-building activities, but also personnel who can provide the necessary expertise as an input to existing development cooperation with countries with escalating conflicts. As one element in this context, we are currently establishing the Civil Peace Service in Germany. Simultaneously, efforts are being made to improve capacities for providing qualified personnel for peace missions run by the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Limiting military spending—implementing more restrictive arms export policies

As early as 1991, German development policymakers started to incorporate military spending in their development policy criteria. While we attempt to take account of the legitimate security interests of our partner countries, it is decisive that the budget is designed in a balanced way so that it focuses on development in the country in question. The 1999 Cologne Summit of the G8 called for systematic monitoring of military spending in relation to other public expenditures and in the macroeconomic framework of growth and development.

A coherent strategy for effective arms control must treat arms exports in a restrictive manner while taking into account the protection of human rights and the fostering of sustainable development. The 1998 EU Code of Conduct provided important guidance in this field; it now needs to be applied

consistently by the member states and other partners. One response that must not be tolerated is an increase in arms exports with the aim of increasing manufacturing series to diminish unit costs.

The availability of huge numbers of military small arms is a factor that greatly facilitates violent methods of conflict settlement. These weapons are relatively cheap and have a very long life. Most of the weapons used in today's conflicts are not newly produced but originate from previous wars.

From the development policy perspective, it is thus essential to apply a narrow interpretation of export rules not just to weapons of war but to any arms. The problem of small arms in the developing countries cannot, of course, be resolved by this alone. Efforts must be made at several levels. Improved transparency with regard to production, transport and transfers might provide more information, as a first step, and create more public pressure to resolve the problem. The extensive marking of small arms would make it much easier to identify the channels of transfer of weapons and ammunition. Non-governmental organizations and networks should contribute to monitoring the flow of small arms and collecting relevant information. A central element is the interest of the recipient countries in collecting arms and preventing their further dissemination.

The May 1999 meeting of the EU Development Council adopted a resolution on small arms that I had initiated. We have thus complemented a common stance that was adopted within the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and is now being introduced into the UN process.

Achieving rule of law-based control over security forces—reforming the military and the police

Demobilization and reintegration of soldiers and combatants, as well as downsizing of the military sector, are central elements of many peace agreements. Development policy has made contributions in this field in numerous countries over the past few years. Germany has supported corresponding projects in Angola, Mozambique, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The focus of such efforts, besides collecting weapons and discharging soldiers, is mainly to help people to reintegrate into their social community and secure a living. Only if people feel that they have prospects for survival outside the military or armed groups can they be expected not to take up arms again. This is particularly true in those places where years of civil war have left their mark on entire generations who know no other way of life but armed strife. In order to achieve sustainable success, such efforts must be part of comprehensive programs that have the support of the conflicting parties.

Given the significant impact of violent conflict on the developing countries, the question of security sector reform in these countries has increasingly been recognized by the donor community. One important aspect is rule of law-based security forces. Security forces play an important role in protecting internal security, but in many developing countries the role played by the military and police causes instability in society. Frequently, it is the security forces themselves that commit human rights violations. There can be no doubt that this sector requires a great deal of support from the international community. But it is also a sector that is particularly sensitive: if the appropriate framework is not in place, external support may remain ineffective or even have a negative impact. Budget allocations

for the military, and civilian and parliamentary control over the military and police forces, must also be taken into account.

Furthermore, we must advocate internationally that children and youth not be deployed as combatants in armed conflict. 'Straight 18' as the minimum age for deployment must become the internationally accepted standard, also for recruitment.

Post-war must not become pre-war—fostering reconciliation and reconstruction

In post-war settings there is a formal peace accord but this usually merely denotes the absence of war, not the presence of peace. Violence has often left deep wounds of hatred and mistrust which can only be overcome slowly. The countries concerned and the international community are not only faced with the task of physical reconstruction. They must also launch the necessary measures for restoring a social climate that facilitates peaceful conflict management. Societal divisions must be overcome. We have seen these types of difficulties in both Rwanda and Kosovo.

Generally, it can be said that in post-war settings support from the international community can bring about a sustained effect only if governments are truly interested in peace and if the prerequisites for internal peace are in place.

Expanding international and regional structures for peaceful conflict management—strengthening the United Nations

Over the past few years, efforts to improve conflict management have been reinforced at the regional level. This approach will definitely

Seven components of development policy which can contribute to human security

1. Reducing the causes of violent conflict—fostering justice
2. Developing mechanisms for non-violent conflict resolution—strengthening human rights and democracy
3. Recognizing conflict potential early—orienting development cooperation to crisis prevention
4. Limiting military spending—adopting more restrictive arms export policies
5. Achieving rule of law-based control over security forces—reforming the military and the police
6. Not allowing the post-war situation to devolve into the pre-war one—fostering reconciliation and reconstruction
7. Expanding international and regional structures for peaceful conflict management—strengthening the United Nations

pay off and may contribute to crisis prevention. The regional institutions created to contribute to conflict management are also suitable, in principle, to serve as forums for resolving regional conflicts. They should be further strengthened to deal with these tasks.

Ultimately, however, it is the United Nations that plays the central role in issues of war and peace. This is the only forum that can take decisions that will be accepted by the entire international community. The UN structures for crisis prevention work must therefore be further strengthened. The case of Kosovo clearly showed that the Security Council, with its traditional structures, could not respond to the new needs.

The Psychological and Cultural Dimension of Conflict Prevention

by *Regionald Moreels*

Peace and the prevention of violence are not a dream or utopia, although dreams can provide useful ideas for the future. One dream is to move from a culture of violence and war toward a culture of peace, even now, when groups are fighting wars and economic battles. We must create an environment, an ambience, in which people are less aggressive toward each other, although it takes a long time for a man, woman or child to forgive, for example, the assassination of his or her parents, brother, spouse or partner. A long-lasting process has to start from a cease-fire and move to peace arrangements and reconciliation.

Globalization

We can observe two trends of globalization. The historical trend is primarily centered on the growth of the economy, science and technology, expressed in rapidly growing financial flows and scientific advances in genetic engineering, etc. But globalization also needs an ethic underpinning. The other trend of globalization is the fight for human dignity. True, the quest for universal observance of human rights was started centuries ago but for a long time the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained unratified by most governments of the world.

Even in today's world, human rights are being grossly violated. We did not stop the crimes and genocide in eastern Congo, even though placing a few monitors at the airport of Gomo three years ago would have stopped the flow of arms to this conflict. The Council of Ministers of the European Union rejected an initiative to deploy such monitors—of course very politely, as always in these types of meeting, but the fact remains that monitors were not present when they were needed. One way to reduce the use of arms in conflicts is to offer incentives. Debt alleviation for countries which both decrease their military expenditure and implement comprehensive measures for disarmament and destruction of weapons—like the program in Mali—is a concrete idea.

Today the privatization of security, conflict and war, the involvement of private companies, mercenaries and militias, is an increasingly worrying factor. The traffic in arms, financed by exports of raw materials and precious stones as in Angola, southern Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, is also part of the trend toward globalization.

The two types of globalization—advancement of technology and science, and expansion of the market economy and the fight for human dignity—are complementary, not contradictory.

“It is not enough to collect weapons from an adult—he also needs a job and a place to live, otherwise demobilization and disarmament are of no use to him. When you take a weapon from a child, you must send him to school. Education and, more importantly, psychological treatment are needed. Humanitarian assistance is not enough to cope with the psychological problems of

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people in war-torn societies and their reintegration—what in medical terms is called the post-acute stress syndrome. People in a war environment even years later have dreams about bombing, hiding in shelters, gun shots, suffering from wounds, and assassinations.

Psychological counseling is an important element of the peace-building process.

Education, vocational training, sports and jobs can all be important factors against aggressiveness.

Disarming people who have nothing to do the whole day is not enough. A simultaneous comprehensive approach which emphasizes disarmament and development, reconstruction and employment, and education and training is important. ”

Humanitarian assistance, psychological factors

Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance might contribute to exacerbating tensions and violent conflict. As armed forces disperse and dismantle to form militias, external assistance might—intentionally or not—contribute to the survival of groups who have looted their own people. We have witnessed a tremendous victimization of civilians: it is estimated that 95 percent of the victims in wars are civilians. A particularly dark chapter of wars is the recruitment of child soldiers. The psychological impact on child soldiers is horrendous and their traumatization is not being dealt with effectively in development cooperation.

The increase in crime and corruption, encroaching even on humanitarian assistance, makes it extremely difficult to prevent conflict. We must examine our own role in humanitarian assistance when we amputate a child's arm, for example in Cambodia, or operate on people in Angola who have been injured by bombs, when they are asked to take up arms immediately after their discharge and rehabilitation. It seems that both humanitarian assistance and politics always lag behind conflicts and wars. This can be remedied only by moving toward a culture of peace and a culture of conflict prevention.

Democratization

Democratization plays an important role in conflict prevention. It is a long process—in the western democracies it took more than two centuries. Democratization includes a fight for the respect of human rights and against corruption in our home country. Although it requires a long-term perspective, the process can be initiated now. Democracy includes social democracy and the new challenge of cultural democracy. How do we learn to live together in our systems? Cultural democracy is the most important challenge for all democracies. Democracy cannot be reduced to only free and fair elections. It seems senseless to vote when you have nothing to fill your stomach, when you are sowing or harvesting, or when you have to walk for three or four days to reach the polling station. Free and fair elections are only one aspect. We cannot immediately impose a multi-party system because most parties correspond to factions in many countries. The type of democracy needs to be adapted to the situation, but universal values such as freedom, responsibility, stewardship, ownership and justice have to become norms and be complemented by local cultural values.

Peace cannot be defined solely by the absence of widespread violence. This definition is too restrictive and lacks the concepts of freedom and social and economic values as well as security and the rule of law. Prevention of conflict, violence and the escalation of violence are more than mere rational science. Emotions are involved in the achievement of peace. The technical or scientific element of peace involves tackling the problems of disarmament and conversion. This is a practical undertaking and requires arms control, export controls, programs

A Perspective Based on Operational Experience

of civilian reuse of former military resources, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, etc. Governments and even the private business sector need to be engaged. Practical programs for micro-disarmament, to control the flow of light weapons, must be developed. These are concrete steps, with a methodology and strategy. There are also techniques for forgiveness and reconciliation, but there is no reconciliation in a society with impunity. Therefore, trials for crimes committed during a conflict, international tribunals, extradition arrangements, agreement and treaties, etc. must also be included. Such an international judiciary system is gradually evolving.

“Conflict prevention is a multi-dimensional science but it is also an emotional ‘project’—a rational science with all the concrete projects and methods which depend on the hearts of people. Not only weapons need to be converted but also the hearts and minds of people to place them in the right environment for peace.”

by *Reinhart Helmke*

Never has the relationship between armed conflict and development been so clear and never have armed conflicts constituted such an obvious impediment to development opportunities. UN policy, as reflected in such key documents as the *Agenda for Peace* (1992) and the *Agenda for Development* (1994), firmly recognizes the linkages between conflict prevention and development. All UN peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War have been built on this model, which shows no signs of becoming obsolete as the UN and the EU cooperate to restore peace to Kosovo and the entire Balkan region.

Furthermore, never has the role of the private sector been so instrumental in either promoting or preventing conflict. This is not to point the finger or make a collective accusation. Business can tilt the balance of conflict in one direction or the other, and the question is how it can assist in tilting the balance toward conflict prevention.

The conflict prevention role of UNOPS in development cooperation

The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is an autonomous UN body and the only entirely self-financing entity in the UN system. It is exclusively funded by fees paid for services rendered and is based on the principle of comparative advantage. Its comparative advantage is project management and execution. UNOPS is the UN's management specialist and over the past two years has become the largest executing agency in the UN system, handling a portfolio of projects for execution and supervision valued at US \$3.8 billion. It comes as close to operating as a private firm as is possible within the UN context and competes for business in the international market; it has a marketing strategy and is expected to be flexible, timely and competitive. UNOPS has no specific mandate but can in fact work according to any mandate since its specialty is execution, operating as general contractors. It hires consultants and experts, buys goods and services, and in the process of managing projects has developed an expertise in many issue-areas where the UN's success is contingent upon the quality of its operations. Anyone

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who has served in a UN peace-keeping operation knows that, without proper logistics, the peace-keepers might as well go home. Without good operations, development policies can also 'go home.' Providing quality operations is its mandate.

UNOPS is a product of UN reform. It was established as an independent organization when the UN system began to consider competitiveness, efficiency gains, and specialization. UNOPS responded to the call: it continues to introduce innovative management concepts and instruments which can be applied to other UN organizations, particularly those involved in operational activities.

The Geneva Office has a unit called RESS, Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability. In a way, RESS symbolizes the UN's response to the end of the Cold War. It provides the operational tools to complement the UN's policies on dealing with post-conflict situations, including such challenges as reconstruction, social rehabilitation, resettlement of refugees and returnees, demobilization of combatants, and demining. RESS designs, formulates, monitors and evaluates UN projects in these areas throughout the world. Again, targeted policies are essential, but without the means to implement them they would only pay lip service to the challenges the UN faces.

The RESS approach is guided by the following principles:

- It focuses on regions that have suffered physical destruction and where people have been uprooted, displaced or exiled.
- It insists on the non-discriminatory inclusion of all population groups in a specific target area.
- It promotes local empowerment and encourages participatory decision-making.
- It emphasizes the integration of women in conflict-resolution processes.
- It seeks to strengthen local implementation capabilities.

Integration of conversion and disarmament issues with development policy and cooperation

A few examples amply illustrate UNOPS's contribution to conflict resolution and peace processes. Last February, the UN saw the end of a successful mission of investigation and documentation of human rights abuses in the 35-year Guatemalan civil war. The Guatemala Historic Clarification Commission issued its report that month and presented it to the UN Secretary-General. UNOPS's support to that mission was crucial in ensuring its final success. What did UNOPS do to support this political mandate? It hired the right experts and staff, set up offices in the countryside so that interviewers could collect testimony from the local population, bought the required goods and services,

and ensured project management and monitoring. The outcome of the Commission's work is a landmark in the defense of human rights and consolidation of peace in a country emerging from internal strife. Its conclusions as they pertain to the social and economic impact of conflict are also relevant to the discussion of today.

The Commission estimated that the direct *quantifiable* costs of the internal armed confrontation alone amounted to close to US \$10 billion, which represents 120 percent of Guatemala's 1990 gross domestic product (GDP). Most of this cost was due to lost production attributable to the death, disappearance or forced displacement of individuals who had to abandon their daily activities or were recruited into the militia, army or guerrilla forces. The cost of the destruction of physical assets, including private and public property, and the waste of infrastructure, such as bridges and electricity towers, was also high. Other, not easily quantifiable, losses, such as foreign investments that did not take place owing to the conflict, are similarly not included in the US \$10 billion price tag.

In addition, the Commission found that one of the factors that kept the conflict going was the inability of states to provide minimal social services in some of the most needy regions. One of the reasons for this was that the armed confrontation weakened the ability of the state to collect taxes. There is now a general awareness that the macroeconomic consequences of conflict will have to be addressed. Indeed, over the course of the conflict, the budget deficit grew, further weakening the state's capacity to promote development.

The Commission's report constitutes only the most recent demonstration of the fact that disarmament, demobilization, conversion, reintegration and rehabilitation are integral parts of social and economic processes and of development projects in countries recovering from protracted conflicts.

Several years ago, based on the experience of his own country, Costa Rica, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Oscar Arias launched a campaign for the elimination of armies in a number of developing countries—an initiative which poverty- and violence-stricken Haiti has meanwhile adopted.

“In many post-conflict countries, the absence of economic opportunities is compounded by the desperation of former combatants to whom society offers few alternatives in civilian life. This dilemma has been at the center of UN peace processes in such countries as Angola and Mozambique. No constructive civilian jobs = no peace. It is really as simple as that. The principal challenge is to promote the change from a war economy to a peace economy.”

In many post-conflict countries, the absence of economic opportunities is compounded by the desperation of former combatants. Drug money, for example, can provide the means to pay generous salaries to well-equipped combatants under conditions that compare favorably with those offered by a regular army. In crisis situations the economy breaks down completely. But there is always economic activity, and the sad fact is that there are socially irresponsible investors who have a stake in crisis economies. The principal challenge here is to promote the change from a war economy to a peace economy.

In this effort, we need to address disarmament, demobilization, conversion, security, reintegration and rehabilitation in post-conflict situations in a coherent, consistent and timely manner in order to move toward sustainable peace and development. Military conversion and reintegration of warring combatants are important but of little impact unless they are integrated into a broader social and economic conversion framework. In practice, this implies that international cooperation needs to inscribe its interventions within a broader framework. More than individual projects, what is needed are comprehensive programs.

This is the approach that was taken in the Development Programme for Displaced Persons, Refugees and Returnees (PRODERE) which UNOPS executed following the Esquipulas Peace Treaties in Central America. A similarly integrated design was provided for the Cambodian Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project (CARERE), where the broader framework comprised social and economic conversion at the local level, preceded by demining operations.

A new type of partnership between the private sector and the international community

Civil wars are not new; what has changed is the interaction between conflict and business, as reflected in the most recent *Human Development Report* of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Defense and war are becoming increasingly privatized. International private defense firms are thriving because their services are in high demand and they can produce goods or deliver services more efficiently than public sector firms can. To a great extent, they also control military research and development (R&D). It is only logical that they should control the markets.

Advances in communication technologies and the intensification of information exchange also benefit arms dealers, drug traffickers and money launderers. Globalization facilitates and accelerates the organization of violence and crime.

In some countries, large private entities play an economic role in fostering conflicts. Angola is a case in point, where diamond, mining and oil revenues have fueled and sustained the conflict on both sides. Elements of this problem are present in Sierra Leone as well.

There was a time when the goals and practices of business were considered incompatible and even hostile to public values and the values of international organizations such as the United Nations. The establishment of UNOPS provides evidence that business practices and public values can be reconciled. UNOPS puts the management techniques of business at the service of the values and ethics embodied in the UN Charter—and this works.

However, business has also come a long way from the hard-core belief in capitalism at all costs, exemplified by the behavior of some multinational companies in the 1970s. To give one example, there was a time when corporations—particularly the big ones—considered environmental issues as alien to their core concerns and profit-making responsibilities. Over the past decade international corporations have reversed this view and we now see companies such as British Petroleum promoting awareness of sustainable development together with the UN.

What has begun to happen in development issues needs to be transferred to conflict prevention, and there is no reason why the private sector cannot follow on that terrain and meet the UN half-way. Work in this direction has already started. Several meetings have been held between the UN and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to discuss the private sector's promotion of basic human rights based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.

At the January 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked the international private sector to adopt a 'Global Compact of shared principles and values' based on respect for human rights, labor rights and a concern for the environment. This Global Compact provides an ideal framework for engaging business in issues that transcend national boundaries and can therefore only be resolved in an international framework such as that offered by the UN. The Global Compact can be translated into Mini-Compacts (or Mini-Charters) for, say, conflict prevention, development issues, humanitarian assistance, and so forth. The Davos Compact provides an ideal macro-picture, and we can apply it to various UN mandates by simply defining the values that apply to each one.

How can this idea work in conflicts or post-conflict situations? When the UN decides to involve or work with business in countries with long-simmering disputes or in countries recovering from conflicts, corporations may be asked to respect, co-define and promote a set of values that would provide the conceptual framework for business involvement in these sensitive situations. One of the tools of our RESS projects is the creation of Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDAs), a concept which the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNOPS are jointly promoting. The RESS approach may therefore provide some guidance on the set of values that constitute the common denominator between the UN and the business sector. UNOPS wants to promote inclusion, non-discrimination, empowerment and equity, which are not the same as equality, self-reliance and conversion to a civil economy in post-conflict situations. No CEO would oppose these values since they have long been the foundation of sound and growing businesses.

What is advocated here is not a UN formula for constraining or regulating business—those days are long gone, fortunately. Rather, it is a formula for sustaining global growth in a way that benefits all people and promotes peace and international stability, which ultimately is the best guarantor of profit.

Once we develop these Mini-Charters of common values between the UN and business, UN bodies with operational mandates, such as UNOPS, will turn these principles into operational guidelines, which will be reflected in projects and procurement policies. This type of work has already started at the UN, and UNOPS is a part of this effort. UNOPS can also contribute to defining standards and guidelines for working with the private sector in the crucial area of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Conflict and post-conflict work would be one important area of a UN–business partnership.

“The responsible and forward-looking CEOs of the 21 century understand that if globalization is to be sustained, and if an open and expanding economy is to keep its promises of growth for the international private sector, it will have to be in such a way as to give all peoples of the world a share of the pie in the respect of their cultures and human dignity. Globalization is a complex process.

It has both constructive and destructive aspects. Unless its positive effects are brought to bear, there will be no globalization at all. So, this turnaround is a sound business decision. Either business introduces ethical values in its traditional profit-making imperative, or a general backlash against globalization will plunge the entire world in a political instability and an economic contraction that could far surpass anything we experienced in the 1930s in the wake of the ‘Big Crash’ of 1929. Given this alternative, the choice is easy to make.”

2

Concepts of Prevention and Practical Experience



Photo: Natalie Patwels, BICC



The Future of Disarmament

by Patricia M. Lewis

Many trends are far from encouraging; indeed, the theme of arms control and disarmament today is one of despondency and gloom.

Over the past decades the field of arms control and disarmament has achieved a great deal. On the nuclear front, bilateral treaties such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) as well as multilateral treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) have undoubtedly been successful. When seen together with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention (Ottawa Convention) and the confidence-building measures of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), it is clear that a formidable treaty architecture has been put in place.

At the end of the Cold War expectations for international cooperation and disarmament were high; now they are very low. In the lead-up to the 1995 extension of the NPT, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament was busy negotiating the CWC and then moved on rapidly to the CTBT. Since 1996, however, there has been a stalemate. The nuclear weapon tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 demonstrated that some countries still believe in the usefulness of nuclear weapons. From the point of

view of Russia, NATO expansion, the potential deployment of a US ballistic missile defense (BMD) system and the crisis over Kosovo have led to a reassessment of the value of nuclear and conventional forces. China, too, is reacting negatively to the chain of events since 1996; it is developing a second-strike capability and has announced that it has the capacity to build neutron bombs.

Both China and Russia (along with the United Kingdom, France and a host of other countries) are very concerned about the fate of the ABM Treaty. Several Russian analysts have gone so far as to say that, if the ABM Treaty unravels, this could lead to an unraveling of the entire treaty architecture. On the other hand, the US Nunn-Lugar program—assisting Russia with its fissile material problems—has been continued, as has the US-Russia cooperative venture on early-warning centers. The United States has suggested that START-III discussions begin before START-II has been ratified.

On the conventional arms front, a beacon of light is emanating from West Africa. Following on from the courageous and, so far, successful attempts by Mali to prevent civil war, the 16 states members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have negotiated and implemented a moratorium on small arms in West Africa.

Several big issues need to be tackled urgently:

- Connected to missile defenses is the 'minefield' of nuclear disarmament. If nuclear disarmament is not making progress, then the NPT is vulnerable to frustration on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon states.
- The Biological Weapons Convention is undergoing a process of change. On the one hand, States Parties are negotiating a verification protocol, and on the other hand new biotechnology is advancing so fast that governments can hardly keep up with their assessments of the implications of new developments for biological warfare and biodefense. Controls on new technologies are vital if arms control is to keep up with technological advances.
- Similarly, new conventional military technologies and the so-called revolution in military affairs need to be placed under scrutiny.

Admittedly, this analysis paints a gloomy—although realistic—picture, but there are things that can be done to rectify the situation. In the first place, those who care about people-centered security need to ensure that the international treaty architecture is prevented from unraveling. This concept of disarmament and security—freedom from violent conflict—must be reestablished as a basic human right in order to prevent humanitarian disaster caused by violence, be that by the use of nuclear weapons or Kalashnikovs. Strong action from non-governmental organizations is needed if there is to be progress in disarmament.

About the author

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◀◀ *Destruction of small arms in Cambodia*

Peacekeeping and Post-conflict Rehabilitation

Lessons Learned in the United Nations

by Nicola Koch

In an open debate held on 8 July 1999, the UN Security Council focused exclusively on "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment." It recognized disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as "a continuous process which is rooted and feeds into the broader search for peace, stability and development" and considered it a crucial instrument "to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building."

This statement reflects the change in the nature and scope of peacekeeping operations. Until the latter part of the 1980s the UN, in principle, only intervened in inter-state conflicts. The main objectives of the UN were to negotiate cease-fires, facilitate the separation of forces, organize demilitarized zones and deploy peacekeeping forces to monitor compliance with peace agreements. This traditional form of peacekeeping provided the buffer for the peace-making process to take its political and diplomatic course. There was no requirement for disarmament and, as such, the issues of demobilization and reintegration did not arise.

Recent peacekeeping operations have been established in countries afflicted by internal conflicts that are saturated with arms. In such environments, disarmament becomes a crucial factor. However, without demobilization, reintegration of ex-combatants and the economic development of civil society, disarmament alone has no long-term benefits. Experience has shown that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants form a continuum. Where disarmament terminates, demobilization begins

and where demobilization ends, reintegration must take over. As an indivisible process, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises have become an integral part of modern peacekeeping operations and subsequent post-conflict peace-building.

Lessons learned in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

I. Political and legal basis

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises can only be successful if they have the full support and cooperation of the parties to the conflict.

II. Integrated planning and management structures

Experience has shown that all disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures need to be fully integrated in an overall framework for the provision of assistance, protection and opportunities for development. In this regard, close consultations should be held between the military and humanitarian actors in the field as early as possible in the planning process.

III. Weapons collection, disposal and long-term weapons management

In addition to weapons collection and periodic amnesties, effective long-term weapons management requires a comprehensive national policy, which includes:

- clear national legal frameworks for ownership and possession of weapons,
- effective enforcement mechanisms,
- control of inter-state transfers, and
- regional cooperation on weapons management.

IV. Reintegration

Upon demobilization, ex-combatants need to be prepared for their reintegration into civilian life. Since many of these soldiers know no profession other than fighting, it is extremely important to fill the vacuum which disarmament creates with regard to their means of livelihood.

V. Sensitization

Ex-combatants returning to their communities are not always welcomed by the population. This attitude has to be reversed to allow veterans to live peacefully within their communities and in civil society at large. In addition to the national dialogue on reconciliation and peace-building, it is recommended to strengthen the coordination among governments, international organizations and NGOs to facilitate the smooth transition from emergency humanitarian assistance and post-conflict assistance to long-term development.

About the author

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Peacekeeping and Post-conflict Rehabilitation

Post-war Demobilization, Reintegration and Peace-building

by Kees Kingma

Demobilization and reintegration are priorities in post-war peace-building. Planning and preparations for demobilization and reintegration can therefore not start early enough—even when war is still being waged in the country. Demobilization requirements are often urgent since soldiers could pose a potential threat to the entire peace process. There are usually large potential benefits in support to demobilization, through effective logistics, proper implementation of disarmament, timely and sufficient basic needs, including food and health-care, counseling, etc.

In general, the personal opportunities and initiatives for (re)developing livelihoods, community support for reintegration, strengthening state capacity, 'law and order', and development of processes of democratic decision-making and non-violent conflict resolution all contribute to peace-building. Even in a desperately poor war-torn society one should perceive the national process and capacity as central, from 'day one'. The political environment and the time pressures in some post-war countries have put external agencies in a central position but have also put undue emphasis on the perception of demobilization as a technical matter. Especially where there is a strong foreign military presence, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is difficult to see the effect of demobilization on the actual peace process 'on the ground'.

Several conditions are required for successful demobilization and reintegration, and there is a risk that these processes may lead to new conflicts or revive old ones. Clearly, some experiences with demobilization and reintegration have been positive, and some kind of conflict or frustration during the adjustment processes is inevitable. But one needs to exercise caution in the design and implementation of support measures. Designing the support efforts requires a participatory process. Some appropriate support efforts are likely to focus on the ex-combatants, particularly former child soldiers and those seriously traumatized.

But on the whole, peace-building requires an inclusive attitude, long-term perspective, and greater interaction and cooperation between different groups—confidence-building through transparency and debate.

“Demobilization is not a ‘magic bullet’, which automatically takes care of a large set of development and security problems. One cannot force the peace through demobilization and reintegration.

‘Politics’ has to come first. Only then, on the basis of a real political solution of the conflict, will demobilization, resettlement and reintegration support be natural—and often inevitable—components of post-war rehabilitation and human development.”

A remaining paradox is that the threat from demobilized soldiers and guerrillas is mostly perceived in the urban areas, while most root causes of conflicts lie in the continuing disparities between urban and rural areas. In these conflicts, ex-combatants could potentially be remobilized. The main peace-building challenges in the countries concerned thus still lie in addressing the larger issues of redistribution, empowerment and democratization.

About the author

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Peacekeeping and Post-conflict Rehabilitation

Donor Perspectives: Experiences from GTZ Projects

The above examples show that demobilization and reintegration support efforts have brought a new level of complexity to the decisions on development policy and consequently to decisions on development cooperation. Flexible external assistance could play an important role in making resources available for speedy implementation of demobilization. Demobilization should not, however, become the new 'fashion'. It should be dealt with within the entire complex range of post-war rehabilitation and development issues. Like most efforts in development cooperation programs these days, the guideline should be to act with a long-term perspective. Among the central concerns are local capacity and ownership, sustainability, empowerment of women, 'process rather than project,' etc. A heightened political awareness among aid workers could make it easier to anticipate problems and conflicts and to prevent assistance from becoming manipulated. Despite the range of improvements that development agencies could make, people and their organizations and leaders hold the key responsibility for each peace-building process.

by *Bernd Hoffmann*

Coordination between national institutions and donors

There is usually consensus on the need for demobilization and reintegration programs. However, when the interests and the intended impacts of donors and governments are compared, differences come to light. For the governments of post-war societies, these programs are a political instrument through which loyalties can be created and 'potential enemies' pacified. Donors place emphasis on harnessing the economic potentials of ex-combatants and on political neutralization of the individuals concerned.

The transfer of external resources can become the real driving force behind these programs. Development banks and bilateral donors direct their inputs to development targets, such as budgetary reform and democratization, and turn these activities into conditionalities tied to their financial inputs. In contrast, government decisions are influenced by domestic factors. The ethnic and political identities of demobilized forces and factions within armies and governments constitute the key determining criteria.

Selecting the right partners

In a number of countries, overall responsibility for programs rests with a civilian authority. Since donors are development-oriented, and when reintegration measures are implemented, ministries for welfare and agriculture also become partners in implementation. This constellation and the interests of the armed forces can quickly lead to problems, especially if the institutions depend on external donors for program financing.

The important decisions remain a privilege of the armed forces and local commanders. In most cases, however, armed forces are only indirectly involved in programs. They are not partners of donor organizations since these institutions possess neither the mandate nor the expertise for security sector and army reform.

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What conclusions can be drawn?

- Cooperation among donors should be improved.
- Donors should from the outset organize a process of coordination to prevent the program from being blocked by one donor.
- The delivery of advisory services to program institutions and policymakers should be strengthened. However, monetization of inputs does not release the concerned ministries from political responsibility.
- The armies of the concerned countries should be more closely involved as partners.
- Major structural changes and organizational challenges generated by these programs are faced by the affected armed forces. Multilateral and bilateral donors should broaden their mandate so that they are also able to cooperate with armies.

The relationship between advisory services and financing

Donor institutions usually attach more value to the financing of reintegration packages than to the provision of advisory services. The aim is to implement programs quickly, wherever possible through institutions that can be dissolved once demobilization has been completed. This can be useful for swiftly integrating ex-combatants into civilian settings and demilitarizing state structures. For governments, however, the problems of implementation are not solely of a financial nature. Such programs have far-reaching consequences for the organization, the size of the armed forces and even security policy. Uncertainty and a refusal to carry out necessary reforms may result if the army is not sufficiently involved. Yet negotiation and planning activities are not conducted with the army but primarily with the ministries for finance and welfare. To date, they have been characterized by a lack of systematic coordination.

Outsourcing

In the aftermath of a war, the army and the state are often not in a position to organize the technical procedures for demobilization. International donors therefore prefer to use the services of external agencies. The best example of this is Sierra Leone, where the World Bank is managing a trust fund from which program components are awarded to foreign development agencies and specialist firms. Inevitably, an increasing number of organizations and firms are offering to deliver services during post-conflict phases.

Outsourcing takes less time and costs less money than cooperation with less effective local institutions. However, it may also create an institutional vacuum after programs have been completed which neither the armed forces nor other state organs can fill. At the end of such programs a vacuum may arise that cannot be adequately filled. A further problem is that a market for modern mercenary organizations has arisen. They not only offer training but are also in some cases directly involved in military conflicts.

Conflict Prevention and Settlement

Crisis Prevention: Lessons for Development Cooperation

by *Evita Schmieg*

During the past decade, the prevailing type of conflict in the world was not 'traditional' conflicts between states but conflicts between groups within state borders. The issue of security has therefore become less one of the peaceful co-existence of states and increasingly the peaceful coexistence of people within states. Traditional military instruments have often proven inadequate to deal with the new nature of crisis or to resolve the underlying causes of crisis. It is obvious that the prevention of conflict must be the common task of all policy areas, above all development policy, diplomacy and security policy. In all these areas an intense discussion has taken place during the past few years on how to refine the instruments and mechanisms to tackle the new task of contributing to conflict prevention.

Crisis prevention— a challenge for developing country societies

It must be recognized that violent conflicts can only be prevented by the societies themselves. Outside players can only support such efforts. To take preventive action it is necessary to analyze the development of societies and to recognize emerging lines of conflict at an early stage. It has often been stated that there has always been sufficient information on emerging crises; only the political will has been lacking. While this may be right, the link between information and political action has been missing.

There is a clear interdependence between the causes of conflict and the dynamics of conflict up to the point where it is no longer possible to objectively identify the root causes of the conflict because the views of the parties to the conflict differ. The importance of the root causes may even fade so much into the background that addressing them is no longer central to resolving the conflict. The conflict has developed a dynamic of its own. This is one of the reasons why new branches of research in the past few years have centered not on the causes of conflict but on the causes of peaceful development, the determinants of peace.

Poverty and social disparities are among the most important structural causes of conflict. Many conflicts can be traced back to such causes, but ethnic or religious differences

are frequently used as a pretext by individual leaders to depict the other side as 'the enemy'.

In tackling poverty and social disparities, we must be careful not to let development cooperation become a substitute for national efforts. Natural resources are another potential source of conflict. A lack of access to resources is behind many continuing conflicts.

Crisis prevention as a strategy

The work on strategies for conflict prevention has made great advances but many tasks still lie ahead. Theoretical concepts need to be further refined and practical guidelines still have to be elaborated.

- Systems for the early recognition of conflict lines in societies have to be tested, and mechanisms for response to 'early warning' have to be implemented and improved.
- The staffs of ministries and implementing agencies have to be trained and encouraged to be open to new ideas and challenges, a 'culture of conflict' has to be developed.
- There is a need for coordination with other policy areas. It is obvious that diplomacy, development cooperation and security policy have to work closely together.

About the author

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Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs as a Means to Prevent Deadly Conflict

1. Conflicts are always caused by a complex set of factors. There are no single causes of conflict or violent crisis.
2. Early warning is still an issue.
3. Conflict can only be prevented by the societies themselves. Outside players can only support them in their related efforts.
4. Development policy itself is not crisis prevention. Policy coherence is required for effective prevention.
5. Conflicts have external dimensions. Donors need to work for stronger policy coherence.

In the history of development cooperation, deliberations on its possible contribution to crisis prevention are relatively new. In the past few years, progress on the conceptual side has been remarkable. More thought needs to be given to the role of the military, the possibility of downsizing the military through demobilization and conversion, and civilian control over the military. The question is how development cooperation can contribute to such efforts.

The implementation of developed concepts is, however, very much dependent on the will and ability of developing countries' governments and conflicting parties to peacefully settle internal conflicts. International players can support such efforts. To facilitate the prevention of violent conflict, they also need to improve the coherence of their policies.

by Peggy Mason

The first, comprehensive post-Cold War peacekeeping operations were not perceived only as mere crisis intervention. They were theoretically (and obviously ambitiously and somewhat in contrast to practice) designed as a comprehensive approach and process which would address all the necessary elements of a sustainable peace. This kind of conceptualization of the overall post-conflict process fits very well with a long-term preventive strategy. An early example of the gap between concept and practice was the mission in Namibia, but Mozambique and Cambodia also provide later examples.

The main problems were:

- The lack of resources for peacekeeping missions.
- The very serious—and unresolved—'turf problem' between peacekeeping and development, which are funded from different budgets. However, this distinction is difficult to maintain if peacekeeping is viewed as a comprehensive approach.
- The 'coherence problem', which is magnified by the lack of a single budget.
- The timing of programs. The stipulated time-frames are becoming shorter and shorter. A comprehensive approach is by definition also a long-term approach, requiring a long-term commitment. In practice, however, as the example of Angola illustrates, demobilization had not been completed when the election was held.
- The lack of necessary follow-on. Follow-on programs could have helped to mitigate the negative effects of short-term peacekeeping mandates.

About the author

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“If properly planned, and implemented in a comprehensive and coherent way (and this is of course easier said than done), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration can be an important instrument in the overall rebuilding of a post-conflict society. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should not be looked at as an add-on, but as an integral part of the whole process of good governance.”

The effect of short-term mandates, as opposed to a comprehensive approach, was a focus on elections and the determination to leave after they were held. Indeed, elections provided exit strategies.

Post-conflict demobilization is usually defined as a process in which government and opposition forces either downsize or completely disband as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. This theoretically involves disarmament, the administration and discharge of former combatants, who receive some form of compensation package and/or assistance programs, and their integration into civilian life. In parallel, or subsequent to demobilization, national defense forces, composed of a certain percentage of government and opposition forces, should be created. This has been a very problematic task.

Local ownership, empowerment and capacity-building are recognized as important prerequisites for success but they often clash with external notions of efficiency and time-frames interfere with local efforts. In Sierra Leone, for example, in the summer and fall of 1998—before the last onslaught on the capital, when there was hope that the rebels would be contained and the settlement would hold—a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan had been developed with many local inputs. However, the process of getting all the local actors to agree on what should be done took a very long time. Here, the process needed an external push, in this instance from the World Bank, imposing its own strategy.

By definition the disarmament aspect of a demobilization process involves the collection and disposal of small arms and light and heavy weapons. An element which was often neglected but is now seen as an important aspect is the development of responsible arms management programs. An obvious example is Somalia, where some weapons were collected but where arms management was not seen in a broader context. The mismanagement or even non-management of arms is probably an appropriate description of what occurred. The disarmament process should not be an add-on but a fundamental part of the peace process, and it has to be designed, planned and implemented as an integral part of the overall post-conflict national recovery strategy. From this perspective, disarmament and demobilization are important components of reform of the state security apparatus, of the military, police, and judiciary and penal systems, and furthermore of a broader process of democratization. The broad concept of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which is being carried out to a greater or lesser degree in various places, is in fact an aspect of good governance and development policy.

Practical Disarmament

Transition to Peace: Guatemala and El Salvador

by *Francesco Vincenti*

Demilitarization and disarmament are key elements of the transition from a war-torn to a peaceful society. However, initiating a peace process by demanding immediate disarmament and demilitarization will generally lead to failure if that process does not legitimize the struggle of the parties and provide security guarantees. A peace process must take these elements into account in order to make the peace process sustainable. The peace process, including demilitarization and disarmament, requires the full recognition of the parties involved, since this is decisive for being able to get a sense of the degree of credibility and political will in the negotiations.

A clear example of failure is the case of Colombia. During previous peace processes, a cease-fire agreement was reached with the FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, or Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces), launching the political participation of its political branch, the *Union Patriótica* (UP, or Patriotic Union). However, between 1985 and 1995 more than 3,000 political leaders and members of the UP were murdered—including its presidential candidate. Clearly this failure to provide security to ensure the enforcement of agreements impeded any success in the demilitarization and disarmament efforts.

In 1990 another insurgent group, the M-19 (*Movimiento 19 de Abril*), signed a peace treaty with the Colombian Government under a framework of disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration. The *Acción Democrática M-19* (the M-19 political party) was granted amnesty and political participation in a constitutional reform as part of the agreements reached. In democratic elections,

the AD M-19 won the presidency. To other insurgent groups this proved the advantage of taking part in the political process in exchange for disarmament and reintegration. However, after a few years the AD M-19 party was slowly absorbed into the traditional political forces, proving the experience to be a failure in the eyes of other insurgent groups. The lack of incentives and guarantees of participation in real structural reforms discouraged other insurgent groups from participating in a peace process focusing primarily on disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration.

How can the creation of different devices make the transition feasible? This requires guaranteeing not only the security of the disarmed but also their eventual incorporation into an economic and a political environment. Providing security is as important as enabling political and economic participation.

Both El Salvador and Guatemala are good examples of this situation. Although the conditions for negotiation and the distribution of power between government and insurgent forces were different in both countries, demilitarization and disarmament, based on a reform of the armed forces, were possible.

The reform of the judiciary system is a decisive component of reform, since it enforces the legitimate monopoly of the use of force. In Latin American countries, the appearance of a parallel 'law' or 'private justice' arises from the lack of government presence. Filling institutional gaps previously filled by privileged groups, insurgent forces or private armies is crucial for recuperating governance, establishing the rule of law and consolidating peace initiatives. In this context,

Strategies applied in Guatemala

- Revision of the educational bases and doctrines of the armed forces.
- Creation of a commission to investigate past events.
- Limitation of the role of the armed forces to external issues only.
- Holding trials of military personnel implicated in human rights violations.
- Dissolution of army units carrying out police functions.
- Reduction of the armed forces.
- Creation of a public security academy to train new members of the National Civil Police.
- Participation of local communities in the recruitment process.
- Limitation of the intelligence apparatus to external defense operations.

Strategies applied in El Salvador

- Creation of an ombudsman office.
- Dissolution of the military security and intelligence apparatus, and creation of a new national civil police and intelligence agency.
- Creation of a commission to purge the public forces.
- Redesign of the educational system of the public forces.
- Restructuring and reduction of the size of the armed forces.

conversion should be understood as a process which is more than a technical effort; it should also work to forge a new political culture in a society divided by memories, abuses of war and personal revenge.

About the author

Francesco Vincenti is United Nations Resident Coordinator in Colombia.

Practical Disarmament

Micro-disarmament in Central America

by **Alejandro Bendaña**

Arms Collections

In El Salvador

The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) destroyed 10,232 military firearms turned in by the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) in 1992/93. Since 1996, the *Movimiento Patriótico contra la Delincuencia* (MPCD), a business group, has been active in gun buy-backs and trade-in for food coupons. According to one analyst there are some 300,000 weapons in the hands of civilians—enough to arm an army 42 times the size of the FMLN or five times that of the Salvadoran army in 1992, when the war ended. Observers calculated that about 30 percent of the weapons are military stocks in good condition, of which about one-half is “property of the United States’ Government.” According to the Ministry of Defense, 1,000 new arms are imported into El Salvador every month. The Ministry of Defense estimates the number of unregistered guns as about the same as the number of legal guns in civilian hands. With a population of six million, that gives El Salvador about one gun for every 20 people.

Little is known about the black market there, but the National Civilian Police (PNC) have some knowledge of where the guns enter and know that they are sold in central San Salvador. Many of the unregistered weapons probably come from the black market.

In Nicaragua

At the end of the war the UN registered a total of 14,920 small arms handed in by the Contras, along with 1,182 grenade launchers, 1,130 grenades, 134 mines of all types, 134 mortars and 112 missiles. In 1991 the Special Disarmament Brigade collected some 67,000 weap-

ons, but the number of weapons in Nicaragua appears to be growing today. The police and armed forces are requesting additional resources to be able to track the weapons and to cope with illegal arms.

In Guatemala

Large numbers of small arms are also in circulation in Guatemala. Businesses and individuals applied for permits in 1997 to import 84,212 firearms. The Arms Control Office approved 20,653 permits that year and reported that 19,588 firearms were sold. This compares to the 1,800 arms officially turned in by the *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (URNG) in 1996 as a result of their disarmament and demobilization. There is no public record of the thousands of F1 and F2 arms distributed to the infamous PAC’s civil defense patrols during the years of conflict.

Demands for crackdowns become dangerous when democratic forces are locked in a difficult political battle to curb the power of the Armed Forces, as required under the Peace Accords. One mechanism contemplated in the agreements is the constitution of an independent, professional civilian Police Force. However, as in the rest of the region, the government’s determination to appear responsive to the rising public concern about crime hampers efforts to ‘civilianize’ the police. A ‘no arms’ campaign is underway, promoted by a group of NGOs called *Manos Libres* (‘Free Hands’). The campaign employs such methods as distribution of reproductions of children’s handprints and TV spots warning against playing with guns.

Structural constraints

- Loss of confidence in and growing pessimism over the human and political will to make the necessary changes in attitudes

and institutions which will secure social peace. More people expect increasing social strife. This framework of doubt undermines efforts at not only disarmament but also demilitarization; indeed, our core beliefs about civility, justice and opportunity are called into question.

- The belief of many people that there are powerful negative economic forces beyond their control. Uncertainty becomes dangerous as demoralized people withdraw from potential community and collective solutions.
- Poverty: Diminished resort to arms will, more than anything else, be a byproduct of the capacity of people to reduce poverty and enhance power.
- Perceptions of powerlessness: How can a global and national reconfiguration of power between rich and poor that can only produce social disorder and militarization be overcome?
- The political system: One cannot divorce small arms proliferation in the region from the underlying causes of economic and social crisis, namely, the region’s highly fragmented, personalized and corrupt political systems.
- Weak states: Weak states combine with a myopic economic elite and the glorification of corporate enterprises. In many cases weaker states are more corrupt and incapable of developing a national development strategy, let alone sustaining a conversion program.
- Internal security: How can an internal security that is fundamental to demilitarization be improved while public institutions are collapsing and economic programs do not put food on the table?

About the author

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Practical Disarmament

Destruction of Small Arms in Cambodia

by Edgar Janz

Cambodia is well-known for the large number of landmines emplaced there. They were littered throughout the country during almost 30 years of internal armed conflict. Less well-known is the equally lethal legacy of the small arms that accumulated across the country during the period of fighting and distrust. Although the weapons were not the direct cause of the fighting, they led to its intensity and prolongation. A recent census showed that out of 15,000 households interviewed over two-thirds admitted possessing weapons. The actual number is believed to be significantly higher.

There is easy and inexpensive access to weapons across the country. For example, AK-47s are readily available almost everywhere. The price of an AK-47 ranges from US \$5 to \$15. In some areas a B-40 rocket-launcher with four explosives may cost as little as US \$32. Pistol prices start from around US \$120 and ammunition is readily available. But there is reason for hope. Citizens interviewed expressed a strong consensus that, if people feel secure, most would willingly give up their arms. The vast majority of citizens support the collection of lethal weapons and they believe that disarmament will improve the safety of their families and communities. However, it is difficult to establish the rule of law.

A newly formed Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR) is trying:

- to transform the desire to own and use weapons into a commitment to and skills for non-violent problem-solving,
- to reduce the number of small arms and light weapons,
- to establish proper control of weapons, and
- to work to achieve the destruction of all weapons removed from society.

On 5 May 1999 more than 10,000 citizens gathered in the Olympic Stadium in Phnom Penh and witnessed the crushing by bulldozers of 3,855 weapons (mostly old and dysfunctional AK-47s). The government then announced its intention to collect weapons in each of the provinces in Cambodia. As of August 1999 over 61,000 additional weapons were collected from citizens, police and military soldiers. Given the low capacity of the police force and soldiers, lacking discipline and with insufficient salaries, it is not surprising that many of the weapons collected and stored were illegally resold and recirculated. Weapons collection and destruction alone are not effective means to reduce the number and use of weapons. Trafficking of weapons in and out of Cambodia's porous border can undermine any efforts and therefore needs to be addressed directly.

“There is widespread support for action, of both governmental and non-governmental bodies, to reduce the number of weapons and the practice of using them for solving problems. Many people believe that communities and groups of citizens could play an important role to improve the situation. If disarmament is to be effective, it is essential that all weapons are publicly destroyed. It is the only guarantee that weapons are not recycled by trafficking rings. Public destruction of weapons is an important symbol through which the government can begin to improve public trust.”

About the author

Edgar Janz is a member of the Working Group for Weapons Reduction, Cambodia, and works on small arms control.

Practical Disarmament

The Small Arms 'Joint Action' of the European Union

by *Walter-Jürgen Schmid*

The primary focus of the current government campaign is to curb criminal activities. The pending plans for military demobilization, with inadequate provisions for disarmament, will only exacerbate the problem. Until the government further commits itself to instate the rule of law, citizens will either keep their weapons or become victims of those who use violence with impunity. Reducing the number of arms held by the armed forces and determining the need for weapons for defense purposes could contribute to restoring public confidence.

There must be accompanying efforts to address the culture of violence, which is another legacy of the long history of violence and conflicts. Public education and raising awareness can provide Cambodians with an opportunity to deal with their own fears and find common solutions to achieve peace. Disarmament needs to be understood as a broader process.

Alongside the challenges, however, there are also opportunities. Armed conflict in Cambodia has finally come to an end and the political environment is improving. Despite its lack of experience and its poor resources, the government is demonstrating an openness to civil society and assistance from the international community. This is encouraging.

On 17 December 1998 the European Union, under its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), adopted the Joint Action on small arms, which is legally binding on the EU member states. The Joint Action integrates previous CFSP instruments, notably the 1997 EU Programme for Combating and Preventing Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms and the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The objectives of the Joint Action are threefold:

- to combat and contribute to ending the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms,
- to contribute to the reduction of existing accumulations of these weapons to levels consistent with countries' legitimate security needs, and
- to help solve the problems caused by such accumulations.

Article 4 of the Joint Action contains a number of guidelines for action. Assistance and material support are to be given to those countries that are keen to establish more effective controls. This is particularly important where there is a looming crisis. In post-conflict situations, such reductions may be feasible. In the context of demobilization, measures designed to build confidence and reintegrate former combatants and incentives to voluntarily surrender weapons are called for.

The EU not only established a set of guidelines but also committed itself to providing concrete financial and technical support for programs and projects to tackle the problem of small arms. Thus CFSP funds are being used to support a small arms program in Gramsh, Albania. Other EU projects, in Cambodia and Ossetia, are currently in the process of evaluation.

In tackling the small arms problem, measures to promote development have an important part to play. The EU Council of Ministers, responsible for development affairs, agreed in May to devote special attention to small arms. Specifically, this means that the EU is committed to supporting development projects that provide incentives for the voluntary surrender of surplus or illegally held small arms, the destruction of weapons and ordnance, the demobilization of combatants and their rehabilitation and reintegration into society as well as measures to restore and maintain law and order (the 'security first' concept). This support comes with conditions attached: respect for human rights and international law, good governance and commitment to effective prevention, that is, to stop the proliferation and new destabilizing accumulations of small arms.

About the author

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The Joint Action is concerned only with military small arms. It starts from the assumption that, unlike anti-personnel mines, small arms cannot be banned as a category. Their possession and use may well be fully consistent with a country's legitimate security needs. Legitimate arms holdings are arms held at the level required to ensure a country's external defense, maintain law and order, and support international efforts to resolve conflicts. The Joint Action proposes the adoption of confidence-building measures such as regional registers and sharing of information on small arms exports, imports, production and holdings—measures that could increase transparency among the countries of a region.

Countries may supply small arms only to governments, which should consequently commit themselves to acquire them only for their legitimate security needs. In essence, private individuals would not be allowed to possess military small arms. Restricting supplies only to state actors can in certain internal conflict situations be tantamount to protecting governments with unsavory reputations. Within the EU we have discussed this problem in depth and concluded that there is ample evidence that conflicts within countries cannot be resolved by supplying arms.

“Complex as the whole issue may be, in essence the problem is one of arms control, the need to control excessive and destabilizing accumulations of small arms. What is needed is a reduction in surplus arms as well as effective measures to prevent new accumulations posing a threat to security, in effect a classic arms control task. An approach confined only to combating illegal transfers of small arms, which some see as the key to a solution, does not go far enough, since it obviously does nothing to address the pressing problem of existing accumulations. What's more, nearly all 'illegal' small arms start out as legally held weapons.

Only if we also consider the legal production, transfer and legal holding of such weapons and study these issues from an arms-control perspective will we be able to devise satisfactory responses.”

Security Sector Reform

The Concept

by Michael Brzoska

The 1990s have brought a renewed interest in military-related issues among those concerned with development policy and practice. This revival began in the early part of the decade, with a focus on resources, on reducing excessive military expenditures and on reinvesting the peace dividend. It continued with interest in the military aspects of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and, especially, post-conflict reconstruction. At the end of the 1990s, a new concept has begun to attract attention: security sector reform. What is security sector reform? Why is it important? What are its goals and instruments? What does security sector reform promise to achieve? What are its possible pitfalls? What factors contribute to or impede successful security sector reform?

Development policymakers have long thought it best to avoid as far as possible military- and security-related issues. It took the end of the Cold War to put military-related issues back on the agenda of development policy, from several points of departure:

- excessive military expenditures,
- democratization,
- governance,
- demobilization support,

- post-conflict reconstruction,
- concerns of physical security, and
- wider concepts of security.

In one sentence, the ultimate objective of security sector reform is to create functionally differentiated, professional armed forces that are under objective and subjective civilian control, at the lowest functional level of resource use, and are able to provide security for the population. Obviously, this definition conceals major dilemmas, the most obvious of which is that between resource use and provision of security. Another dilemma may arise between civilian control and professionalization.

Pitfalls of security sector reform

Security sector reform may seem to be a rather simple undertaking. In practice, however, it is generally a complex and potentially messy affair. It often requires that power is taken away from those who have been disproportionately powerful. It may also require rapid change in an organization which is inherently conservative and resistant to change. Security sector reform may thus be difficult to achieve. Those promoting security sector reform may deem it necessary to sequence and condition reforms to other political processes. Unfortunately, some of the

most favored avenues of compromise in security sector reform may be detrimental to the development benefits. It is fairly common practice to shed unreformable officers by 'golden handshakes' or to make forces accept civilian control by 'giving toys to the boys.' In general, central development goals such as saving resources must be weighted and defended by the concerned actors against other objectives, such as the provision of physical security.

Even where security sector reform seems to progress smoothly, the dangers of a reversal to patterns of pre-reform behavior are not eliminated. In fact, some students of civil-military relations have argued that highly professional militaries are a greater danger to civil societies than are inefficient militaries. What seems to be important is to minimize the gap between the efficiency, and thus legitimacy, of civilian and military institutions. There is little sense in having a highly modernized military force when civilian institutions are too weak to provide effective and legitimate control. The military may well see itself justified in taking over. There is also the danger of collusion between an exclusive regime and the armed forces. The elements of security sector reform which probably provide the best barriers against such behavior, namely, democratization of the forces themselves and a prominent role for the public at large, are generally the least liked elements among decision-makers in armed forces.

Reformed security forces

Political level	Objective and subjective civilian control
Level of economic development	Minimal resource use by the security sector
Institutional level (armed forces, police, paramilitary)	Professionalization of forces
Societal level	Provision of physical security for people

About the author

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*Security Sector Reform***Good Practices***by Nicole Ball*

The two main objectives of security sector reform are to establish good governance in the security sector and to enhance a country's capacity to develop systems of economic and political governance which benefit society as a whole and foster the creation of a safe and secure environment at the international, regional, national and local levels.

Good governance in the security sector requires that decisions on security-related issues are taken as a matter of course in a coherent, transparent manner. For this to occur, mechanisms for defining security policy, identifying security needs and assessing the appropriate means for addressing these needs must be institutionalized. Similarly, methods must be established for agreeing on the doctrine, missions and structures of the various security forces a government has at its disposal and on how these forces will be financed. It is equally critical to institutionalize norms and mechanisms for promoting the observance of human rights conventions and norms as well as the rule of law. While the security forces themselves will naturally have an important role to play in these activities, civilians and civilian organizations and institutions should manage the process. Members of civil society can assist by providing inputs into the decision-making process and by monitoring the activities of the security forces.

Responsible government capable of providing security at all levels of society and promoting broad-based economic and political development requires first of all that the security forces are not involved in governing the country, either directly or indirectly. History is replete with examples of politicized militaries undermining efforts to develop or maintain participatory political systems. State security institutions should also neither own nor have other economic or financial interests in commercial enterprises. In addition, it is extremely important to reach and maintain manageable levels of security spending so that economic and social needs are not sacrificed to unsustainably high security budgets. Abuses of civil and human rights committed or condoned by the security forces are unacceptable. Crime prevention and cooperative regional security arrangements can also contribute importantly to achieving this objective.

External actors can promote the security-sector reform agenda in a number of ways. Based on experience to date, the most important types of assistance to improve the ability of local actors to undertake security sector reform are:

- strengthen civil institutions;
- professionalize civilians;
- professionalize the security forces;
- institutionalize mechanisms for developing security policy and assessing security needs; and
- provide assistance to overcome the legacies of war.

Security Sector Reform Agenda

- Ensure that security-sector organizations, especially the security forces, are accountable both to elected civil authorities and to civil society and that they operate in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.
- Make information about security sector budgeting and planning widely available, both within government and to the public, to promote achievement of manageable levels of security expenditure. Institutionalize mechanisms that promote security sector transparency.
- Create an environment in which civil society can actively monitor the security sector and be consulted on a regular basis on defense policy, resource allocation and other relevant issues.
- Strengthen civil society organizations and other non-governmental actors to play these roles.
- Foster an environment that promotes regional/subregional peace and security.
- Give adequate attention to specific legacies of war, such as practical disarmament and demobilization.

This reform agenda describes the ideal which all governments should strive to achieve. Every country has room to improve, including the OECD states, and can learn from other members of the international community.

About the author

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Security Sector Reform

World Bank Programs

by *Betty Bigombe*

There are also a set of key considerations that external actors should give priority to when providing assistance to reforming countries. These are:

- define security sector reform and foster collaboration and new partnerships;
- work to develop the commitment of national leadership;
- build on what exists locally and take local ownership seriously;
- make ample use of confidence-building activities;
- build new partnerships; and
- take a long-term view.

If successful, these reform efforts should greatly enhance the transparency and accountability of the security sector and the ability of civilians to manage the security sector.

To meet the twin objectives of security sector reforms, it is extremely important for civil organizations of the state to function effectively.

The achievement of the two core objectives in reform of the security sector invariably requires some degree of institutional and organizational reform and human and organizational capacity-building. The precise nature of the reforms undertaken varies from country to country, but can be summarized by the reform agenda (see Box).

As in any good business portfolio analysis, the World Bank must face the fact that a growing number of its clients live in countries affected by conflicts, whether in Indonesia, Colombia, Albania or Ethiopia. Without a perception of security, foreign investment will decline, existing assets will be at risk and people will not invest in their own communities. In a survey of 69 firms conducted for the *World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World*, security was ranked as the number one risk facing investors.

Through its involvement in post-conflict reconstruction, the World Bank has realized that the state of security has a major impact on the Bank's ability to respond to a country's needs. However, it has been difficult to address these concerns because an understanding of the nexus of poverty, security and development and a strategic approach to dealing with it are still evolving, although the Bank has long implicitly recognized the importance of human security as a cornerstone of broader economic recovery in societies emerging from war. Through its lending and non-lending mechanisms, the Bank is increasingly demonstrating a sensitivity to security in its development work, particularly in post-conflict countries. Its work on public expenditure analysis highlights the tradeoff between 'productive' and 'nonproductive' expenditures.

Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and other war-affected populations, demining and local capacity-building (empowerment of communities to manage their own reconstruction and reconciliation processes) are now common features of Bank assistance to many war-torn countries. The Bank's governance work in judicial reform

and its growing anti-corruption agenda are also directly linked to security-related sectors of the state.

Post-conflict development projects address many of the types of activities needed to jump-start the economy by restoring key financial, legal and regulatory institutions, reestablishing a framework for governance so that civil society can work freely, repairing physical infrastructure, supporting health and educational needs, targeting war-affected populations through reintegration of internally displaced persons, demobilization of soldiers and ex-combatants, revitalizing local communities through credit lines, supporting landmine action programs, normalizing borrowing arrangements for working out arrears, and designing means for the restoration of economic life.

In addition to these areas, there has been a renewed focus on specific post-conflict-related issues such as how violence has emerged from the criminalization of many post-conflict settings in the absence of public security.

There are numerous questions which we should examine in our dialogue on the relationship between security and development. Specifically, we should consider whether the Bank's tremendous research capacity should begin to systematically address this relationship in a coordinated, strategic fashion. In its program evaluation, it might be useful to explore how the different types of lending and non-lending activities have contributed to a more cohesive approach to

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Security Sector Reform

Reform in New Democracies

“Security is a critical development issue and the Bank needs to more explicitly recognize it and integrate security concerns into policies and programs, developing an ability to respond. There are many ways to do this.”

**James Wolfensohn,
World Bank President**

security conditions in the context of development. There may also be value added in the work the Bank has begun on defining performance criteria for countries emerging from conflict. Should security sector reform packages be accompanied by other social and economic aid incentives, actualizing the ‘holistic’ approach envisaged in the Comprehensive Development Framework?

Like any large organization, the World Bank has its own institutional Charter for development which defines its mandate and capacity to respond to changing global events. Certainly, the Bank’s Articles of Agreement (particularly Section 10, Article IV) have constrained any type of engagement in political conduct through the provision that “only economic considerations shall be relevant” in its dealings with its members. This has certainly challenged the Bank’s creativity in confronting the ‘boundaries’ of its development assistance in the post-Cold War era.

by Laurie Nathan

South Africa’s White Paper on Defence

South Africa is one of the few countries in Southern Africa to have developed a comprehensive anti-militarist policy on security and defense. For example, the White Paper on Defence for the Republic of South Africa (1996) summarizes the transformation agenda in the form of the following ‘principles of defense in a democracy’, each of which is explored in some detail:

- National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa’s people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.
- South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with other states.
- South Africa shall adhere to international law on armed conflict and to all international treaties to which it is party.
- The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.
- South Africa is committed to the international goals of arms control and disarmament. It shall participate in, and seek to strengthen, international and regional efforts to contain and prevent the proliferation of small arms, conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction.
- South Africa’s force levels, armaments and military expenditure shall be determined by defense policy which derives from an analysis of the external and internal security environment that takes account of the social and economic imperatives of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.
- The SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently.
- The functions and responsibilities of the SANDF shall be determined by the Constitution and the Defence Act.
- The primary role of the SANDF shall be to defend South Africa against external military aggression. Deployment in an internal policing capacity shall be limited to exceptional circumstances and subject to parliamentary approval and safeguards.
- The SANDF shall be subordinate and fully accountable to Parliament and the Executive.

About the author

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- The SANDF shall operate strictly within the parameters of the Constitution, domestic legislation and international humanitarian law. It shall respect human rights and the democratic political process.
- Defense policy and military activities shall be sufficiently transparent to ensure meaningful parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate, insofar as this does not endanger the lives of military personnel or jeopardize the success of military operations.
- The SANDF shall not further or prejudice party political interests.
- The SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture as required by the Constitution.
- The composition of the SANDF shall broadly reflect the composition of South Africa.
- The SANDF shall respect the rights and dignity of its members within the normal constraints of military discipline and training.

International involvement

There are no 'quick fix' solutions to the problem of security sector reform in the new democracies. The international community should avoid the assumption that northern models can be replicated easily or, indeed, that these models are appropriate in every respect to conditions elsewhere. Principles which are taken for granted in the North are radical in countries emerging from authoritarian rule and the institutional capacity which is taken for granted in the North may be entirely absent.

The difficulties and obstacles related to formulating and implementing new policy on security and defense are substantial, and success is unlikely to be attained if reforms are not shaped and embraced by the new government, civil society and the security institutions themselves.

The agenda for democracy and disarmament promoted by countries of the North is constantly undermined by the failure of these countries to adhere to their professed values. For several decades they have supported dictators and rebel movements engaged in terrorism; they frequently seek to impose positions on developing states; they remain massively over-armed; they flout or ignore violations of arms embargoes and other sanctions regimes imposed by the UN Security Council; and they export armaments in a highly irresponsible manner. The endless flow of arms from the North to the South is not the primary cause of civil wars but it enables the combatants to sustain hostilities and inflict massive damage on civilian populations. Security reform is a challenge in the North as much as in the South.

The Future of Conversion

The Future of Disarmament

by Anke Brunn

What can disarmament and conversion contribute to conflict prevention and development cooperation? Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s disarmament took place at an exceptional pace, comparable only to the draw-down after such major conflicts as the two world wars. Initially, disarmament was expected to swiftly produce significant economic benefits, more or less automatically. But instead of producing early economic gains, disarmament appeared to cause problems. It put companies, jobs and know-how at risk. Governments and managers hoping to reuse resources from the military sector for civilian purposes realized that they had to invest in order to get a future return. Consequently, the expectations of a peace dividend have given way to a more pessimistic view.

What is the reason for this shift in opinion? Violent conflicts continue in many parts of the world. Disarmament faces serious challenges, and conversion is far from being an easy and smooth process. During the early 1990s, both the public and the experts were unaware of the many real or imagined barriers to rapid disarmament; they underestimated the technical and financial cost of moving military resources to non-military purposes. Nevertheless, efforts toward global disarmament continue today, at the end of the 1990s. Clearly, the pace of global disarmament has slowed down, but it has not stopped and conversion is still required.

As the world order changes and the disarmament shock of the end of the Cold War fades, the face of conversion management will also change. However, the questions to be dealt with remain the same and the problems that disarmament creates for many actors must be solved. What is the new role of scientists and engineers employed in weapons labs today? What happened to the well over eight million people employed in defense factories who lost their jobs, and why are so many defense enterprises faring better today than they did 10 years ago? Will all demobilized soldiers find a productive life outside the army? What must small rural communities do when faced with the closure of a military base larger than 500 soccer fields? Where are the millions of surplus weapon systems and all other inherited problems of the arms race?

“Conversion has to be proactive. The benefits of conversion might well have an impact on the willingness to disarm. ‘Proactive’ conversion could provide a means of preparing for disarmament and avoiding the negative social and economic effects of military downsizing. It might even help to prevent conflict.”

The obstacles and difficulties that conversion faces are manifold and complex, particularly in states in transition and post-conflict societies. Big and difficult challenges still lie ahead. The practical work to be done is not as spectacular as juggling with the hundreds of billions of US dollars which piled up when military budgets were cut, but it will provide benefits to the international community, national societies, local communities, companies and individuals.

About the author

Anke Brunn is a former Minister of Science and Research of the Government of North Rhine-Westphalia; she is a Member of Parliament of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and chair of BICC's International Board.

The Future of Conversion

Preventive or Proactive Conversion

by **Keith Krause**

Is conversion obsolete?

In the light of changes in the global military-strategic environment and in the agenda of international peace and security priorities, it is worth asking whether conversion is an idea whose time has passed. First, has the process of conversion been largely completed? With new cooperative security structures in place or emerging in many regions, how much disarming and concomitant converting is there left to do? Second, what role has conversion played in this disarmament process, and was the transformative potential of conversion—from disarmament to economic and social development—actually realized? This 'transformative' vision of conversion implies that it is more than just a 'clean-up' process that follows the transformation of political/security relations as essentially a technical and managerial task. It implies that conversion can play a role in the transformation of political/security relations themselves.

The original concept of conversion of the 1980s seemed to rest analytically on three pillars. The first was a focus on the *macroeconomic* or industrial aspects of defense spending. The second pillar was the belief that the process of moving from a 'military' to a 'civilian' economy required some measure of *state intervention*, through careful planning and deliberate policies.

The third pillar was the idea that conversion efforts contained a '*transformative potential*.' On this account, conversion activities would be part of a longer temporal 'chain' of conflictual and cooperative interactions and could play a role (along with other instruments) in easing tension and building security. This concept of conversion, on the one hand, has been rescued from premature oblivion by 'retooling' it to deal with an impressive range of contemporary problems stemming from the end of the Cold War and the changed international security agenda, including in particular the disarmament and demobilization of military personnel into civilian life and the dismantling or scrapping of surplus weapons. On the other hand, it has turned (whether intentionally or not) into somewhat more of a managerial tool for dealing with the consequences of changed security relationships than its more ardent proponents would have wished.

About the author

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What is the future of conversion in relation to disarmament and development? The need to disarm and restructure military sectors and simultaneously prevent violent conflicts is increasingly urgent. We must learn to see conversion policies as strategies for managing structural societal change which should be optimized. The potential benefits of disarmament and conversion go beyond economic advantages. Disarmament and conversion have to develop their internal dynamics. The link is clear and obvious: disarmament, conversion, and a favorable political and economic environment can contribute to the prevention of violent or deadly conflict and to post-conflict rehabilitation. The absence of violent conflict is a foundation for sustainable human development and thus important for development cooperation and conflict prevention and management. The absence of violence is the real 'peace dividend'.

“What would change by introducing the concept of ‘preventive conversion’ is that conversion activities would be inserted into the entire ‘cycle of conflict’, not just as a technical or managerial solution to disarmament problems created as a result of a change in political or security relationships, but as a proactive tool that could help (albeit in a small way) transform these relationships.”

‘Preventive conversion’

The logic of the concept of conversion implicates three things: a concern with the economic dimension of military expenditures and related activities, an orientation towards a process of ‘managed change’, and a focus on the potential of conversion activities to transform the role and weight of institutions of organized violence in social, political and economic life within and between states. The logic of prevention implies action taken to avoid a specific and undesirable outcome. On this formulation ‘preventive conversion’ is:

The pro-active development and timely implementation of conversion policies to prevent the escalation of protracted conflict relationships (inter-state or societal) into violence, to diminish or avoid the accumulation of excessive and destabilizing quantities of arms or the waste of economic and human resources, and to reduce the militarization of social, economic and political relations (within societies and between states).

Situating preventive conversion: five related activities

Five other activities on the security and peace agenda of the 1990s would seem to be implicated in (or related to) preventive conversion:

- **Early warning:** Early-warning activities focus primarily on mobilizing actors (international or domestic) to prevent the escalation of existing conflicts, and not particularly on transforming these conflicts into more cooperative relationships. Preventive conversion is more likely to intervene further ‘upstream’ in the cycle or chain of conflict relationships. Preventive conversion would be more an element of confidence- and security-building measures designed to manage or resolve conflicts.
- **Preventive diplomacy:** Preventive diplomacy can be seen as action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit their spread. There is no particular overlap between preventive conversion and preventive diplomacy (other than the word ‘preventive’), since the latter implicates directly no concrete or practical measures, beyond diplomatic discussions or negotiations.

- **Post-conflict peace-building:** Post-conflict peace-building is defined in the Agenda for Peace as “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.” Here it is clear that conversion can play a role in peace consolidation, especially in the area of disarmament and weapons destruction, or in security sector reform. Almost all contemporary conflicts are part of much larger ‘enduring rivalries’ or ‘protracted social conflicts’ in which violent episodes are all too frequent. Thus thinking about preventive conversion as one tool to help break a cycle of violence and conflict ought to help clarify the goals of post-conflict conversion efforts.
- **Confidence- and security-building:** In some respects, preventive conversion may be closest to some understandings of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), which can be described as ‘cooperative security’ measures. Preventive conversion would be a natural part of this larger set of measures, in particular through regulation of the size, technical composition and investment patterns of military forces.

■ **Security sector reform:**

A vast array of measures can be developed to achieve the goals of good governance and to develop systems of economic and political governance in a security sector reform program. 'Preventive conversion' can be seen as a crucial component of many dimensions of security sector reform. Important and powerful interests exist in states and societies in need of security sector reform, and these interests are seldom easy to dislodge. Preventive conversion would attempt to reduce the role and importance of the institutions of organized violence in social, economic and political life through practical measures that 'demilitarized' different facets of society, politics and the economy. (See Chapter 2, "Security Sector Reform" in this *report*)

The costs and benefits of 'preventive conversion'

The idea of 'preventive conversion' is a supplement to ongoing conversion activities that does not overturn the logic of the current concept of conversion. It accents it with the addition of three elements:

- a focus on the entire chain of conflict,
- the mobilization of new actors and stakeholders, and
- emphasis on practical elements of the 'transformative' vision of conversion.

Incorporating each of these elements into a project of 'preventive conversion' has several benefits, but also a few costs (or pitfalls) of which one must beware. One benefit is that conversion is no longer regarded as a 'one-off' activity to be undertaken as a consequence of disarmament decisions or activities and then completed, nor is it just a technical solution to a post-conflict 'problem' of resource reallocation. A second benefit is that 'preventive conversion' may mobilize new actors or stakeholders to undertake conversion activities. The third benefit is the recapturing of the 'proactive' and transformative elements of the broadest vision of conversion.

These three 'benefits' of the concept of preventive conversion require, however, that some difficult choices be made, choices that should be considered as potential costs or pitfalls. Making explicit the link between practical projects and broader peace-building requires a willingness to recognize the circumstances under which practical conversion projects should not be undertaken. Similarly, if conversion efforts that include opportunity costs (time, energy, international resources) are to be undertaken, choices may have to be made between difficult projects with low chances of success and less difficult but longer-term efforts aimed at prevention and slow transformation. The wider scope of preventive conversion activities (to reduce the militarization of social, economic and political relations between and within states) also raises the usual dangers associated with large-scale social engineering projects.

3

Regional Experiences




Photo: Hacky Hagemeyer, Transparent



Economics of Security in Europe

by Daniel George

In considering the economic security of Europe, the economic conditions of **Russia** come to mind first:

- There is the obvious danger that people with much-needed skills will seek to emigrate in greater numbers.
- *The whole rationale of economic transition may become discredited by Russia's continuing economic weakness. 'Reform' may be written off as a failure before it has had a chance to succeed.*
- The government's greed for cash could tempt it to turn a blind eye to its own arms exporters as they sell advanced technology to rogue regimes, thereby increasing proliferation.
- There is the danger that growing regional assertiveness and autonomy could get out of hand. *Regional differences are great and growing, with the richest regions naturally being the keenest to run their own affairs.*
- Economic weakness leads to a degraded military. There is also the risk that a degraded conventional force will lower the nuclear threshold, as hinted at in Russia's new National Security Concept.

The situation could be ameliorated by a wealthier, more self-confident Russia which would be economically more diverse. The rest of Europe would benefit greatly from the increased commercial potential that a wealthier, more economically diverse Russia would represent.

◀◀ *Loyalist mural in Belfast, 1996*

NATO and Russia have a common interest in preserving peace and enhancing prosperity and stability. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris on 27 May 1997, provides the conceptual framework for a new relationship. To carry out the aims of and activities provided for in the *Founding Act and to develop common approaches to European security problems*, NATO and Russia have established the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and hold regular meetings of military representatives. Meanwhile, however, Russia has decided to suspend PJC activities.

The **Kosovo** crisis is the best illustration of the various facets and complexity of economic security:

- First, the *causes* of the conflict: No one can ignore the historical and ethnic aspects, or the role of religion, demography and the *personal policies of Milosevic*, but neither should we forget the extreme poverty of the province and the near-colonial status of its economy.
- Second, the *course* the military conflict has taken: We have witnessed a confrontation between two military forces of entirely different categories, one with the most sophisticated modern technology available in terms of economic resources. At the other extreme we have seen the effect of the most primitive methods—social, human and economic disruption in both the province of Kosovo and neighboring countries.

In the search for solutions, everyone is aware that reconstruction is a major factor of stabilization, followed by economic growth in not only Kosovo but also the whole region. The notion of 'reconstruction'

should not be understood to mean simply repairing all the considerable damage caused by the conflict. Reconstruction is a more ambitious project of economic dynamism which could bring prosperity to the region.

The situation is obviously different from that of western Europe after the last world war since it possessed assets—well-qualified human resources, long traditions, know-how, etc.—which allowed the American aid channeled through *the Marshall Plan to have a rapid beneficial effect*. The task in Kosovo is no doubt more difficult, but it can be achieved.

In this regard, international aid, if administered correctly, can make a powerful contribution to re-establishing—or simply creating—a healthy economic fabric capable of growth, but it can and must also encourage political, economic and security cooperation among the nations of the region as well as between them and European or trans-Atlantic institutions. The eradication of divisions and resentment—which in 1945 were also considerable in western Europe—is possible if the international community, through all its constituent bodies, is both open and firm in its intentions and actions, and if the regions' leaders are sufficiently enlightened. Past experience and lessons drawn from mistakes may offer reasonable prospects, even if it may take years to attain these goals.

The security economy, in Europe or elsewhere, is not merely the field of interaction *par excellence* but also the field of cooperation between nations. This means that the problems must be handled consistently by the many parties involved in one country and by concerned international organizations.

About the author

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The Regulation of Armaments in Southeastern Europe

by Ian Anthony

With the breakdown of civil and military control in the former Yugoslavia, arms were often not only in the possession of forces under the control of the state (including paramilitary and armed forces). Non-state warring parties also had access to significant quantities of arms. A new challenge for arms control is created where the authorities do not have the support of citizens—perhaps including the armed forces. Under these conditions the value of the signature of a party to an agreement is likely to be reduced in the eyes of other parties.

The framework for regulating armaments in southeastern Europe is extremely complicated. Some regional states participate in Europe-wide conventional arms control efforts while others do not. One state (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) is subject to a mandatory UN arms embargo. The European Union member states maintain arms embargoes against both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, but these states are able to modernize their armed forces by imports from other suppliers. Three states participate in the only subregional arms control arrangement currently in force in Europe. A mandate exists to develop a regional process covering not only these three states but also any other state that chooses to participate. The existing subregional process also covers specific non-state actors. The agreements that accompanied the ending of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and recently in Kosovo included demilitarization arrangements intended to eliminate all irregular forces. These various efforts to regulate

armaments are the responsibility of different organizations. However, there is no formal coordination between some of the processes and no coordination at all between others. The coordination of export controls by European countries remains extremely rudimentary. Although the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has discussed the issue of conventional arms export controls, it has done so in a rather perfunctory manner. Regional arms control aimed at expanding the geographical scope of arms control but still below the all-European level (as foreseen in Article V of the Dayton Accords) has not progressed beyond preliminary discussions in spite of many forecasts that further regional conflict can be expected unless new political arrangements are found.

There has been relatively little political momentum supporting subregional arms control from key states in southeastern Europe and relatively little pressure on these states from external major powers. This reflects the fact that states have downgraded the political importance of arms control as an instrument of security policy, concentrating attention more on integration processes such as NATO enlargement.

The post-conflict arms control arrangements of the Florence Agreement appear to have been successful, underlining that arms control can play a useful part in managing post-conflict security problems. In other cases the arms control arrangements in the 'gray area' between peace and war suggest that the more successful efforts have focused on control of units and forces rather than weapons. The only implemented arrangement

“A range of different procedures intended to regulate armaments in southeastern Europe can be identified. First, after September 1991 arms embargoes and sanctions have been applied at different stages to various territories in the area without the consent or participation of the governments of the targeted countries. Second, the area is part of a wider European security space in which a framework for conventional arms control has already been developed based on cooperation and consent. Third, measures have been defined in the framework of agreements to end the fighting in specific locations.”

that included weapons other than major equipment provided for control of a small number of weapons handed over by Serb civilians, most of which were not destroyed but transferred to Croatian authorities.

It has not yet been possible to develop arms control and disarmament measures that would apply to forces intended for internal security operations. These kinds of rules and enforcement procedures are still considered to be incompatible with the concept of state sovereignty.

About the author

Ian Anthony is Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden.

Conflict Settlement: The Case of Northern Ireland

by Mari Fitzduff

On Good Friday, 10 April 1998, after 30 years of a bloody civil war in which over 3,500 people were killed and over 30,000 injured and after two long, weary years of political negotiation, the Belfast Agreement was finally signed by Northern Ireland's political parties. In the agreement, the politicians appeared to have achieved consensus on the principles—and in some cases the practice—necessary to govern a society divided on constitutional, political and cultural perspectives. Six weeks later, by a vote of over 71 percent and despite the best efforts of fundamentalist Nationalists and Unionists to wreck the deal, the agreement was endorsed by the peoples of the island of Ireland, north and south. Northern Ireland appeared at last to be on the road to peace. The first major factor in turning minds toward a political rather than a military process of peace was the realization by both governments and paramilitaries that no military victory was possible.

However, this did not bring an end to the conflict. It is a well established fact to those working with conflicts that they do not end—they just change. Undoubtedly, significant challenges remain to be addressed. Among these can be listed the possible further development of some of the splinter groups that have split from the main paramilitary movements and the need for the existing Assembly parties to constructively and collectively deal with this challenge. The issue of contentious parades remains unresolved and there is the continuing difficulty of the possible destabilization of the Assembly through the growth of more 'anti-agreement' representatives who could coalesce around such issues as the failure to agree to a

process for decommissioning of weapons and the difficulties in redeveloping a police service that is more acceptable to the Nationalists.

While the issues themselves are difficult, what may make their resolution more problematic is the relative inexperience of the newly elected politicians in governing and particularly in governing collectively what still remains, despite the Belfast Agreement, a very divided society. Given the nature of the social, cultural, religious and political differences between Unionists and Nationalists, it is inevitable that dialogue between them will be fraught with tension and hostility. It is even more difficult for politicians, paramilitaries or parties associated with paramilitaries to involve themselves in dialogue with each other as they are very closely watched by their communities.

On the positive side, however, much work has been undertaken on the development of pluralist approaches to many of the contentious issues of equality and diversity which have been so divisive in Northern Ireland. In the Good Friday Agreement, there is now in place a variety of mechanisms such as weighted majorities for decision-making which have been designed to deal with the inevitable difficulties that will arise over the coming years. In addition, the paramilitary campaigns—except for those of the minor splinter groups that have arisen or have been revitalized since the Agreement—have virtually ceased. Although intra-community beatings and shootings continue to mar the peace, an increasing number of ex-paramilitaries are choosing to abandon violence and to join in the political, or community, development process.

“Effectively, the war is ended. For many, committee papers have been substituted for guns. Meetings with British civil servants—and even British Prime Ministers—have become part of daily life for erstwhile Sinn Fein/IRA and Loyalist activists many of whom are now full or part-time engaged in national and local politics and who are now having to increasingly depend upon the use of politics to address the myriad local and regional issues that are now their collective responsibility.”

The road to the Good Friday Agreement has been long, complex and often bloody. Almost 30 years and 3,500 deaths have been the result of the fear, discrimination, intransigence, anger and violence with which communities and government have limited their much surer and swifter progress toward peace. The peace has been long in the coming and hard in the making. Major problems still remain. It does, however, at last appear that the hard work and the many committed approaches to both dialogue and constitutional solutions may soon yield enough stability to take Northern Ireland to a future where politics and not violence will primarily prevail.

About the author

Mari Fitzduff is Director of the Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE), Londonderry, Northern Ireland.

The Elusive Peace Dividend in South Asia

by Richard Ponzio

The present South Asian security environment—with its nuclear ambitions, increasing military expenditures and unsettled border conflicts—is far from the environment needed to introduce far-sighted disarmament and demobilization programs. Indeed, discussion of demilitarization and generation of a peace dividend for human development purposes may strike many as illusory or impractical. On the other hand, certain demilitarization and conversion strategies could slowly reverse the region's deteriorating security climate and serve as important tools for preventing future conflicts.

Through carefully designed demilitarization measures it would be conceivable for India and Pakistan to enter into a mutual pact to freeze and then gradually scale back present levels of military spending by 2–5 percent a year. This would accumulate savings over a 15-year period of US \$80–\$125 billion.

“As important as military budgetary savings would be if generated, to realize a broader conception of the peace dividend requires clear headed strategies and political fortitude to ensure that freed resources are reallocated to human development programs.”

Given the considerable repercussions for human security of high military spending and the nuclear stand-off in South Asia, a delicate balance must be sought between future investments in weapons and soldiers and future investments in people's welfare. Such a balance can only come about through a concerted effort to build confidence and devise a new framework for peaceful coexistence in the region. To transcend enmities built up during three wars and the present nuclear dangers, a broad, integrated strategy for peace and human security in South Asia must be forged.

To enhance the sense of external and internal security which both nations require and to induce a more favorable environment for conflict prevention and resolution, the case for demilitarization should be reexamined and an innovative implementation strategy introduced. Demilitarization entails not only reductions in military expenditure, personnel and weapon holdings but also a process for diminishing the

influence of the military over civilian institutions and for delegitimizing the use of violence to resolve conflicts. With comprehensive verification systems, proper incentives and a new regional security arrangement, a step-by-step process for the gradual demilitarization of South Asia becomes the only viable approach to the fostering of trust and building of regional security, in all its dimensions. In this regard, five fundamental steps are recommended:

1. Expand verification capabilities:

In discussing legitimate techniques for comprehensive verification systems and information-gathering, India and Pakistan should consider a regular exchange of military officers, regular on-site inspections, weekly reconnaissance overflights and cooperative use of technical assistance from a third party.

2. Address India's concern and a nuclear threat from China:

Nothing short of complete and universal nuclear disarmament—involving a new, universal regulatory regime—will convince India and Pakistan to dismantle their nuclear warheads and production capabilities. This stems largely from India's perceived threat from a nuclear China.

3. Engage in a national dialogue on the pros and cons of demilitarization and conversion:

Gradual demilitarization can forge national consensus in the South Asian countries on the need for more affordable, yet credible, defense programs.

About the author

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4. Promote a demilitarized

culture: In addition to reducing the level of military spending and number of soldiers, armaments and defense industries, demilitarization involves a process of diminishing the influence of the military on civilian institutions and delegitimizing the use of violence to resolve external and internal conflicts.

5. Establish a regional security

forum: While the above four steps are essential elements underpinning demilitarization efforts in South Asia, a primary vehicle is still needed for negotiating and sustaining a series of regional military cut-backs. Ostensibly, a reformed South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), created in 1985, appears to be a suitable candidate forum.

Sustained demilitarization in a region such as South Asia requires an integrated approach involving local, regional and global actors and must take into account the various dimensions and perceptions of militarism and security embedded in the *status quo*. Continued reliance on cosmetic and ineffectual measures to build confidence and security in the region will fail to foster—and may even inhibit—the political dialogue which is necessary to prevent and eventually overcome current conflicts.

The Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia and Confidence- and Security-building Measures

by Heiner Horsten

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 brought into the open the potential of both states for a full-fledged nuclear arms build-up, which has been clandestinely prepared over many years. The nuclear tests have destroyed all hopes that both countries might reverse their course and nuclear ambitions. India never referred to Pakistan as justification for her own nuclear ambitions. Rather, Indian politicians spoke about a 'nuclear threat' from China and went to great lengths to justify their decision to test their weapons by the lacking progress in nuclear disarmament worldwide. Pakistan, on the other hand, explained her decision to test by India's example. We are therefore confronted with a complicated triangular situation which is probably more difficult to control than the bipolar nuclear threat under which we lived during the Cold War.

Another element is troubling indeed: India and Pakistan are both developing and testing short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Their most recent missile tests have shown that missile programs on both sides are running at high speed. Taking China into account only adds to these worries. It is therefore no exaggeration to speak about the beginning of a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent. The declared goal of both states is 'minimum nuclear deterrence.'

The most obvious course of action is to seek confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) which could control the conflict, reduce tensions and prepare the ground for further arms control and disarmament measures. CSBMs are not new to either India or Pakistan, but they are becoming much more urgent as nuclear weapons slowly but steadily enter their military arsenals. The problem is that although various CSBMs have been agreed they were not always relied upon in times of conflict.

About the author

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A brief overview shows that India and Pakistan have already agreed to:

- The installation of quick communication links ('hot lines') between Prime Ministers' Offices and Directors General of Military Operations and Frontline Headquarters along the Line of Control.
- The prohibition of attack against nuclear installations and facilities (agreement signed in 1988, ratified in 1991).
- The prevention of airspace violations and permitting overflights and landings of military aircraft (agreement signed in 1991, ratified in 1992).
- Advance notification of military exercises, maneuvers and troop movements (agreement signed in 1991, ratified in 1992).
- Joint Declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons (signed in 1992).

The meeting of the two Prime Ministers in Lahore, Pakistan, on 20–21 February 1999 seemed to give a boost to peaceful conflict resolution and CSBMs between the two sides. After the recent violent conflict on the Line of Control in the Kargil area of Kashmir, it is an open question whether much of that 'spirit of Lahore' will prevail in the future. The shooting down of a Pakistani military aircraft by India has made things worse.

A possible future course of action would be to pursue the proposals made by both sides to institute consultative working-level mechanisms for periodic review of CSBMs to ensure their effective implementation. This could be of great significance since the lack of enforcement or verification mechanisms has hampered the implementation of existing CSBMs. The OSCE's annual implementation assessment meetings could provide a model.

- Both sides have produced proposals to build on the agreement of advance notification of military exercises. This would include commitments to notify military exercises and allow observers to attend them. An annual exchange of military information—to include a declaration of holdings of specified equipment and recent figures for actual and planned defense expenditure—would give additional assurance, specifically if inspection procedures to verify declared holdings were included.

- India's proposal for an exchange of visits by high-level military officers along with an invitation for the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff to visit India is also a step in the right direction.
- The improvement and more regular use of 'hot lines' between political and military decision centers should be encouraged.
- Both sides should honor their commitments, gain experience in relying on CSBMs and use them better, specifically in times of crisis.
- Security relations between India and China could also be greatly improved by the development and implementation of CSBMs. India and China must adopt a general policy of greater transparency also in the nuclear field.

The Peace Process in Cambodia

by Lakhan Mebrotra

During the past three decades Cambodia entered an inferno and witnessed one of the worst genocides in human history. With much of its recent history characterized by violence of the most egregious kind, Cambodia more than most other countries needed coherent, comprehensive and effective implementation of disarmament and conversion programs at the start of this decade.

Looking back, one can now see that the failure to create sufficiently attractive incentives or imperatives in the Paris Peace Accords led to the failure to attain satisfactory demobilization and disarmament during the United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC) operation. Consequently, the success of the operation depended almost entirely on the goodwill of the Cambodian protagonists.

Demobilization can only take place when there is political harmony, when there is an absence of military factionalism, when there are strong and legitimate state institutions, and when there is peace. Only with a strong rule of law, only when all sides believe they will be physically and politically safe if they fail in elections, will true democratic transition take place. UNTAC could not fulfill the demobilization and disarmament aspects of its mandate because none of these elements was present. The Paris Accords rested precariously on the assumption that peace would come with the holding of elections. UNTAC concentrated its energies on controlling the factions prior to the elections, not on fusing them permanently into the rubric of democracy, a task which needed more healing time and the assured cooperation of each of the factions.

'National reconciliation' thus remained a distant goal. In the aftermath of the 1993 elections, Cambodia was unable to deal with its legacy of violence and all its trappings. With the preservation of a winner-takes-all mentality, the presence of the Khmer Rouge justifying the maintenance of a bloated security sector and military factionalism, Cambodia's democratic reforms during and after the term of UNTAC were more a matter of form than substance. Under these circumstances, no faction would be willing to surrender its armed might.

Since 1998 there has been greater hope for progress. The Royal Government of Cambodia has prepared a work plan for the year 1999/2000 under a 5-year scheme to demobilize 55,000 soldiers by the year 2003. The program of action starts with the process of registration of soldiers in service, identification of 'ghost soldiers' and preparation of a consolidated computerized database of Royal Cambodian Armed Forces personnel. Nevertheless, total military expenditure, which accounts for 40 percent of the national budget, remains high. And while the number of soldiers goes down, salaries will go up and the armed forces will be modernized.

From early 1999, the Royal Government of Cambodia has turned its attention more seriously to the problem of small arms proliferation. In Cambodia, as much as in other unsettled societies, small arms have been an important cause of political instability, institutional insecurity and social unrest. Over the past three decades, the entire Cambodian society seems to have become trigger-happy, with a gun culture that has penetrated the social fabric. (See "Destruction of Small Arms in Cambodia" in this report.)

“The consolidation of peace, and the reaping of the peace dividend, required a successful democratic transition. Now, one year after the elections of 1998, the situation may give greater cause for optimism. A combination of factors—a more focused and coordinated international position, growing war weariness between the factions, and an end to the Khmer Rouge in their old incarnation—contribute to this renewed hope.”

The conversion process will be arduous and painful. The process of disarmament and demobilization which is now in motion is only one, but an essential, first step. The people of Cambodia and its leadership as well as its international partners must ensure that this train does not again stop in its tracks. Just as the process of disarmament and demilitarization has now gained some momentum, so has the movement towards peace, rehabilitation and development. For that process to be completed, more bridges of confidence will have to be built in Cambodia's body politics.

About the author

Lakhan Mehrotra is a former ambassador of the Government of India; he serves as the UN Secretary-General's Personal Representative in Cambodia.

Peace-building Initiatives of Civil Society in Africa

by Hassan Ba

The role of civil society in conflict resolution and rehabilitation should not be seen only as a possibility; it also has its limitations. Conflict is not an academic but a practical problem, which has been addressed by Synergies Africa, a non-governmental organization (NGO). It began working within civil society in 1994. Its activities have been focused on the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi and Congo) and on Western Africa.

In discussing civil society in Africa, we should distinguish four groups:

- 'classic' humanitarian NGOs;
- social movements, such as trade unions;
- traditional elders; and
- the private sector.

Experience from practical field work shows that classic NGOs are usually the most active actors. At the same time, however, these NGOs have less legitimacy than the social movements and traditional chiefs because many of them were created by foreign activists. Our experience shows that civil societies can be very active and useful during low-intensity conflicts, such as local conflicts. During high-intensity conflicts, or wars, on the other hand, our experience was that it becomes very difficult to have any impact. In low-intensity conflicts, for example conflicts over the allocation of natural resources, it is possible for civil society to play a role. In some West African conflicts, the traditional elders worked hard and successfully during the different stages of the conflict. In local conflicts, for example those between the villages and nomadic people of Senegal and Mali, they are making useful contributions to conflict resolution every day.

For traditional chiefs it is difficult to be respected by all the conflicting parties. The second limit is the lack of decentralization, which prevents the traditional chiefs from playing a useful role in conflict resolution. Finally, societal change in Africa creates problems: the elders' authority is undermined by modernization processes.

In 1995 we organized a meeting between traditional chiefs and the government in Yaounde. Chiefs from 10 West African countries (among them, the king of Burkina Faso, leaders from Ghana, etc.) attended the meeting. Encouraged by Synergies Africa, during the meeting, women from NGOs in more than 10 countries approached the chiefs about problems related to gender and enslavement issues.

Even in ethnic conflicts, local NGOs can play a role by starting initiatives at the local level. For example, in 1989, during the conflict between Mauritania and Senegal, the local mayors in Senegal played an important role because they had detailed knowledge of the situation. In other situations, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it was and remains impossible for civil society to make useful interventions. Between May and July 1996, at a meeting in Geneva between President Carter, President Mobuto and other representatives, NGOs asked President Carter to discuss with Mobuto their problems in Kivu. These problems were expected to become even worse if the refugee problem was not addressed. Mobuto refused to deal with the concerns of these NGOs. When the war broke out in October, no work could continue on any of the local initiatives.

Lessons must be drawn from these experiences:

- Successes at the local level depend on successful peace processes at the national, international or regional level. It seems that a regional approach is the best way to resolve conflicts.
- It is important to conclude an agreement to stop the combat. The timing is crucial. For example, at the moment we have a reasonable chance for peace in Congo because all parties seem to be exhausted from the war.
- Civil society can be more effective during rehabilitation and reconstruction processes because there is then an urgent need for leadership.
- It is important to reinforce African civil society, but we also have to recognize its limits. In order to expand the influence of civil society, we have to strengthen the dialogue and exchange of experiences at the local level.
- We cannot deal appropriately with conflicts such as that in Congo without cooperating with multinational corporations that have an economic interest in the country.

Similarly, offers by NGOs were neglected by Kabila, making it impossible to influence the conflict. A meeting between over 200 NGOs from the whole country and the new leaders took place on 20 July 1997, 10 days after Kabila had arrived in Kinshasa. Issues of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation were discussed. A follow-up was planned, but afterwards many activists were either killed or forced to leave the country.

About the author

Hassan Ba is Secretary-General of Synergies Africa.

Civilian Conflict Resolution in Africa

by *Günther Baechler*

In many regions of Africa, various actors intervene in order to address the dramatic increase in violent disputes and armed conflicts. Peace promotion by parties external to the conflict, such as development agencies, churches and other NGOs, requires that those actors know not only where the major conflict areas are but also the reasons for and the dynamics of the disputes and conflicts in which they intervene.

Conflict geography

Current violent conflicts and wars have broken out primarily in the least developed countries of the world. In second place are the countries with medium development and countries characterized by poor state performance and unstable political conditions. Sub-Saharan Africa not only accounts for almost one-third of the world's refugees; with 9.4 million displaced people it also hosts about half of the world's

internally displaced persons, estimated at 20.8 million. This is the highest migration rate *per capita* worldwide.

Current conflicts are often characterized by ethnic, religious or other group differences—but this is only part of the picture. The causes of war are often confused with what causes certain parties to fight. In fact, the root causes are normally found in the competition for resources and often in the struggle for power and influence. There is ample evidence of a correlation between rural poverty, environmental stress in rural areas, discriminated access to resources and poor state performance. These factors coincide with political instability, that is non-democratic change in regimes and/or violent conflicts and wars.

Third party interventions


Conflict resolution encompasses a whole range of interventions by different actors, means, methods and tools. Third party intervention

urges actors to carefully trace causal pathways. This is complicated by the fact that the cause of a conflict is not necessarily identical to the causes for which the parties believe they must fight. Furthermore, the perception of causes can change during the conflict.

Three crucial aspects have to be taken into consideration. First, analysis of causal pathways must be carried out. Second, the different but interacting roles those factors play must be identified. Third, one cannot focus exclusively on structures, background conditions and threshold values. Any conflict study must include actor orientation by dealing with perceptions, positions, interests and decision-making processes.

Multiple causal roles concept

Conflict analysis is improved by separating causes from triggers, structures from actors, and dynamics from individual events. This concept consists of five roles: reasons, triggers, targets, channels and catalysts.



Development Assistance in Areas of Potential Conflict in Africa

Combined interventions

Conflict transformation in modernizing societies must address all five aspects. In order to do this, different types of third party intervention—carried out by distinct actors—have to be coordinated and combined.

Development cooperation supports socioeconomic development, good governance and political participation. It empowers people to gain access to resources and promotes self-help capacities. However, violence may occur despite the engagement of development agencies. Thus, prevention does not automatically exclude destabilization, crises, state failures and conflict escalation. Peace promotion in developing countries must go beyond development assistance and concentrate on special prevention in the short and medium term. It has to focus on actors and their interests, perceptions and strategies rather than on structures and background conditions.

The lack of coercive power makes it necessary for informal intervenors to be more creative and persuasive. To be effective, they need to address the real interests and values of the parties involved. Mediation, problem-solving workshops and other third party activities also attempt to improve relationships among the conflicting parties. The third party seeks to provide participants with an opportunity for a more effective mode of interaction and to permit them to view the conflict from an analytical rather than a coercive perspective.

A third party normally acts in a complex environment consisting of different actors with distinct cultural backgrounds, value systems, behavioral norms and methods of conflict resolution. Third parties should learn from the successful conflict resolution of local actors, not only from the failures.

About the author

Günther Baechler is Director of the Swiss Peace Foundation.

by Wolfgang Buch

Africa is confronted with several large and small conflicts which share a number of common causes:

- the weakness of civil society organizations and democratic mechanisms to constrain power and to control the military,
- the lack of justice and general impunity,
- the lack of protection for minorities,
- inter-communal conflicts, poverty, corruption, the omnipresence of weapons and external interference, and
- the absence or inefficiency of regional or subregional peace regimes and the multilateral institutions required to prevent or contain conflict.

The possibilities for development policy to contribute to conflict prevention have to be seen realistically; this contribution to peaceful development can at best be a small one. Of critical importance is the commitment of those involved in conflicts.

It is useful to distinguish between two aspects of the potential role of development policy in preventing or counteracting conflict:

■ The contribution, if any, of development policy to fighting the causes of conflict:

The main objective of development policy—poverty reduction and social equality—is to prevent the emergence of conflict situations. In many parts of Africa, access to land, water and mineral

resources is increasingly becoming a primary source of conflict. The appropriate use and conservation of natural life-support systems are therefore important goals of development activities. Another highly significant element is population policy, since high rates of population growth increase the pressure on the limited natural resource reserves.

The positive impact in classic fields of development assistance is contrasted, for example, by the fact that official cooperation might support the government of a country, which may itself be a party to a conflict. Another important fact is that development cooperation diminishes the pressure on the government to seriously address the causes of conflict in the country. Some African countries have been granted so much assistance that the government and society have shed their responsibility for making active efforts to achieve a balance between the interests of various groups in the country. In many African states, the considerable inflow of resources serves to foster cronyism and corruption. The groups that benefit from development cooperation defend their privileges, which may exacerbate conflicts to the use of violence.

About the author

Wolfgang Buch is Head of Division for Africa in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany.

Arms Supplies Fueling Conflicts in Africa

■ The opportunities for development policy to contribute to peaceful conflict resolution:

The primary factor here is popular participation in the political process. Support for mechanisms such as village committees or municipal councils to balance the interests of different population groups, activities for the decentralization of decision-making power and generally support for democratization deserve special mention in this connection.

The work of non-governmental organizations has proven to be important not only in fostering conflict awareness in society but also in many individual cases when projects were carried out that had a conflict-related objective.

One vital ingredient of non-violent conflict resolution is the legal system. Unambiguous legislation, an administration that adheres to the principles of the rule of law, and an impartial judiciary that is accessible also to the poor are all decisive prerequisites for preventing conflict and protecting human rights. Another essential ingredient is the establishment of civilian control over the military and police, which often are the cause of instability and human rights violations rather than contributing to the protection of the whole of society. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the experience of many years of development cooperation with a large number of African countries. Prerequisites for successful development cooperation are:

- a high degree of flexibility,
- preparedness to assume a high level of responsibility and to bear a high risk,
- close ties with foreign policy,
- a long-term critical engagement, and
- a more intense relationship between development aid and security.

by *Mohamed Sahnoun*

A strategy of development assistance, a type of mini-Marshall Plan, is needed in several regions of Africa. It should be carefully designed to include reconciliation, good governance, with inclusiveness, justice—and certainly disarmament and conversion. Several opportunities have been missed—in Rwanda, former Zaire, Burundi and Somalia—for which these countries and the international community are still paying the price. Donor countries and agencies, as well as field actors, should signal their readiness to assist in:

- establishing national commissions of truth and reconciliation,
- assisting in building and enhancing the judiciary system,
- community rehabilitation through integrated community development programs aimed at building powerful, binding forces between ethnic groups and promoting national unity,
- effective programs of disarmament and conversion, using remaining national army units for large national works, and
- a real, serious and thorough fight against arms trafficking.

The supply of arms must be controlled so that economic development can take place and form the foundation for peacekeeping and conflict prevention.

“In my modest experience in mediation and good offices, one of the most frustrating elements which I encountered, is the disruptive effect of arms supply. Very often in our endeavors, as we came near to a breakthrough in our negotiations, we saw one party or another suddenly fail to comply with the plan. After investigating into the reasons for such a behavior, often it became clear that an important arms cargo had reached the party concerned so that it felt powerful enough to achieve its ends by military means.”

About the author

Mohamed Sahnoun is the United Nations Special Envoy in Africa.

Examples of the crucial role of arms supplies

- Arms supplies to the conflict in Congo-Brazzaville were paid for with oil revenues.
- In Rwanda a large armament program was facilitated and carried out that partly induced the ensuing genocide.
- In the Central African Republic, the government incurred economic ruin by buying arms for its armed forces and then had no money to pay its soldiers. This contributed to the eruption of violence, destruction of businesses, decrease in tax revenues and further budget reductions.
- In the Great Lakes region pilots would take great risks to land their planes in the middle of the bush at night to unload their arms cargo.
- Somalia received an almost unique supply of arms from the different blocs during the Cold War because it aligned itself with one or the other side. We have witnessed the extensive supply of arms along the coast of Somalia. The professionals in arms trafficking raised funds from the Somali Diaspora in Europe and North America.
- Today, with the Ethiopian–Eritrean border dispute and the conflict in southern Sudan, Somalia has become a source of arms for guerrilla groups as well. The situation has deteriorated so seriously that in August 1999 Kenya deemed it necessary to establish a ban on air flights and close its borders with Somalia.
- Ethiopia and Eritrea are engaged in the ‘first modern war in Africa.’ Both countries have been able to align 70,000 troops, according to some estimates well over 100,000, and arm them with sophisticated weaponry, ready for several rounds of armed confrontation. Who is providing the armaments?

It should indeed be asked who is benefiting from the arms trade. 85 percent of the world arms trade is in the hands of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. This arms trade, although mainly in heavy and sophisticated weaponry, also facilitates the trade in light weapons. The possession of light weapons and ammunition leads to conflict situations.

Experience in Central Africa and in the Horn teaches more about the failure to act than about peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping processes and peace-building in post-conflict situations can only be efficient if the arms dimension is seriously taken into consideration. In most developing countries, arms conversion should be an essential component of development strategy, and external assistance should promote this component. The international community also should play its part in preventing arms trafficking.

Lessons Learned and the Agenda Ahead

Linking Conflict Prevention, Disarmament and Conversion to Development Cooperation

by *Herbert Wulf*

Armaments and wars throughout the world continue to be a major cause for concern. They are particularly disturbing in view of the poverty and lack of opportunities that plague most of the world's population. The need to disarm, restructure military sectors through conversion and simultaneously prevent violent conflicts is becoming increasingly urgent—despite a number of positive developments during the past decade. A combination of disarmament, conversion, and a favorable political and economic environment can contribute to the prevention of violent or deadly conflict and to post-conflict rehabilitation. The absence of violent conflict is a foundation for sustainable human development and thus important for development cooperation as well as conflict prevention and management.

One of the central objectives of the conference on "The Contribution of Disarmament and Conversion to Conflict Prevention and its Relevance for Development Cooperation" was to foster the linkage between these different issue areas.

Preventing violent conflict

The issue of conflict prevention as an integral part of development policy came to the forefront in the early 1990s and has since been advocated by the United Nations in response to the increasingly alarming conflict situations in the developing countries. While conflict prevention was initially perceived as a corollary to preventive diplomacy, during the decade other elements were added which reflected the short- and long-term needs in post-conflict situations: humanitarian and emergency aid, reintegration of refugees, rehabilitation of physical, social and economic infrastructures, and social sustainability programs.

“Preventing violent conflict is a complex process. Clearly, a broad and sustained effort is needed to put this idea into practice and to make available the resources for structural changes which will promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”

Conflicts are quite natural. The goal is to transform or manage them, thereby preventing the use of violence. Conflict prevention includes early warning and early action, but even more so it consists of *primary prevention* measures aimed at removing the root causes of violent conflict and the implementation of mechanisms for non-violent conflict resolution. Prevention of violent conflict also encompasses so-called *secondary prevention*, that is, protecting and providing for the rehabilitation of victims of war. It is more than simply repairing physical infrastructure. It includes peace-building, with all its political, economic, social, cultural and psychological aspects.

The paradox of conflict prevention is that it is cheap (compared with the cost of conflict) but extremely difficult to finance. Governments, international organizations and aid agencies find it easier to raise resources to deal with wars that have broken out than to mobilize the means to prevent these conflagrations. Today, conflict prevention is a popular idea, but an underfunded and underdeveloped policy. A broad and sustained effort is needed to put this idea into practice.

About the author

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Early warning needs to be combined with structural and contingency plans for action. Furthermore, economic measures also have a role to play in conflict prevention. Punitive sanctions can be imposed to deter parties from embarking on a course of violence, but positive incentives to resolve conflicts in a non-violent manner may be more effective. Beyond the immediate and short-term action to prevent conflict from becoming violent or from spreading, the initiation of long-term structural changes is required in order to strengthen the capacity of societies to remove the root causes of conflict. Forceful measures by outsiders should only be used as a last resort. They must be based on the universally accepted principles laid down in the United Nations Charter and be integrated into an overall political and economic strategy.

Sustaining viable disarmament

Although disarmament has been implemented on a large scale since the end of the Cold War, the process is not free of ambiguity or contradiction. Wars continue to break out in many parts of the world, talks on arms control are breaking down, the established nuclear weapon powers are modernizing their reduced arsenals, and other states are building new ones. New weapon technology is being pursued and armed forces are being modernized. Even disarmament itself creates new threats when surplus weapons proliferate. Such recent developments indicate that there is a disruption in the disarmament and peace process which started so promisingly in the late 1980s. Not only is disarmament slowing down, but there have recently also been signs of a reversal in the disarmament trend.

“To be viable disarmament needs to be based on a fundamental, long-term approach. It should consist of more than occasional stop-gap measures or the temporary reduction of resources in the military sector when mandated by economic constraints.”

Yet positive changes have also occurred in the area of practical disarmament. A majority of countries continue to decrease their military expenditures, promising peace agreements are being implemented, demobilized soldiers are being supported in their reintegration into civilian life, and ground-breaking initiatives have been launched on such pressing issues as child soldiers, landmines and small arms.

The first goal of disarmament is to prevent war, but there is another important reason. The allocation of world resources is still seriously distorted. Official development assistance continues to be a fraction of the amount spent on global military efforts. Although money is not the solution to all problems of human development, promoting expenditures for peace and development and reducing the funding for war must be allocated a more prominent place on the international agenda. In addition, programs of practical disarmament, such as the control and destruction of small arms, control of surplus weapons, demobilization and disarmament of soldiers and their reintegration into civilian life, demining and other practical measures need to become an integral part of both peace-building and development programs.




Photo: Knut Simon

Jean Christophe Bouvier (UNOPS, Geneva)
Moderator panel:
Peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation



Photo: BICC

Trevor Findlay (VERTIC, London).
Moderator panel:
Conflict prevention and settlement, preventive conversion



Photo: BICC

Espen Eide (NUPI, Oslo).
Moderator panel:
Practical disarmament

Making conversion proactive

Conversion, the transformation of military structures and resources for peaceful purposes, is perceived by many as the direct expression of the 'peace dividend'. Conversion deals with the economic and social consequences of military downsizing and disarmament, and in practical terms with the reduction of military expenditures, reorientation of research and development, transformation of production facilities, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, redevelopment of military sites, and dismantlement of surplus weapons. The benefits achieved from conversion might also have an impact on the willingness to disarm. 'Proactive conversion', a term signaling that conversion is more than reacting to a military drawdown, could provide a means for preparing for disarmament and might even help to prevent conflict.

Conversion goes beyond the identification of opportunities. The reorientation of former military activities for civilian purposes needs to be implemented. Conversion facilitates the productive use of scarce resources and—if well managed—reduces the risk of violent conflict. Thus, conversion has an important role to play in development cooperation. War-torn societies face the task of transforming from militarized to civil societies. Reform of the security sector (the military and police) is essential to provide public security and establish or restore the rule of law. This can only be pursued on the basis of the government's willingness to conduct reform and seek non-violent solutions, transparency and parliamentary control of military budgets, and political control over the military. Well-managed conversion activities provide opportunities and can serve as catalysts for this type of transformation, enabling lasting human and economic development.

“Proactive conversion could provide a means of preparing for disarmament and avoiding negative social and economic effects of military downsizing. It might even help to prevent conflict.”

Implementing sustainable development

International development cooperation has only recently begun to address military-related issues—including the detrimental effects of high military expenditures, the allocation of scarce resources to weapon imports, the need for demobilization and reintegration of military personnel, and the establishment of democratically controlled security sectors, particularly after the end of armed conflicts. These issues have traditionally been perceived as of a 'political nature'. The end of the Cold War has offered opportunities and even demonstrated the necessity for linking such issues with conflict prevention and development cooperation. Work in war-torn or conflict-prone societies is now seen as an integral part of development cooperation. However, while aid is often considered to be a means for peace-building, it can also be harmful, aggravating the dispute between parties in conflict or prolonging the fighting. Development cooperation cannot be neutral in conflict situations. A primary function of development work is therefore to assist in removing the root causes of conflict and to contribute to strengthening the capacities of societies to manage their conflicts without resorting to violence.

Development cooperation and emergency aid must address the whole spectrum of violent conflict: preventing the emergence of violent conflict, the spread of ongoing conflict, and the reemergence of violence after the end of wars. International development institutions and national donors cannot single-handedly resolve conflicts or remove their causes, but they can assist in establishing a basis for sustainable development by providing the means for lifting some of the barriers to peaceful development. The development of new concepts and the implementation of practical projects focused on security sector reform, demobilizing soldiers, dismantling surplus weapons, demining agricultural lands, rehabilitating refugees of war-torn countries and many other issues are essential elements of today's development cooperation policy.

Achieving lasting peace

The objectives of achieving lasting peace, preventing armed conflict, implementing viable disarmament, managing conversion proactively and implementing sustainable development can only be achieved through a comprehensive approach which requires political, economic, social and in some cases military means. Care must be taken to prevent military responses from being seen as quick fixes to political or social problems. Development cooperation can play a central role in achieving this ambitious goal and promoting a coherent policy.

Development cooperation should strive to create an environment conducive to structural stability and durable peace, since this is the basis for sustainable development. When civil authority has broken down or is under threat, an important priority is to restore the rule of law and a sense of security. However, security should not be perceived as military-based national sovereignty. The security of a society should be redefined in terms of human security.

“A primary function of development work is to assist in fighting the root causes of conflict and to contribute to strengthening the capacities of societies to manage their conflicts without resorting to violence. The donor community, including multilateral institutions, has a major role in preventing violent conflict, assisting with the implementation of peace agreements, supporting disarmament measures, and aiding conversion projects.”

Conventional approaches to problems of defense, security, disarmament and development need not be abandoned. However, some approaches need to be reconsidered, new measures must be taken and linkages need to be made, especially between security, development, foreign and economic policy. These linkages will lead to synergies, new ideas and a fresh impetus to stimulate conflict prevention, disarmament, conversion and development cooperation.

Strategic Considerations and Operational Concepts for Conflict Prevention

by Lutz Bähr

General strategic considerations on conflict prevention

This summary of the interrelated topics discussed at the conference is a synthesis of the presentations of the seven panel sessions and the concluding plenary session. These topics are considered to be relevant for the formulation of conflict prevention strategies; they may also be useful for clarifying the understanding of some of the key issues addressed by the conference. The following seven topics were identified:

- In addressing ‘conflict’ and ‘conflict prevention’ the conference participants made a distinction between conflict as an inherent element of societal interaction and situations affected by military violence. In fact, the latter was predominantly perceived as a ‘new security issue’ which has evolved as a result of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union ten years ago, affecting numerous developing countries and some of the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union. The common denominator of this ‘new security issue’ is that military conflict is mainly of an inter-state rather than intra-state nature.



Photo: Knut Simon

Lutz Bähr (UNOPS).

- The general deliberations on ‘conflict prevention’ reflected on both pre- and post-conflict situations. Specific observations, in most cases based on operational experiences, related primarily to post-conflict situations in individual countries.
- The conference participants felt that special attention should be paid to the timeliness and type of international interventions. Often, interventions need to be carried out immediately but with sustainability in mind. The overall duration of international cooperation is a highly relevant aspect. Forceful measures by outsiders should only be used as a last resort.

About the author

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■ Strategic considerations on conflict prevention were derived from an analysis of the root causes of conflicts, which is the 'new security issue.' Although these conflict roots may vary from country to country, a common feature is that they are determined by external factors, in particular international interests and interference, as well as by internal factors, which may signal political destabilization, economic crisis or social disintegration. External and internal factors normally go hand in hand and reinforce the intensity of the military conflict. The dynamics of the external and internal determinants of military conflict need to be identified and linked when addressing strategies for conflict prevention. These strategies also have to become the expression of a new culture of peace; they have to be imbedded in a new reform concept for international and local security.

■ The warring parties in the majority of the countries which in recent years have been subjected to internal military conflicts did not find it difficult to acquire arms. Three control aspects are of importance: control of transfers (imports and exports), control of arms in circulation and prevention of their unlawful use. The proliferation and use of conventional weapons, including light weapons and small arms, as well as the underlying interests in exporting arms to countries in conflict, constitute one of the external determinants of internal military conflict. Sustained international efforts to control arms exports (and stop arms transfers in particular cases through embargoes) are required. As part of such a strategy, the arms-producing countries should be encouraged to convert their military production to civil use. Disarmament and the destruction of light weapons and small arms have to be put in the context of worldwide conflict prevention. Furthermore, adopting a clear and unambiguous legal basis for the possession and use of arms is necessary for suppressing and removing the tools of violence.

■ At the local and national level in countries which are vulnerable to internal military conflicts or which encounter such conflicts, security issues cannot be addressed in isolation but need to be considered as part of a comprehensive and reformed development policy. Security sector reform (military, police and judicial systems) should be part of such a comprehensive approach. Such a reformed policy must also be guided by principles oriented to protect human rights, replace the law of force with the force of law, promote good governance and enhance civil society.



Photo: Knut Simon

Adolf Kloke-Lesch (BMZ).
Panelist: Closing session



Photo: BICC

Ernie Regebr (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Waterloo).
Moderator panel: Development policy and security sector reform



Photo: Knut Simon

Josef Holik (former Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament).
Moderator panel: Europe

■ Of crucial importance is civil society as an indispensable orientation for conflict prevention strategies. Civil society is perceived as a new quality of a society in which military and government executives continue to play a role but in which local and national security issues are controlled by empowered civil forces. Reform policies need to be based on an open and participatory dialogue, which will promote the democratic stability of societies.

Guiding principles for the operational concept

Experiences in the implementation of reconstruction and social rehabilitation programs in the war-torn societies of more than 20 countries clearly indicate that, because of the complexity and specificity of each country's situation, these programs need to be carefully designed and adjusted to specific needs and conditions. However, the panel sessions also reflected on regional operational experiences, indicating the common grounds that can be translated into guiding principles for the formulation of operational concepts:

- Operational concepts need to be based on closely interlinked activities of physical reconstruction, social rehabilitation, economic recovery and institutional reconstitution. The linkages between and coherence of development cooperation and economic, foreign and security policy (including arms control, disarmament, conversion and conflict prevention) need to be strengthened.
- Reconstruction operations may need to address emergency situations in the beginning but should be incorporated at an early stage into long-term development programs. They should be seen as part of a strategy of long-term conflict prevention, in tandem with normal development efforts.
- These programs must attach special significance to the protection of human rights as well as the promotion of civil society and good governance, thus promoting the rule of law and accountability of government (including the security forces).
- In pursuit of these objectives, a special focus must be placed on refugees, uprooted populations, victims of human rights violations, demobilized troops, child soldiers and children in general as the most vulnerable segments of society.
- Reconstruction and social rehabilitation programs have to observe the indiscriminate inclusion of all segments of the population, in particular those who have been excluded in the past. They also offer an opportunity to promote gender equality.
- The promotion of consensus-building and participatory decision-making for all segments of the population in programs of reconstruction and social rehabilitation is essential for a sustained process of development and national security.



Photo: Knut Simon

Winrich Kübne
(Member of Directorate, SWP, Ebenhausen).
Moderator panel: Africa



Photo: Knut Simon

Ramesh Thakur
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Moderator panel: South Asia

- In pursuit of institutional reconstitution and civil society it is important to emphasize the role of grass-roots organizations in empowering local authorities and local implementation capacities. This requires strengthening societies' capacities to deal with their own security issues and to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner.
- In pursuit of the revitalization and promotion of the economic sector, consensus-based investments are of importance.
- Private entities play an increasing economic role in fostering conflicts. However, constructive cooperation between the private and the public sector in the international community (governmental and non-governmental) is possible. The private sector should be encouraged to become more forcefully engaged in conflict prevention and reconstruction programs.
- National security issues should not only be the end of a process of intervention in conflict prevention but also a means to continuously address the promotion of development, peace and reconciliation programs and the implementation of security sector reform.

Appraisal of the conference

An initial appraisal was made:

- The conference succeeded in putting into their international and local context the internal military conflicts of the past decade which the international community has perceived as a 'new security issue'. It also made transparent the dynamics of the external and internal factors which affect these conflicts. It made a convincing case that these factors and their interrelationship need to be addressed in strategies of conflict prevention.
- The conference succeeded in highlighting the importance of disarmament and conversion at both the international and local level in the prevention of internal violent conflicts and as an integral part of development cooperation.
- The conference succeeded in making the case that concepts of conflict prevention should be incorporated into broader and long-term development policies by emphasizing good governance and civil society orientation as indispensable elements of national security and the prevention of violent internal conflicts.
- The conference highlighted not only the problems and risks with which specific programs have to cope in post-conflict situations. It also highlighted the opportunity of such a situation for international development cooperation and local initiatives to introduce national security, social and economic reforms.

- In emphasizing the operational experiences in the field and in taking stock of the experiences in various countries over a period of more than five years, the conference made a valuable contribution to the international discussion on conflict prevention.
- The conference stressed the need to link the still often separated program and policy areas (disarmament, conflict prevention and development cooperation) to promote comprehensive approaches instead of piecemeal strategies.

The international discussion will not only benefit from a more differentiated practical approach to conflict prevention but can also draw conclusions about the limitations and opportunities. After all, these operational experiences also represent the feasibility and validity of conflict prevention strategies and operational concepts. The latter is important to demonstrate that conflict prevention can be successful and that there is a real chance for peace in the countries which were affected by violent conflict in the past decade.

List of Participants

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


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