Between Distance and Dependency: Syrian Diaspora, Reconstruction and the Politics of Return

Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek

April 2026

Introduction

In academic scholarship and development policy, migrants and diasporas are increasingly framed as key agents of development. In post-conflict settings in particular, diaspora communities are expected to contribute not only through financial remittances, but also via the transfer of skills, knowledge, and political and social capital. From this perspective, diasporas are seen as providers of economic resources, human capital, philanthropic engagement and even policy influence. Recent political developments, such as the Syrian president’s visit to Germany, have renewed and intensified these debates for the Syrians who are also identified as an emerging diaspora.

Across European policy circles—most notably in Germany, which hosts around one million Syrians—there is growing interest in mobilising the Syrian diaspora as a resource for reconstruction and in encouraging them  to return. Policy initiatives increasingly focus on assessing the diaspora’s potential to contribute to reconstruction, investment and expertise, often framing diaspora engagement as a cornerstone of Syria’s future. This bicc peacebit shifts the focus of these debates. Rather than examining what the diaspora could do, it asks how the diaspora is actually perceived by those inside Syria. Drawing on 51 interviews conducted with Syrians inside the country in March 2026—primarily in Raqqa and Homs—as part of a research project, this peacebit explores how diaspora communities are viewed in relation to reconstruction, return and national recovery. The findings reveal a complex and ambivalent picture: Diaspora actors are seen as indispensable economic supporters but also as socially and politically distant, and as potential contributors to reconstruction whose potential remains largely untapped. This gap between expectation and reality reflects not only perceptions of the diaspora itself, but also the structural constraints shaping Syria’s post-conflict environment.

1. Diaspora as an Economic Backbone, but Distant from Everyday Realities

Echoing broader policy narratives that frame diasporas as key development actors, respondents inside Syria overwhelmingly identify the Syrian diaspora primarily through its economic role. Across interviews, diaspora communities are consistently described as a critical source of financial support—their remittances are an essential lifeline for households struggling amid economic collapse, and their role is largely reduced to this. Diaspora members are seen as “a source of foreign currency” or as actors who “only help through remittances.”

This perception highlights a crucial structural dynamic: In the absence of effective state institutions and social protection mechanisms, diaspora transfers are not merely supplementary but have become a de facto substitute for welfare provision. Yet, in practice, this support tends to remain on an individual level or within families, rarely extending to collective forms of investment or broader reconstruction processes. As a result, the diaspora’s economic role, while indispensable, is often seen as fragmented and disconnected from wider recovery efforts. This economic dependence coexists with a pronounced sense of social and physical distance. Many respondents describe Syrians abroad as detached from everyday life inside the country—individuals who have “left the Syrian reality behind” and no longer fully grasp the depth of daily hardship. 

These perspectives reveal a persistent tension between dependency and distance. Despite being appreciated for their financial support, diaspora members are also viewed with ambivalence—and at times resentment—for their perceived detachment. In some accounts, this is expressed through the idea that those abroad have “forgotten the country,” pointing to a broader gap between external engagement and internal realities.

2. Diaspora as Untapped Human Capital

Many also perceive the diaspora as an untapped reservoir of human capital. Moving beyond remittances, a notable share of respondents point to the diaspora’s potential to contribute through knowledge, professional expertise and investment. Syrians who have been educated and gained work experience abroad are frequently described as having a “substantial role” to play in reconstruction, or as a “missing link” in Syria’s recovery. These perceptions align with broader policy assumptions that frame diasporas as agents of knowledge transfer and institutional development. However, in the Syrian case, this potential remains overwhelmingly aspirational. Respondents consistently highlight a gap between what the diaspora could contribute and what is actually being done in practice. Across interviews, respondents consistently emphasize that the current limitations of diaspora involvement are not due to a lack of willingness or capacity, but rather the absence of enabling conditions. As some interviewees succinctly put it, reconstruction “requires governments, not individuals,” underscoring the limits of fragmented, individual-level contributions in the absence of functioning institutions.

This gap reflects not only the limitations of diaspora engagement, but more fundamentally the absence of institutional, political and economic mechanisms capable of channelling diaspora expertise into meaningful and sustained reconstruction processes. In the absence of such frameworks, contributions remain ad hoc, informal and highly individualised—mirroring the fragmented patterns observed in financial support. As a result, the diaspora is not seen as lacking capacity or willingness, but rather as structurally underutilised. The persistence of this unrealised potential highlights a broader disconnect between external resources and domestic recovery processes, further widening the gap between expectation and implementation.

3. Conditional Expectations of Return and Evolving Mobility Patterns

Building on these perceptions of economic dependence and unrealised potential, expectations toward the diaspora are strongly shaped by a normative assumption: that Syrians living abroad should actively contribute to reconstruction, most notably through return. A substantial number of respondents explicitly call on diaspora members, particularly those with financial resources and professional expertise, to return and take part in rebuilding efforts. Yet, these expectations are far from unconditional. Across interviews, return is consistently framed as contingent on tangible improvements in security, economic conditions and governance. Many respondents stress that, under current circumstances, return is neither feasible nor desirable. Concerns about economic collapse, deteriorating infrastructure and the absence of effective state support lead some to explicitly discourage return at this stage.

This tension reveals a critical insight: While return is widely seen as a key to reconstruction, it is also understood to be constrained by Syria’s current political and economic conditions. Interview data point to the growing relevance of alternative mobility patterns that challenge the binary distinction between return and non-return. Respondents frequently refer to temporary visits, circular migration and ongoing outward migration as dominant trends. Some diaspora members are described as maintaining their lives abroad while engaging in short-term visits to Syria, while others highlight continued emigration -particularly among the younger population. Instead of permanent return, more flexible and transnational forms of involvement are emerging as the primary modes of connection between Syrians abroad and those inside the country.

Conclusion: Between Expectation and Constraint

The findings reveal a central tension shaping diaspora engagement in Syria: a gap between high expectations and constrained realities. Syrians inside the country view the diaspora as an essential economic lifeline, a largely untapped source of human capital and a potential driver of reconstruction. Yet diaspora engagement remains fragmented, informal and predominantly individualised. While remittances sustain households, diaspora’s knowledge and expertise are underutilised. Expectations of return persist but are widely seen as depending on improvements in security, governance and economic conditions. As a result, engagement is less defined by large-scale return than by flexible, transnational mobility patterns that blur the line between presence and absence.

The Syrian diaspora’s contribution to reconstruction is significant, but it cannot be a substitute for state responsibility or international oversight. Germany and the European Union should not view the diaspora only as a humanitarian community but as a strategic partner in reconstruction, peacebuilding and reintegration. Unlocking this potential, however, requires more than rhetoric. It depends on credible governance, improved economic conditions and targeted policies that connect diaspora capacities with domestic needs—supported by institutionalised inclusion, clear mobility frameworks and appropriate financial instruments. Without these foundations, expectations risk remaining disconnected from reality. Turning this potential into coherent policy is therefore essential for a sustainable, rights-based recovery in Syria—one that restores not only infrastructure, but also trust, dignity and belonging.