Returning to Presevo Valley? How Social Boundaries and Structural Marginalisation Shape Belonging, Trust and Mobility
Clara Schmitz-Pranghe and Fidan Fejzuli
October 2026
Despite Serbia’s far-reaching legislation on the rights of so-called national minorities, representation and participation of certain communities remain poor. This also directly affects the livelihoods of returnees. This bicc peacebit addresses the social and political positioning of Albanian-speaking returnee communities in the Presevo Valley vis-à-vis the Serbian state and society, as well as manifestations of social boundary-making in the region.
The socio–political context
The municipalities of Preševo/Preshevë and Bujanovac/Bujanoc1 are located in Pčinja District in southern Serbia bordering Kosovo and North Macedonia, often referred to by locals as the Presevo Valley (Eng.)/Presevska Dolina (Srb.)/Lugina e Preshevës (Alb.)2. Most of Serbia's Albanian-speaking population (62,000, according to the 2022 census; less than 0.1% of the population) lives here (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2023). While Bujanovac has a diverse population of persons declaring as Albanians (62%), Serbs (25%) and Roma (9%), Presevo has a strong Albanian-speaking majority of 94 per cent, according to the 2022 census, with the remaining population declaring as Serbs and Roma.
The region experienced a brief period of armed conflict between the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveda and Bujanovac (UÇPMB) and the security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 2000 to 2001, during which an estimated 12,500 Albanians fled to Kosovo (ICG, 2007). The conflict ended with the demilitarisation of the UÇPMB and the so-called Čović plan. However, most of the former fighters have not returned to the valley but have stayed abroad since the conflict, as they still fear prosecution by state authorities (SERCSPIC16). Other agreements followed in 2009 and in 2013 (commonly referred to as the Seven-Point Plan), which refers, among other things, to the "integration of Albanians into the political, governmental and social system and respect of [sic] their human rights; establishment of safety and peace in the region; economic and social revitalisation of the region" (Kamberi, 2016, p. 1). According to experts interviewed, the Plan is still insufficiently implemented (SRBCSPEI26).
Despite its strategic location on the transit route between Belgrade and Athens and investment in infrastructure (railways, highways), the region remains economically marginalised. The resulting high emigration, limited return migration and dependency on remittances further weaken the region's economic and social prospects (SRBSH28).
Owing in particular to the lack of livelihood options, mobility is a constant feature of the region. According to our interviews, the lack of jobs and health-related reasons are the main drivers of high emigration rates, circular, pendular and permanent migration, mainly towards Western Europe. Moreover, we find high degrees of work- and education-related cross-border-mobility, mainly to Kosovo and North Macedonia. Return migration is rare and concerns mostly those who studied in Kosovo or North Macedonia or those with no prospect of legal residence in Germany or Switzerland. Most respondents identified family bonds and care responsibilities as decisive for their return.
Causes and symptoms of boundary-making in the valley
According to our empirical data, continued marginalisation of Albanian communities, decreasing interethnic interaction and ongoing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo are the principal drivers of social boundary-making based on linguistic and cultural differences.
Continued marginalisation
Albanian-speaking Serbians are massively underrepresented in public institutions in the valley such as the municipal administration, health care, the judiciary and the police. This and widespread ethnonationalist rhetoric against Albanians in Serbia might explain the deep distrust towards the central government and the weakness of a civic identity among interviewed Albanians. In addition, fears of diminishing representation of the Albanian community in public life and political decision-making (currently one member of parliament belongs to an Albanian political party) are heightened by the passivisation of addresses, which disproportionately targets Albanian-populated areas in Serbia, particularly in the municipalities of Medveda and Bujanovac (Ferati-Sachsenmaier, 2023).
This distrust towards Serbian politics and society, including the political and extra-parliamentary opposition, is mirrored in the non-participation of the Albanian communities in the recent protest movement against the current government following the collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad railway station in 2024. One interlocutor commented: “In Presevo, there had been no protests, demonstrations, blockades or any other solidarity activities. Even if there was a change in government due to the protests, our main problems—economic decline, the non-recognition of Kosovo diplomas and passivisation of addresses will remain” (SRBCSPIC14).
Decrease in everyday encounters and the loss of bilingualism
Most living and working environments in the valley are ethnically segregated. Consequently, spaces for social interaction are rather limited, resulting in a decline of formerly widespread bilingualism. The de facto segregated school systems, with schools operating in either Serbian or Albanian, reinforce this trend. Usually, Serb children in Bujanovac do not know any Albanian; neither do Albanian children speak Serbian (SRBSCPCSO39). In contrast, in Presevo where majority–minority relations differ, Serbs reportedly usually do speak Albanian and English, while, again, Albanian children do not speak Serbian (SRBSCPCSO39).
The loss of Serbian as a second language has consequences beyond everyday interaction. It impedes meaningful participation by Albanians in national political and public institutions and in non-ethnically defined political parties and blocks access to employment. Limited Serbian-language proficiency, combined with the scarcity of higher education institutions teaching in Albanian, means that Albanian-speaking Serbians often study in Kosovo rather than at Serbian universities. Although conflicts over the recognition of car number plates and identity cards were resolved in 2022, Serbia and Kosovo have yet to achieve mutual recognition of diplomas. As a result, returnees who completed their studies in Kosovo may be unable to access jobs in key public institutions, including the judiciary, healthcare and education. Segregated education systems in both Serbia and Kosovo already inhibit, and will continue to inhibit, meaningful participation of Albanians at the state level in Serbia.
How tensions between Serbia and Kosovo affect the valley
Given the valley’s proximity to Kosovo and shared cultural and linguistic characteristics, Kosovo is a central point of reference for Albanians in the valley. This has been reinforced by Kosovo’s engagement as a kin state, such as financial and cultural support for the valley and discussions about a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo, an issue that seems to be off the table politically but remains present in local perceptions.
The unresolved dispute over Kosovo's status directly affects the daily lives of the people in the Presevo Valley. According to local experts, it is at the core of the insufficient integration of Albanians into Serbian public institutions. “The Kosovo war happened 25 years ago but how many more years will it take until we can live together again? […] Yesterday is 25 years ago, but we live now” (SRBSCPCSO39).
The delay in normalising relations and manifest violence (see the Banjska events in September 2023) contribute to the ethno-political charge carried by other issues, including the economic and demographic situation. A social worker recalled: “Tensions between the students are apparent. […] When something happens in Kosovo, this is immediately reflected in Bujanovac” (SRBSCPCSO39).
The ethno-political framing of all issues overshadows broader economic and societal challenges affecting the population across the Preševo Valley and northern Kosovo. Nationalist discourses often interpret population decline, for example, in terms of displacement (of Serbs from Kosovo, of Albanians from the Presevo Valley) rather than as a trend that characterises large parts of Serbia. This ethnicisation of tensions therefore diverts attention from structural causes of social and economic hardship, including weak welfare systems, corruption and clientelism.
To conclude, the Presevo Valley is an important example of how social boundaries and social distance are constructed and reinforced by ethnonational politics and a lack of economic and social inclusion.
This text has been written as part of the qualitative research project “Return and Belonging after Conflict-induced Displacement”, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). It draws on ten qualitative interviews with returnees in the municipality of Presevo and 13 interviews with experts, activists and representatives of civil society organisations, political parties, public institutions and international organisations in Presevo, Bujanovac and Vranje, conducted between 2022 and 2025 by the authors.
1 Place names are given in bilingual Serbian/Albanian form at first mention. For readability, subsequent references use the form most established in English-language reporting and scholarship (e.g. "Presevo", "Bujanovac", “Medveda”), which—as is generally the case with English exonyms in contested toponymy—corresponds more closely to Serbian orthography. This is a stylistic choice made for economy of reading and should not be read as reflecting a position on the region's naming.
2 The term “Presevo Valley”/“Preševska Dolina”/“Lugina e Preshevës” encompasses the districts of Preševo/Preshevë, Bujanovac/Bujanoc and Medveđa/Medvegjë. In practice, this term is used primarily by the international community and most ethnic Albanians in the valley.
Sources
ICG (2007). Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley (Europe Report 186). International Crisis Group. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/43985/186_serbia_presevo_valley.pdf
Kamberi, B. (2016). (Non)implementation of the agreements of the governments relating to the south of Serbia. The Council for Human Rights. https://www.chris-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Nonimplementation-of-the-agreement-of-the-governments-relating-to-the-south-of-Serbia.pdf
Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2023). Ethnicity Data by municipalities and cities. 2022 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings. Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2023/PdfE/G20234001.pdf