The Politics of Syrian Refugee Return in Germany: Balancing Rhetoric and Reality
Ruth Vollmer, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek, Selina Engelberth (Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies (bicc))
The prospect of Syrians returning home is a complex and multifaceted issue that requires careful planning and responsible governance. A responsible approach to governing return migration must carefully balance the interests of Germany, Syria and of displaced persons.
This entails
- Cautioning Against Premature Return
- Facilitating Family Visits and Circular Mobility
- Avoiding Premature Migration Partnerships
The Risks of Premature Return:
Efforts to push for returns, often driven by short-term political gains and domestic dynamics, overlook the risks and complexities associated with post-conflict1 returns. In fragile and unpredictable environments such as Syria, premature, one-way returns risk triggering renewed displacement or migration when resources are exhausted. Maintaining the strategic advantage of no (premature) return is essential in such contexts.
Heterogeneity of Aspirations and Prospects:
Return aspirations and prospects among Syrians are as diverse as the displaced population. Many Syrians living abroad provide vital lifelines to families in times of insecurity, contribute to transitional resilience and hold greater potential to drive positive change. They require legal certainty and protection to stay engaged and prepare for eventual return.
Balancing Hope with Caution:
While the current situation offers glimpses of hope, it must not distract from the significant uncertainties surrounding future developments. Evidence from other post-conflict contexts shows that violence and displacement are more likely to resume than not. Ill-prepared or forced returns often lead to precariousness and new cycles of displacement.
Germany should reaffirm its leadership role by prioritising return preparedness—at the individual and institutional levels. This includes concerted efforts to mitigate the risks and alleviate the hardships associated with ill-prepared and forced returns. By leading by example and investing in sustainable return strategies, Germany can ensure a more effective and humane approach to return migration.
1. Introduction
The Syrian refugee phenomenon has long been a central issue on the European political agenda, particularly since 2015. However, recent developments surrounding Assad's departure have reignited discussions and brought the protection status of Syrian refugees in Europe and the prospect of their return from the European Union and neighbouring countries to the forefront of policy debates. Over 5.2 million Syrian refugees are currently registered in neighbouring countries, with approximately one million living in Germany.
In Germany, the debate has been intensified by the upcoming elections in February 2025. Thus, within hours after Assad’s ousting from Damascus, bold and largely unsubstantiated claims were made about facilitating and possibly forcing returns to Syria, which received widespread media coverage. While such moves appear to promise quick political gains, they also have a divisive effect, spreading fear and uncertainty among Syrians currently living in Germany and portraying the asylum system as an obstacle to swift political action rather than a legitimate instrument providing much-needed protection and legal safeguards. At the same time, the debate is far from new and follows well-established patterns, with mainly conservative (CDU/CSU) and more populist parties (such as AfD and BSW) predictably presenting returns—the sooner and the more, the better—as a necessity and/or solution. In response, voices from the (former) governing coalition of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals, as well as civil society, warn against immediate returns, underlining the unpredictable (in)security situation, framing it in legalistic and instrumentalist terms. These include an emphasis on the legal and administrative obstacles to immediate return (that asylum can only be revoked if returnees face no more risks) and the potential shortage of skilled workers in critical fields such as health care in Germany.
Despite repeated statements by the EU Commission that currently Syria can not be considered save for assisted or forced returns, the first administrative changes were made very quickly. Just one day after the political change in Syria (9 December), the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees announced that all pending asylum applications filed by Syrians would be put on hold, a move that other EU countries are following. Meanwhile, the Austrian government has not only announced a review of asylum decisions already taken and a halt to family reunification for Syrians, but has also declared its intention to set up a repatriation plan for Syrians and called for broader EU efforts in this direction. Often, the strongest claims of forced removals are not followed by action and are later corrected or withdrawn, as in the case of Austria, as they would be unlawful. The need to return especially those Syrians who have committed crimes, failed to integrate or are dependent on social welfare either now or when the situation allows, seems to be a common denominator among political parties across the political spectrum and in different EU countries. In such a discursive climate, voices that advocate addressing the question of return within the broader framework of an international long-term stabilisation strategy are struggling to be heard.
We will argue that the German debate on swift returns has largely failed to take into account critical insights from empirical research and past experiences of return and (post-)conflict dynamics and is not in line with a development-oriented and human rights-based stabilisation of Syria, and is therefore not in the interest of Syria, the displaced or, indeed, Germany.
2. Return Aspirations, Return Preparedness and the Potential of Transnational Returns
Research has consistently shown that many Syrians have a strong desire to return. However, just like the population inside Syria, the displaced are characterised by a heterogeneity that reflects both their intentions to return and their prospects of return and reintegration. For example, prospects of return vary widely between government-controlled and other parts of the country. Research on return aspirations has also shown that many individual characteristics play a role, not only ethnic and religious affiliation but also gender, age, education and life-cycle stage, as people tend to understand how these may shape their post-return experiences.
Another aspect that is under-represented in public debates is the difference between genuine return aspirations of displaced people as part of their life plan and a wish to return to escape from a situation of failed or denied integration, where they find themselves unable to achieve any of their life plans. This may be due to a prolonged insecure legal status denying access to the labour market, family reunification or other obstacles such as the language barrier, which may lead to the perception that there is nothing to lose by returning. As the political transition in Syria has been unexpected, family reasons (especially when relatives have been released from jail) and enthusiasm have triggered some spontaneous returns; however, the largest group of people crossing the border (and in doing so often giving up the possibility of leaving again) belong to the second category: people whose life in exile has denied them integration, dignity, and prospects for achieving their life aspirations. Moreover, returning to a region still marked by high levels of insecurity is realistically not an option for those without ties to controlling groups or networks. For those without such connections, the prospects of returning safely are minimal.
However, research shows that two main conditions facilitate sustainable returns and help returnees play a positive role in reconstruction efforts: return preparedness and absorption capacity. Return preparedness consists of a genuine desire to return (not a result of external pressure) and the mobilisation of material and immaterial resources for one’s return. Therefore, a high level of integration in the destination country puts migrants in a much better position to return successfully. The refugees who have not had the opportunity to integrate and who may face removal orders due to their insecure legal status—and who therefore feature prominently in the rhetoric of large-scale returns—are much less prepared to become agents of development and peaceful transition and may even become a burden on their families upon their return.
While living and working in Germany, many support family members back home. Syrians living abroad are literally a lifeline providing protection and livelihoods for families remaining in Syria. This lifeline is likely to become even more vital in uncertain transitions, as it helps to buffer supply shortages, insecurities, issues with the provision of public services, etc. When this lifeline is cut, for example, by returning before economic conditions support self-sufficiency, another family member will likely have to migrate, or the entire family will face displacement. At the same time, analysts have observed that the integration and sense of belonging of the Syrian diaspora in Germany is being undermined by rising AfD support and anti-Arab rhetoric, so that Germany feels less like a safe haven and staying is driven more by a lack of alternatives in the context of continued insecurities. Any discussion on return must first and foremost take into account the voices and perspectives of Syrians themselves.
Beyond these family-based support networks, displaced Syrians living and working in host countries such as Germany have the potential to contribute significantly to Syria's reconstruction efforts. They provide critical resources, skills and transnational networks that can play a key role in fostering development and stabilisation. In addition to these contributions, the Syrian diaspora has given rise to an extraordinarily active and diverse civil society, a unique and critical feature of Syria's transformation. The repressive nature of the Assad regime prevented civil society actors from organising effectively inside Syria. However, in the diaspora, numerous organisations have emerged outside the country, specialising in almost every area imaginable, from education, healthcare and human rights to governance, women's empowerment and economic development. This vibrant and dynamic civil society is an essential dimension of Syria's stabilisation and long-term reconstruction, offering expertise and initiatives that would be difficult to establish domestically in the current context. The transition offers these actors new opportunities to reconnect with their country of origin and to engage in new spaces. Visits, temporary returns and circular mobility are important steps in fostering dialogue between Syrians living inside and outside Syria on the future of the country and preparing for a potentially more permanent return. However, these are tied to permanent residency and secure legal status, which are crucial for Syrians to realise their potential role as agents of change for inclusive development in the country.
3. The Complexities and Pitfalls of (Post-)Conflict Return: Beyond the Removal of Assad
The Assad regime has been a critical but by no means the only obstacle to returns to Syria, and the fact that it is gone means that Syria is now entering a phase of hopeful transition fraught with many uncertainties and risks of conflict (re-)emerging. Returns risk becoming temporary and precarious without meaningful, long-term investment in reconstruction and reconciliation and responsible migration governance.
Syria is Still Not a Safe Country
For years, Syria has been characterised by fragmented control, with the Assad regime controlling only 60 per cent of the territory while three other political and military entities compete for power/influence. Although large-scale violence has declined, Syria has continued to function as a 'failed state,' grappling with deep-seated insecurity, economic collapse and widespread distrust of all governing authorities. Since 2019, a small number of displaced individuals has returned spontaneously, but trust in local administrations remained strikingly low across all regions. This distrust has primarily been fuelled by two factors: (1) the proliferation of armed groups and ongoing inter-group conflict and (2) severe economic challenges, further exacerbated by external interventions. Food insecurity, high inflation and the dependence of a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) on humanitarian assistance compound the difficulties. Ongoing demographic changes and unresolved territorial disputes add another layer of complexity, making sustainable returns an even greater challenge.
The recent removal of Assad and the diminishing influence of actors such as Russia and Iran signal significant changes in Syria's political landscape. However, these developments have also prompted other regional actors to expand their control over Syrian territory. While Turkey and its allied militias have sparked conflicts in the north, Israel has launched incursions from the south. These escalations are straining Syria’s fragile emerging political order and seriously threatening successful consolidation. Syria's future trajectory in the post-Assad era remains uncertain. The presence of armed groups, widespread economic and physical devastation and persistent security concerns continue to pose a risk to returning refugees.
Safety and security considerations remain a pressing concern for Syria's foreseeable future. While Assad's departure marks a significant shift in the political landscape, deep-rooted structural challenges are unlikely to be resolved soon. The continued presence of fragmented actors and competing authorities increases the risk of new internal conflicts and power struggles. These dynamics could perpetuate violence, hinder cohesive recovery efforts and make the inclusiveness—or exclusiveness—of state-building processes highly uncertain. This unpredictability significantly compounds the risk of violence against various identity-based or religious groups (minorities), whether stemming from specific power struggles or from a broader inability to establish the rule of law in a transitional context. Such an environment is often conducive to impunity, further undermining the prospects for stability and reconciliation in the post-Assad era.
Furthermore, the lengthy processes of institution-building, reform and infrastructure development are likely to be unevenly distributed. Access to livelihoods, income opportunities and public services is expected to remain concentrated in the capital and a few major cities, leaving many regions neglected and underserved. This imbalance may trigger renewed displacement. While the end of Assad's rule may symbolically represent freedom for those who have been oppressed for decades, it does not inherently create a safe or stable environment.
Lessons from Other Case Studies: The Risks of Premature Return
Many of Germany's return counselling and return assistance organisations were established in the late 1990s when tens of thousands of refugees had to return to their homes in the former Yugoslavia, destroyed by the wars. The realisation of how challenging return to a new country with no functioning infrastructure and institutions is also spurred many civil society organisations into action. They provided aid, medicines and reconstruction materials not only to war survivors but also to returning refugees, but all described the process as too challenging. Voluntary returns to Bosnia after the Dayton Agreement (1995–96) fell far short of expectations, even more so for the minorities. Although substantial assistance was offered for their return, it could not compensate for the lack of security and the traumatic memories associated with the place of displacement. Instead, territorial transfers led to further displacement. Throughout post-Yugoslavia, unresolved property issues and houses that had either been destroyed or occupied by others were persistent problems to return. In Bosnia, returnees were not unanimously welcomed, and social cohesion between those who had suffered during the war and those who had continued their lives abroad was fragile.
Similar to the situation in Syria today, family ties and the enthusiasm for newfound freedom drove spontaneous return decisions by Kosovo Albanians to return when the war there ended. Those who did not find employment with international organisations often regretted the decision to return as they became dependent on aid or a burden on their struggling families. In the midst of the destruction of production facilities, people found that "you cannot eat freedom." The experience of finding some relatives dead and others never has haunted many returnees to this day. Families with small children to feed tried to re-migrate to Germany, only to face deportation back to Kosovo, which was considered safe by then. Non-Albanian communities faced particular reintegration challenges and renewed violence and displacement years after the war, driven by a geopolitically challenging reconciliation process and widespread impunity due to the ongoing institution-building. Even communities that did not perceive themselves to be at risk because they had not taken sides during the war became targets of attacks and were subject to state neglect. When the United Nations took over the administration of Kosovo after the war, a ban on the return of minorities considered to be most at risk was imposed; however, given the power imbalances and dependencies that usually characterise readmission negotiations, such a stance is unlikely to be taken by interim or transitional governments with high needs for foreign investment.
These cases underline the need for caution in promoting or enforcing return policies. The risk of so-called post-conflict situations relapsing into conflict is unpredictable but statistically high. Similarly, the question of who is at risk of violence or renewed displacement is uncertain and can change many times over during processes of more or less inclusive nation- and state-building. Immediate and unprepared return often exacerbates the vulnerabilities of returnees and their families, as well as communities in the country of origin. For returns to be feasible and sustainable, a comprehensive reconstruction process is essential—one that goes beyond rebuilding physical infrastructure to address the socio-economic and psychological impacts of displacement. These lessons are particularly relevant for Syria, given its ongoing instability, lack of infrastructure and institutional weaknesses.
4. Balancing Immediate Risks and Long-term Reconstruction: Towards Responsible and Sustainable Return Policies
Forced displacement represents a deep disruption in people's lives, forcing them to move and start from scratch in an unfamiliar environment. In addition to homes and property, human and social capital are often lost and need to be rebuilt. Forced and premature return can have a similar effect, especially after long periods of living abroad and the birth of children abroad; the challenges associated with return require significant time and resources for planning. The process of planning returns should, therefore, not be rushed and should aim to strike a balance between the needs and interests of all states and people involved, which is easier to achieve than it often seems if destination countries recognise the long-term strategic benefits of peaceful transition and development as well as the fruits of their investment in integration over domestic political gains.
Allow refugees to reconnect and prepare for return: Many Syrians in Germany wish to visit Syria after being unable to do so for many years, but current regulations pose significant risks, particularly for those in the process of applying for asylum or holding a temporary residence permit. In addition, some Syrians in Germany have never felt fully integrated and have always intended to return at the first opportunity, but without fully knowing what will be expected of them when they do. At this point, it is essential to emphasise the importance of allowing Syrians in Germany to visit their homeland and move back and forth without jeopardising their residence status. This mobility would not only allow them to support their families and contribute to reconstruction efforts but would also help them to prepare for a more sustainable and well-planned return in the future. Especially those who have invested in preparing for their return by saving money and acquiring skills risk losing their investments in the daily struggle to survive without reaping the benefits of their work if they have to return before conditions are conducive to the transfer and application of resources and skills.
Do not waste the tremendous integration efforts: Significant investments have been made to support the integration of Syrian refugees—efforts involving refugees themselves, the government and civil society. Building new lives and careers after displacement is very time- and resource-intensive, and despite the relatively short time since their arrival, Syrians have already made tangible and meaningful contributions to German society. Research shows that investment in the reception and integration of refugees tends to pay off ten years after arrival. For instance, the employment rate of refugees aged 18 to 64 rose from 14 per cent in the year of entry to 74 per cent 15 years later. Thus, while government expenditures may exceed revenues in the early years, the balance shifts later as refugees pay more in taxes and social contributions. Ignoring these realities and overlooking the progress that has been made and that still needs to be made is a waste of individual and collective effort, while high levels of integration encourage rather than discourage transnational engagement with the origin country.
Provide targeted support to those who may (need to) return soon: For some, it is enthusiasm for return; for others, it is a liminal legal status that puts them at risk of being the first ones to (have to) return. Germany should draw on its extensive experience of the potential and limitations of return counselling and assistance. Return counselling should be honest about the risks and uncertainties remaining in Syria and—at this point—discourage return if there is a legal alternative. Where there is no foreseeable alternative, return assistance should be targeted and comprehensive, exploring additional options, such as investing now in (transnationally functional) vocational training programmes now, setting up job-placement programmes, and tailored training to match local job openings where necessary and support language acquisition of youth where this is considered beneficial.
Prioritise support for transition and create conditions conducive to return: Priority and time must be given to ensuring peace and inclusive and sustainable development in Syria. Calls for immediate and mass returns to Syria risk oversimplifying a deeply nuanced issue and ignoring the risks and challenges involved. Negotiating migration deals or readmission agreements with interim governments or non-state actors in Syria risks undermining the stabilisation efforts needed for sustainable returns. Exploiting institutional weaknesses to increase deportations is counterproductive, exacerbating instability and hampering long-term recovery. Rather than succumbing to short-term political pressures, it is essential to promote a more meaningful and informed debate on the feasibility and timing of returns. However, now is not the time for such discussions to be translated into action but for Germany to lead by example (as it did in accepting Syrians in 2015) and demonstrate how a balanced and forward-looking return migration policy can address immediate humanitarian concerns and long-term development goals.
Germany should harness the potential of the Syrian diaspora as a key contributor to the reconstruction and stabilisation of Syria. This includes supporting diaspora-led civil society organisations specialising in education, healthcare, human rights, governance and women's empowerment, as they can play a crucial role in Syria's transformation. To maximise their impact, Germany should invest in capacity-building programmes, facilitate resource mobilisation and ensure secure legal status for Syrians so that they can continue to engage as agents of inclusive development. Collaborative platforms linking diaspora organisations, German institutions, and international actors should also be developed to coordinate initiatives and align efforts with long-term stabilisation and reconstruction goals.
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